

# A New French Revolution?

*An integrative approach in the analysis of the Romanian transition*

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# SUMMARY

This thesis has focused on the Romanian transition. The critical period concerned was from March 1989, with apparent signs of liberalisation, to the 1990 elections. Romania differed from the East and Central European transitions and the background of these cases. The Integrative Approach provided the analytical framework for relations between relevant structural characteristics and the violent revolution. An examination of several levels of aggregation gave actors' preferences and the context of the transition, forming the basis for a game theoretic analysis. The issues justifying a transition questions and its proceedings were scrutinised. Selected theories in transitology were elaborated in light of these requirements. The study thus gave a methodological critique as well. The conclusions both gave insight into the forces that provoked the Romanian transition and illustrated how it was supervised. The observations provide contributions to generalisations on rational choices under transitions' structural constraints, if supplemented with similar theoretical approaches to other cases. The Romanian transition was incomparable to the French revolution.



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# CHAPTER 1: Introduction

## The purpose of the analysis

The Romanian transition involved violence and former communists were not only elected after the revolution but also re-elected a second time. Society was promised a peaceful and fair transition by the former nomenclaturists after Ceau°escu had been removed from power. As the nomenclaturists had secured sufficient power, however, they repressed the opposition. This thesis reveals how they supervised the process in order to seize power. Structural and actor-orientated research strategies aim at explaining when transitions take place and through which modes respectively. This analysis presents research traditions in transitology and elaborates on their ability to show when, why, and how transitions take place. None of them document satisfactorily the dynamics of interactions and the actors' strategies and preferences, which are important for explaining how these interactions are knitted to structures, giving implications for transitions. The research focus is motivated by the following quotation:

*“A revolution is something that changes the political system, while a coup d’etat only changes the political leaders, but maintains the political system” (Pasti 2000, Appendix).*

This definition overlooks the fact that the change of a political system in a revolution must open up for a qualitatively new rule. Pasti used this definition as a basis for comparison with the French revolution. According to his interpretation, the population seized power and then the leaders emerged from the crowds, representing the interests of the population. In Pasti's view, this is equivalent to the Romanian revolution.

“The leaders are not important in a revolution but the political system is important” (Pasti 2000: Appendix). This distinction is insufficient: In order to understand a revolution one should take heed of the change of structures and the change of leaders. Structures must be changed in order to have those of a democratic state introduced. The leaders who have an interest in preserving the privileges of the former regime must be removed in order to give new forces room for competition. This leads to the question of enquiry: How are the roles of the Romanian transition's leaders to be interpreted? Structures and interactions must be analysed in order to document the degree of unpredictability in the emergence of a leadership. For this purpose, hypotheses are given that examine such relations. Wood's understanding of a revolution is worthwhile:

*It is not that men's motives are unimportant; they indeed make events, including revolutions. But the purposes of men, especially in a revolution, are so numerous, so varied, and so contradictory that their complex interaction produces results that no one intended or could even foresee. (...) Historical explanation which does not account for these “forces”, which, in other words, relies on understanding the conscious intentions of the actors, will thus be limited” (Scocpol 1979: 18).*

The task is to elaborate whether no one really intended or could foresee the complex interactions by accounting for these forces. Scocpol's distinguishing between social and political revolutions sheds light on these forces behind revolutions. She understood social revolutions as follows: They are “rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below”. Political revolutions “transform state structures but not social structures, and they are not necessarily accomplished through class conflict” (Scocpol 1979: 4).

The analysis is based on an interpretation of classes as formed by dividing lines between those enjoying privileges from the non-democratic regime and those who do not. As a consequence, a change of power must necessarily involve an alteration of class structures. Elements of a social revolution must be included. As leaders belong to the class that receives privileges, they are important in the sense that they must open up for other classes if competition for power is to be fair.

Numerous studies and observations have documented the failed attempts at giving rules for political development. Like traditional approaches, this thesis will show firstly why the transition took place. Secondly, it scrutinises how it proceeded through the relevant actors' interactions. Alternative approaches to transitology and their conclusions are valued in light of their results. Generalising conclusions will not be provided. The results of this analysis, however, are comparable with analyses of transitions where similar theoretical approaches have been used and can thereby contribute to theory generation.

## **The design of the thesis**

Chapter Two examines the modernisation paradigm as represented by Lipset (Lipset 1959) and Huntington (Huntington 1968). Both gave theories aimed at predicting the timing of transitions. Lipset elaborated on economic development as an independent variable for democratisation and Huntington focused on the relations between economic development and institutions. Thereafter, Linz and Stepan's classification of different non-democratic regimes and their respective problems of democratic transition and consolidation associated with them are presented (Linz and Stepan 1996). Their theory did not belong to the modernisation paradigm. All these theories are criticised. The Integrative Approach (Ugelvik Larsen 2000) is presented as a synthesis. It includes the Funnel of Causality (Mahoney and Snyder 2000) that scrutinises the structural background of actors' interactions. Different levels of aggregation are included as well as each level's variance that the researcher regards as having had influence on the transition process. Variance reduction is extracted from each level through the path-dependent strategy. This methodology provides a framework for the transition and explains actors' backgrounds. Thus the analyst can identify preferences and strategies. The focus is on the transition process and not on the consolidation phase. The first elections are defined as the dividing line between these phases.

Game theory as a framework for analysing the transition process is presented in Chapter Three. Thus an integration of structural variables and action is provided. Rational actors act under uncertainty and try to attain their preferences through implicit or explicit use of threats. The works of Colomer (Colomer 1991), Karl and Schmitter (Karl and Schmitter 1991), Tsebelis (Tsebelis 1990), and Hovi and Rasch (Hovi and Rasch 1993) contribute to the theoretical framework.

Chapter Four applies the funnel strategy to Romanian history. Geo-political position is the first variable. It extracts the variance in state/nation building and Warsaw Pact position that is regarded to have influenced the other variables and the transition itself. Next is economic development. The third variable, degree of coherence in pre-democratic institutions, is orientated towards the meso-level in analysing the Romanian Communist Party, the Securitate and the army. These institutions were important for sustaining the communist regime. Changes in these institutions were crucial for the transition to occur and proceed. The civil society variable addresses the role of, or lack of, societal organisations. Aspiring leaders from the state institutions and society's dissidents are presented in the context that has been created. Elements of different research traditions in transitology are thus included. Their explanatory power is extracted. The chapter concludes by presenting hypotheses that shed light on the relation between the pre-transition regime, transition actors' preferences and the transition mode. The background to the transition has thus been shown before Chapter Five examines interactions in the transition process. The institutional changes that appear during the transition and

their implications for further development are explained narratively underway. Four decisive games are located. The games' actors involve the dictator and his supporters, conspirators against the leadership, and society including central dissidents.

The independent research conducted with the aim of providing information on proceedings and actors' preferences is detailed in the Appendix. A methodological discussion of their applicability is found in Chapter Four. Interviews were done with dissidents and first-hand information forms the basis for understanding their motivations. The "Letter of Six" was written by conspirators and is used to underpin my interpretations. The "Proclamation of Timisoara" in the same manner demonstrates the ideals underlying the social riots in the 1990 spring and thus sheds light on demonstrators' and dissidents' preferences and rationality. Finally, a transcript of the closed trial against the Ceausescus elaborates on their preferences as a supplement to other material. Ratesh's work also functioned as an important source (Ratesh 1991): As the former head of Radio Free Europe's Romanian Broadcasting Department, he interviewed many central actors, such as President Ion Iliescu and the ideologue of the National Salvation Front, Silviu Brucan. Together with an interview with Petre Roman by Der Spiegel, this compensates for first-hand information from these actors that proved unobtainable in this study.



# CHAPTER 2

## Introduction: definitions

This chapter offers selected structural and actor-orientated approaches to transitology. Linz and Stepan's (Linz and Stepan 1996) typology of non-democratic regimes and the transition and consolidation tasks associated with them are presented. Karl and Schmitter's (Karl and Schmitter 1991) actor-orientated approach is then examined. Thereafter, the chapter examines Przeworski and Limongi's (Przeworski and Limongi 1997) two interpretations of the correlation between economic development and democracy as presented by Lipset (Lipset 1959). Huntington's analysis (Huntington (1968), which focuses on the relations between social mobilisation and economic development, is also scrutinised. Finally, the Funnel of Causality (Mahoney and Snyder 2000) as part of the Integrative Approach (Ugelvik Larsen 2000) is introduced. The Integrative Approach provides transitology with a promising research strategy through the combination of its eclectic strategy and path-dependent methodology in the funnel, reducing variance through different levels of aggregation. Game theory explains actors' choices and accounts for the amount of variance that can not be explained by structure.

An effective definition of a transition is needed in order to specify the focus of this study. O'Donnell and Schmitter defined a transition rather broadly as "the interval between one regime and another". Transitions are delimited, on the one hand, by the launching of the processes of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other, by the installation of some form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). The analysis must distinguish between a successful and an unsuccessful transition if this definition is to be adopted. Transitions can be started with the aim of establishing a well-functioning democracy. The consolidation phase shows if it is successful or not. The stabilisation and maturation of an already existing democratic system takes place here. These two stages must be differentiated. The first one forms our focus. Altermark provided a broad definition of a transition:

*A transition is initiated when signs of liberalisation and relaxation start emerging in the authoritarian regime and accomplished when a democratic system of government has been established (in the case of success) or when there is an authoritarian backlash and the start of a new authoritarian regime (in the case of failure). We furthermore take transitions to consist of the parallel processes of liberalisation and democratisation that may include several possible modes (Altermark 1998: 11).*

Altermark's broad definition does not describe political and judicial bodies and their characteristics after a transition. These must be specified for an understanding of the requirements. Linz and Stepan defined a transition phase the following way:

*A democratic transition is complete when "sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative, and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure" (Linz and Stepan 1996: 3).*

Thus they regard a transition as completed after the first elections if these are regarded as free and fair. This is a narrow definition of a transition and it orients this study. It excludes the consolidation phase. Linz wrote that the main actors regard winning free elections as the only means to achieve power in a

consolidated democracy. “To put it simply, democracy must be seen as the only game in town” (Linz 1990: 38). This study defines a transition as the process that is initiated with signs of liberalisation and relaxation in the authoritarian regime and concluded with free elections that have produced a government. The behavioural elements in Linz’ theory are excluded. These are requirements for democratic consolidation.

The Integrative Perspective documents the actors’ goals through their behaviour during this process. The transition does not necessarily have to be a democratic transition.

## **Critique of theories on democratisation**

### **Non-democratic regimes**

Linz and Stepan considered different arenas that must be reformed in order to have a successful democratic consolidation. These include rule of law and civil society freedom, constitutional rules to allocate power democratically, state bureaucracy acceptable and serviceable to a democratic government, and sufficient autonomy for the economic actors to assure pluralism of civil, political, and economic society (Linz and Stepan 1996).

The leader has an exclusive position in the sultanistic regimes, as differentiated from the totalitarian and post-totalitarian ones. The establishment of law sovereignty is complicated in the political society sector where semi-private violence must be suppressed. This means that the organs used for performing violence at the orders of the despot must be abolished. At the same time a popular spirit of trust must be created. Although Linz and Stepan did not propose the establishment of a new constitution in this society, this point should also be considered. Whereas the Party manipulated it in the totalitarian and post-totalitarian societies, it has been used for the personal wishes of the dictator in the sultanist regime. The result is a constitution not at all suited for democracy.<sup>[1]</sup> In the bureaucratic structures, the role of the party has been replaced with clientelist structures, a culture that may survive the overthrow of the former regime. According to Linz and Stepan, even democratically elected leaders may be tempted to abolish these possibilities. These structures apply to civil, political and economic society as well.

Societal sectors are intervened in all the subtypes. This conclusion corresponds to Lipset’s hypothesis, to be elaborated below. Lipset’s hypothesis says that growth of the economy gives differentiation of civil and political society, in turn leading to constitutional and bureaucratic reforms and the rule of law (Lipset 1959). Linz and Stepan did not, however, support causality from economic variables on the likelihood of a democratic transition (Linz and Stepan 1996: 77). Combining economic development and democratisation processes and focusing on legitimacy was, on the other hand, considered effective. Economic trends are accepted as motivating regime protests and preferences for alternatives. In this way they gave the causal relations more complexity than Lipset did. If the regime termination is to come from below, legitimacy will be a necessary predictor variable.

### **Modernisation**

“Modernisation” can be understood as “transformation of civilisation economically (generally through industrialisation), politically, and socially (generally through secularisation)” (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 8, 216b). Different theorists offer alternative approaches to modernisation processes. Differentiation and specialisation, industrialisation, urbanisation, secularisation and individualisation are the relevant characteristics. Common is, however, the supposal that democratisation takes place at the final stage.

Lipset claimed that structural conflicts are weakened in a modern society. Such conditions facilitate



democratisation. The modern middle-class tackles multiple identities and cross-pressure better than “the traditional man”. On this basis, Lipset postulated a correlation between economic development and democratisation (Lipset 1959). His methodology has been debated with reference to the structure-actor discussion in social science. Przeworski and Limongi tested Lipset’s thesis. They excluded religion, colonial legacy, position in world system, income distribution, and diffusion from the analysis. Economic development was used as exclusive predictor variable. Their analysis classified 77 per cent of 4126 annual observations correctly on the likelihood that a regime is democratic by per capita income (Przeworski and Limongi 1997: 157). The probability that this classification is not generated by chance was .99. They provided alternative interpretations of their results, namely endogenous and exogenous. Their first explanation is an endogenous one stating what Lipset supposed; explicitly that economic development leads to democratisation. The material may, however, be used for an exogenous understanding, proposing that a democracy more easily survives in a country experiencing economic progress.

The endogenous interpretation of their results corresponds to modernisation theory. The underlying hypothesis states that economic development leads to regime differentiation and development of a civil society that will provide the foundations for a viable democracy. Modernisation theory, including Lipset’s results, has been criticised for ethnocentrism. O’Donnell attacked this tradition for implying that developing countries have to attain the economic levels of the Western world in order to have democratisation (Przeworski and Limongi 1997: 158). He did not support the necessity of reaching this level first. Therborn turned to the contextual variables surrounding the cases used by Lipset. European countries democratised as a result of the Second World War. The economic growth experienced in the aftermath is not documented as a causal variable for the democratic development after the war. As an example, he contended that the democratic transition in Spain may have been caused by the death of Franco, regardless of economic development (Przeworski and Limongi 1997: 158). On a global basis, the decline in the relative proportion of countries being democratic in the 1960s is to be understood more as a result of formations of new countries than of democracies ceasing.

Przeworski and Limongi’s results concluded that the chance of a regime to be democratic increases with an income level of up to USD 6000 per capita. This is a diachronic explanation. Dictatorships tend to be more stable above this level. Below the level of USD 1000, dictatorships survive or succeed one another. They are less stable between USD 1000 and USD 4000, becoming even more so above USD 4000. But the curve takes a turn at about USD 6000.

With regard to the synchrony question, the survivability of a democracy will increase with higher levels of development. With a per capita income below USD 1000, the probability of a democracy surviving one year is .875. Between USD 1000 and USD 2000 the chance is 0.9429. No threat to democracy exists at levels above USD 6055. Przeworski and Limongi concluded that income level per capita is at least a predictor of the stability of democracies. A dictatorship survives more easily in a less developed country. A democracy is more likely to cease as a result of economic crises in poor countries. Only when democracy has been established does development play a role. Their conclusions support the exogenous explanation.

Przeworski and Limongi’s next step was to check for alternative explanatory variables. They found that the level of education correlates with the percentage of states being democratic. The explanatory power of economic progress, however, survives regardless of the level of education, and it appears stronger (Przeworski and Limongi 1997: 166). Fundamental to the initial correlation is the fact that democracy is precarious in poor countries and secure in rich ones. The former ones are also vulnerable to economic crises. The conclusion was that economic crises initiate democratic collapse in poor countries. The political consequences appear almost immediately, usually one year later. Economic development as a predictor variable must be related to the initial situation of the country before this occurrence. The authors suggested an actor-orientated strategy for transition research because economic determination does not provide sufficient explanatory power.

Huntington focused on the relations between institutions and degree of stability (Huntington 1968). His approach is centred on the effectiveness of governments in both traditional and modern societies. He criticised Lipset for overlooking the relation between social mobilisation and economic development. Huntington's thesis says that social mobilisation without simultaneous economic development is unfavourable to democratisation processes. Mobilisation will imply social frustration when equivalent social mobility opportunities are not present. Furthermore, equivalent political institutionalisation is a premise for participation. Political instability may result if these requirements are not fulfilled. Lipset is evaluated on a methodological basis that also applies to Huntington. Data reliability presents methodological problems to their approaches. Leaders of totalitarian regimes manipulate statistics on economic development. Lipset's focus on economic development as a sole independent variable thereby results in systematic errors. Alternative statistical material is not at hand that counters the data used by Lipset. This unavailability should, however, serve as sufficient proof: Alternative sources of information are repressed. The thesis cannot be evaluated reliably. Huntington's critique of Lipset can be interpreted as a normative approach to how democratisation should best proceed. His conclusions must necessarily be based on empirical observation. A test of Lipset's thesis would, however, require data of a more precise nature. The critique applies to both approaches but implies graver methodological concern on the part of Lipset.

Linz and Stepan did not state when a transition takes place, as attempted by the modernisation paradigm. Neither Lipset nor Huntington analysed the dynamics of the transition itself. Linz and Stepan did however attempt to include external variables in the analysis. These take the form of diffusion or "Zeitgeist". Waning support from a foreign hegemon or patron may de-legitimise the regime if the population is informed about it. Popular tolerance may be weakened if regimes, which the population identifies with, experience changes. The international decline of the totalitarian utopia may further reduce the official agenda of the country's government to pure self-interest, as perceived by the population.

## **Transition tasks**

The economic development variable neither explains when democratic transitions take place nor describes the complexity of variables associated with them. The comparative qualitative approach, on the other hand, enables the researcher to demonstrate the specific characteristics of each case independently. By focusing on the particular case, the ability to explain anomalies, phenomena not fitting the relevant theory, is intended. Linz and Stepan stated that their approach to democratic transitions provides a synthesis of structural and actor-based approaches. They divided non-democratic regimes into authoritarian, totalitarian, post-totalitarian and sultanist ones. These regimes are categorised according to the degree of pluralism and mobilisation, type of official ideology and leadership (Linz and Stepan 1996).

The communist party is the power centre and provides the country with the official ideology in the totalitarian and post-totalitarian regimes. Post-totalitarian societies may enjoy more political, social, and economic freedom in the form of parallel structures than the totalitarian ones. A commitment to ideology as forestalling utopia is weakened as a society evolves from the totalitarian to the post-totalitarian characteristics. A shift towards programmatic consensus based upon limited debate indicates the declining role of ideology. In the post-totalitarian regime, a lack of interest from leaders and non-leaders alike distances it from the totalitarian variant. Success in the party organisation provides the only means of gaining economic or career advantages. This requirement is less stringent as the country has been liberalised into a post-totalitarian regime.

No parallel society exists in the sultanistic regime. There is no rule of law and low institutionalisation. The sultanistic regime has undergone a development where these powers have been transferred to the leader in persona. Mobilisation for the party has also been exchanged with official support for the

leader, and communist ideology replaced by worship of him. This ceremonial variant is the only mobilisation that is not repressed by para-state groups. Glorification of the ruler through manipulation of symbols provides the sole basis of what can hardly be termed an ideological orientation. Compliance with him is based on intense fear and rewards. Nomenclaturists' positions derive solely from their personal ties with him. His leadership is one of great unpredictability within undefined limits. An authoritarian regime differentiates primarily through its lack of any official ideology and by having no extensive political mobilisation<sup>[2]</sup> (Linz and Stepan 1996: 44).

The country's institutional background, measured according to these variables, is decisive for the available transition paths. According to Linz and Stepan, *reforma-pactada*, *ruptura-pactada* is only available to the post-totalitarian regime type as in this variant a moderate party wing and moderate opposition groups can negotiate. In both the totalitarian and the sultanistic subtypes, the strict ruling authorities of the party in the first subtype and of the despot in the second one give no room for a negotiated transition (Linz and Stepan 1996: 57).

Post-totalitarian and sultanistic regimes may experience interim governments after a collapse not initiated by the regime. The new leadership may consist of members of the old party nomenclature who seek the securing of benefits for themselves. In a former sultanistic regime the groups that used to be close to the sultan will claim legitimacy. According to Linz and Stepan, the best chances for a transition to democracy in this case occurs if internationally supported, democratically inclined leaders supervise the process.

This transition path is unlikely in a totalitarian regime, according to Linz and Stepan, given the lack of an opposition in the repressed civil society. However, a deep crisis could lead to the rulers introducing elections, but the chance that they are free is small.

A totalitarian regime could split, which would probably lead either to the continuation of the existing structures or to post-totalitarianism. If a dictator were dependent upon a foreign patron, the withdrawal of his support would raise the domestic costs of repression. This also applies to the post-totalitarian regimes, but here it might lead to democratic elections. In the sultanistic regime the withdrawal of external support might end up with the patron arranging elections that he wants to control. The chance of a democratic transition relies upon the dependency relationships to the patron and his democratic allegiances. If the sultan dies, however, family members will probably take power.

*Reforma-pactada*, *ruptura-pactada*, or the rule by an interim government after regime termination not initiated by the regime, is possible in authoritarian regimes because of the probable existence of a civil society that can participate. Extrication from rule led by a hierarchically organised military is possible but the task is made easier if the military is not hierarchically organised. A civilian-led extrication presents the transition mode that is most likely to lead to a democratic transition.

Linz and Stepan have not achieved close identification with preferences and strategies of actors in their study of democratic transitions. They distance themselves from the structural approaches for which Lipset and Huntington are representatives. Their analysis relies, however, on institutions and does not examine the role of the particular actors involved.

Rostow criticised the structural approaches as being one-sided (Rostow 1970). Lipset's thesis, according to Rostow, did not prove that the correlation between economic development and democratisation was based on causal relations. Even in the case of causation, it is not proved if and how these causal links form individual action. The question should therefore not be how a democratic system emerges, but how a democracy, assumed to be already in existence, can best enhance its health and stability. One needs to operate with a non-deterministic causality. Secret plotting and armed revolt initiate a military regime, while its functioning is based upon massive publicity and an alliance with civilian supporters. Similarly, Weberian-type charismatic leaders gain power by performing apparent miracles, but hold on to it by routinisation. That is why the structural theories by Lipset and Almond and Verba (Almond and Verba 1963) did not manage to shed light upon the question of why democracy emerges in the first place, according to Rostow. Hence a genetic and causal theory is

necessary instead of the functional ones (Rustow 1970: 339). This suggestion provides a starting point for the Integrative Approach.

Karl and Schmitter offered a voluntarist approach to the transitional setting<sup>[3]</sup> (Karl and Schmitter 1991). Their starting point was the fact that regimes change from autocracy by a variety of modes. These modes can be specified and clustered into a number of “modes of transition”. They used inductive observation as a basis for their conclusions. The intention is to show that shifting alliances and strategic choices characteristic of the transition modes decide the outcome. Karl and Schmitter’s approach is illustrated by the following:

*Transitions are “produced” by actors who choose strategies that lead to change from one kind of regime to another. (...) they may be constrained by the choices available to them by prevailing social, economic and political structures and the interaction of strategies may often result in outcomes that no one initially preferred, but nevertheless we believe that actors and strategies define the basic property space within which transitions can occur and the specific combination of the two defines which type of transition has occurred (Karl and Schmitter 1991: 274).*

On the basis of this approach, Karl and Schmitter analysed transitions with reference to two dimensions: The first one was unilateral recourse to force versus multilateral willingness to compromise. The second dimension showed the degree to which the transition was “from above” or “from below”. Ideal types of transition modes thus appeared in the forms of pact, imposition, reform, and revolution. Pacts and impositions take place from above. Reforms and revolutions are led from below. Pacts and reforms in turn involve high degrees of multilateral compromise whereas impositions and revolutions are characterised by unilateral force. Mixed variants were to be situated in between. Karl and Schmitter offered too loose a connection between structure and action. They merely concluded that action may be constrained by structure. This is insufficient for understanding the available strategies and preferences available to the actors as bound by structure. Karl and Schmitter did not analyse structural background and could for this reason not analyse actors’ strategies and preferences, that must be understood in context. Their approach could additionally not show the contents of threats, interactions or alliances. Their classifications offered systematisation but not show the complexities of transitions. They gave classifications of transitions but did not answer how these proceed.


## **The synthesis: The Integrative Approach**

### **The Funnel of Causality**

This thesis examines the Funnel of Causality as presented by Mahoney and Snyder (Mahoney and Snyder 2000) and Ugelvik Larsen (Ugelvik Larsen 2000) and combines structure and actor perspectives. The funnel strategy integrates several levels of analysis simultaneously. A path-dependent strategy connects agents’ choices in the event that shall be explained with historical-structural factors. Mahoney and Snyder Mahoney defined this strategy as the search for “critical junctures when actors created enduring structures that shaped future trajectories of political change” (Mahoney and Snyder 2000: 190). This interpretation was based on the assumption that history “binds”. The analyst should firstly not treat junctures as pre-determined themselves but as outcomes of choice and contingency. Secondly, he should show how these junctures had effects on the change itself. All variables that the researcher would regard to possibly have had any influence should be included.

The following theoretical example is conceived: A first funnel variable is called a, the second one b, and the third one c. We first extract Variable a’s causal effects on variables further down the funnel.

This amount of variance will limit Variable b's room for influence. The same reduction method is also applied to b. The sum of variance in variables a and b that can be regarded to have had influence allows for relevant variance of Variable c to be brought into the analysis. The funnel logic follows this strategy for all its variables. Through this process vectors are identified that have forces and directions leading towards a certain transition mode. The force of each vector illustrates its relative intensity. Its direction shows the type of outcome that it favours. Outcomes are defined by summing up forces and direction of the variables (Mahoney and Snyder 2000: 198). Each level thus explains a certain amount of variance. The rest of its causal effects are left unexplained. The funnel's narrowing form shows this process. Variables can affect outcomes autonomously, but do most often so through other levels situated at lower levels of analysis. The analyst decides which variables are considered relevant for the funnel. None are included in a determined or concrete manner. A historical variable may in some cases have been important for the outcome, sometimes a political party, and sometimes a leader was important. These circumstances vary between cases. This is why the Funnel of Causality does not give a general, "Grand Theory", but offers a framework organised differently for each regime. It is to be used as a heuristic tool. The case decides the variables to be included.



**Figure 1: The Integrative Perspective (Ugelvik Larsen 2000: 432)**

The analyst reasons according to Mahoney and Snyder vertically and progressively down the funnel. Co-variation is one directional. The ordering of the variables refers to levels of aggregation. The macro-structural variable is situated at the mouth of the funnel because it presents the highest aggregate level. Variety in possible outcomes is the broadest at this level. As the analyst progresses down the funnel, variance is depleted and the range of possible outcomes diminishes. The relevant causation in each variable is this way viewed as necessary but not sufficient.

This thesis' framework does not follow the strict one-directional causation lined out by Mahoney and Snyder. Variables' impacts may have different values at different stages in absolute time and thus imply varying effects on other variables and on the event to be explained itself. It for instance institutional characteristics change fundamentally, this could have impacts on the economy. Likewise, connections exist between institutions and civil society: A totalitarian regime may limit civil society's extension and role. This could in turn imply less societal pressure for institutional change in the form of such organisations' bargaining procedures. Society could however organise by using other means

and the institutions would need to adapt to such changes. Mahoney and Snyder's approach is thus used with modifications: Where important co-variation can be traced in the opposite direction so that it has changed preceding variables and this has meant implications for the outcome, we will include these circumstances in the analysis. The funnel explains the background to the first game. During this game the institutions are however changed. This could propose the introduction of a new funnel in order to analyse the new structural context before the next game. That option could however endanger the theory's parsimony. Instead, a solution is to describe the changes narratively as changes in game rules. The funnel still gives the same background for the actors' preferences. Contextual changes are explained and thus the funnel is updated.

Variables included are specific for this particular study. The first task is to situate the regime under scrutiny in a geographical and historical context, which is the macro-structural variable. A country may for instance belong or have belonged to the capitalist world, the post-communist block, the Middle East or the Confucian world. If such belonging can be considered as having influenced the outcome, the exact characteristics of such cultures that are relevant are included.[\[4\]](#)

Economic development is the second variable, following Lipset's theory (Lipset 1959). This analysis does however question its methodology. Leaders manipulate statistics on economic development in totalitarian and sultanistic regimes. This problem also applies to the pluralisation that shall come from economic development: Data are unreliable. A solution is to use impressions gained from interviews and qualitative evaluations of the country's material situation and degree of distribution. Conclusions must be based on a sufficient number of independent sources and critically valued. Lipset's thesis or modified versions of it cannot be tested accurately.

The funnel's third variable concerns institutional development. Institutions are closely connected to economic development. Causal relationships may go both ways. Degree of institutionalisation as given by Huntington (Huntington 1968) provides a variable that can influence a transition. The theory is for this analysis' purpose applied to causal relations between institutions that are meant to support the dictatorship and the dictatorship's survival, this way different from Huntington's original version. Less institutionalisation means that the units necessary for supporting the leadership are weakened. The funnel explains institutional development and the institutional setting for the transition, thereby the framework for the actors and available transition modes.

The civil society variable shows society's ability to organise for common goals within the framework given by the preceding variables. Civil society appears in different extensions and with different goals. Civil society characteristics influence the leadership's relative power and society's influence. Civil society characteristics influence available transition modes. Organisations as necessary ingredients can for example not participate in pacts if the regime has repressed civil society.

The last funnel variable is the leadership level, which examines both regime leaders and society's dissidents. It includes both those understood as potential leaders by society and those having resources to realise such ambitions. This variable is closely connected to the civil society variable. These leaders may represent organisations. If civil society is weak, they will necessarily enjoy more attention as representatives of value systems and societal interests. At the leadership level the analysis has reached the lowest aggregation level and the range of possible outcomes is the narrowest.

The left part of the funnel contains the structural variables and the right part the voluntarist ones.

Transition games are situated at the spout of the funnel. Different games ideally appear as determined by the preference orders of the involved actors. Karl and Schmitter concluded that structures cannot be understood as separated from action because somebody must simply have created the structures (Altermark 1998: 14). O'Donnell and Schmitter assumed that during transitions "those (structural) mediations are looser and their impacts more indeterminate than in normal circumstances". Transitions involve structural factors that are temporally more relaxed (Mahoney and Snyder 2000: 181). That definition is however too imprecise for this analysis. It lacks a definition of the relation between structure and action for the transition process. According to Giddens, actors take the country's situation

into consideration when planning their moves. They perform "reflexive monitoring of action", a process that he understood as "action under the impacts of structures in civil society, while at the same time action has consequences for the surrounding civil society". This "duality of structure" implies action according to structure and reinforcement of structure (Ugelvik Larsen 2000: 437).

The Integrative Approach knits game theory to the context and to the explanation of actors' preferences under the assumption of rational behaviour (Ugelvik Larsen 2000: 439). The analyst uses retrospective induction to find the path from where the actors deduced their arguments for legitimate behaviour in the given event. Altermark understood actors as trying to "understand the structures around them, maximising the possibility of realising their goals and preferences in the actual situation, within the actual structural boundaries" (Altermark 1998: 111). Action is influenced by structure and structure is empty without drawn upon and brought into life by agency.

The funnel is parsimonious. It combines agency and structure in a synthetic way and shows how the interplay of agency and structure leads to games that in turn determine the outcome. Agency is not a result of the other variables but something with its own logic and origin, and as such not over-determined and over-socialised. Game theory systemises and analyses the variance available at this point and determines the available preference orders for involved actors and transition modes given by the funnel variables. The democratisation process itself is analysed in the form of several games. At this stage, it shows how historical variables constrain the availability of moves for the involved actors in the regime leadership and, if available, in civil society. As variance is reduced, the researcher will necessarily have to consider for which persons or groups they are important at all. For instance, changes in socio-economic structures will not necessarily affect all societal groups. Decline in economic prosperity in a given society might, for example, not reduce the advantages of belonging to the army, the Party apparatus or the secret service, but affect large population groups and vice versa. Likewise, institutional characteristics, civil society characteristics and changes must be knitted to the groups or persons for whom they are of relevance.

An important challenge lies in deciding the direction and intensity of each variable influence on the actors' preferences. The outcomes of the different games outlined by Colomer (Colomer 1991) and their strong dependence on the classification of the involved groups leads us to the question of whether the theory implies over-socialisation. A danger lies in placing too strict a dependence of outcomes on preferences formed by structure. Discrepancy can be documented when the actual game results are not equivalent to the equilibria of the game matrixes concerned. Such results facilitate judgement of the variables' relevance, strength, and direction.

The funnel includes two concepts of time: Conventional and relative. The decision must be taken on when the former regime de facto loses power. This time point is zero in the sense of "relative time". The pretext and aftermath are measured by the use of the same scale as in conventional time. Relative time is used in order to shed light upon the ordering of variables and their relative distances. This is necessary for judging vectors' relative forces. The transition context analysis must be open for taking influences from the outside world into concern, analysed as diffusion or "Zeitgeist".<sup>[5]</sup> Different regimes provide different contexts and a variable may have different causal effects. This consideration also applies to diffusion. These concerns are part of Ragin's critique of quantitative analysis where variables give additive effects, for example, in regression analyses. In cases sharing similar structural characteristics, values of dependent variables may as well have been caused by these characteristics as by diffusion. Dissimilar structures may provide for alternative causal effects of diffusion (Ragin 1987). Ragin divided between conjunctural and multiple causation (Ragin 1994). Conjunctural causation meant a certain combination of values of variables that gives a certain outcome. Plural causation is defined as the possibility that more than one specific combination of values of structural variables result in a certain outcome. The Integrative Perspective does not solve these problems. It is based on actors that through socialisation gain values that influence their preferences. The actors are situated in particular contexts. They may not even have considered which values of particular variables made



them act as they did. The focus is on the fact that the structures limit their available choices. The Integrative Approach uses subjective evaluations of actors who “make” transitions as primary explanatory variable. Those structural variables that the researcher regards to have influence are included and they are connected directly to game theory by forming the preferences of actors. The Integrative Approach leaves a conception of rational action and free choice among different alternatives created by structural factors. The temporal focus of the structural and voluntarist approaches are combined: The former would pay attention to phenomena stretching far behind in time as sole explanatory variable and the latter would limit the analysis to interactions occurring in the transition phase itself. The game theoretic approach uses structural variables for deciding actors’ preferences and temporally proximate causes for deciding the game rules. Table 1 summarises central methodological divisions between structuralism and voluntarism (Mahoney and Snyder 2000: 187):

Integrative Approach		
Theoretical Component	Structural Approach	Voluntarist Approach
Primary Explanatory Variable	Objective Conditions	Subjective States of Actors
Use of Comparison	Nomothetic	Idiographic
Temporal Focus	Temporally Remote Causes	Temporally Proximate Causes
Level of Analysis	Macro Level	Micro Level

**Table 1: The Integrative Approach: Combining structuralism and voluntarism**

Concerning comparison is the ideographic method sensitive to characteristics of the particular case whereas the nomothetic strategy strives for generalisations. According to Mahoney and Snyder will the Integrative Approach be closer to the former one. Unexpected outcomes may appear that underline the exclusive character of each case and weaken the potential for comparison (Mahoney and Snyder 2000: 187). Separate case studies facilitate comparison of structures and moves taken in similar or dissimilar situations. This way the Integrative Approach enables qualitative comparison. Relations between structures and choices taken in different cases enable conclusions on rational action in different settings.

The structuralists refer to the macro-level the voluntarists to the micro-level. The Funnel of Causality combines these approaches. The variables are chosen with the intention to include all levels, from which the important elements are extracted. In the end social groups and leadership are involved in the transition itself (Mahoney and Snyder 2000: 189). These respond to our “civil society” and “aspiring nomenclaturists and dissidents” variables. The actors whose interaction will be analysed are thus rooted in structure.

## Conclusions

Methodological insufficiencies in structuralism generally and in modernisation theory specially have been located and the lack of a link between structural backgrounds and transitions has been criticised. These theories do not analyse the transition complexities themselves. Karl and Schmitter, on the other hand, provided an actor-orientated strategy that is insufficient. They did not show how a transition necessarily involves characteristics from different modes. They did see that actors may be constrained by structure but did not show how. The Integrative Approach is a possible solution that combines structure and action. The Funnel of Causality shows variance reduction in structural variables. The funnel gives the actors’ preferences and it documents the transition’s context. The Integrative



Perspective's second part, game theory, provides the analysis of the actors' moves and the interactions between them. Chapter Three presents the game theoretic framework.

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- [1] A totalitarian regime's constitution must be rewritten. This process may be complicated by an inchoate political society, where the communist party had exclusive dominance. The party may be re-created, but shall have no predominance. This applies to civil society, for the role of laws, for the bureaucracy and for the economic structures as well. In a post-totalitarian society, the needed reforms apply to the same sectors. Since the Party did not to the same degree infiltrate as is the case in the totalitarian counterpart, the reform tasks may not be that complicated. Nevertheless, the opposition lacks skills and needs time to evolve. The bureaucratic structures have also in this variant been dominated by the former party nomenclature, a factor that gives them advantages over the opposition.
  - [2] Pluralism in the economy and in social life might be quite extensive and room for semi-opposition could exist. Power could be vested in one leader or in a group. The constraints of their actions are ill defined but somewhat predictable.
  - [3] The structuralist – voluntarist debate goes back to Durkheim and Weber (Collins 1994). Structuralists understood structures as “forces that generate actors' interests and directly define their behaviour” (Mahoney and Snyder 1994: 4). Social groups and classes were used as primary explanatory variables. Historical watersheds were interpreted as creating institutions. Structures were thus given ontological primacy. The main explanatory variables were found at the context level. The problematic task in this approach is to prove *how* structures define action.
  - [4] The fall of the Berlin Wall may have influenced the end of apartheid in South Africa; developments in Hungary were however stronger influenced by it.
  - [5] Karvonen understood diffusion as “social properties (that) spread from one society to another, instead of being created autonomously in each society”. He defined “Zeitgeist” as “current streams of thought in a particular area at a particular time point”. This definition does not imply a causal effect from one particular case to another. “Zeitgeist” may cause divergent effects in different cases, owing to context specifics (Karvonen 1994).
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# CHAPTER 3

## Introduction

This chapter presents the method for analysing interactions in the transition process. Game theory is used for combining funnel structures with actors' preferences and the analysis of transition dynamics. A methodological framework for understanding the Romanian transition will thus be provided through a selection of this theory's aspects. Colomer's (Colomer 1991) and Karl and Schmitter's (Karl and Schmitter 1991) conclusions on the implications of the transition modes for democratisation are discussed. Game theory is presented as an analytic tool. The main theoretical orientations are the works of Tsebelis (Tsebelis 1990), Hovi and Rasch (Hovi and Rasch 1993) and Gates and Humes (Gates and Humes 1997). The presentation shows how actors experience complex contexts and rationally interpret information. On the bases of their understandings and evaluations of counter-players' situations, they pose threats in order to have their preferences realised.

## The voluntarist approach

Agreed reform within the ruling block, controlled opening to the opposition, and sudden collapse of the authoritarian regime present Colomer's three variants of transitions by agreement. "Transitions by agreement" means that no violence was involved: The process developed peacefully. The first transition mode is decided by the regime leaders without involving a potential opposition or other societal groups in an agreed reform within the ruling block. In the second case, case of a controlled opening to the opposition, opposition groups themselves are involved in the decisions on how the transition is to proceed. The third ideal type is the rupture that abandons the institutions of the former regime and initiates a process without restrictions in the direction of establishing a democracy as well as market economy (Colomer 1991: 1284). The round table discussions in Central and Eastern Europe exemplify the second type: The rulers secured for themselves proportions of seats and established premises for the transitions. Thus, they could strongly influence the new laws and decide when to hold elections under election laws through which they were secured certain proportions of the parliamentary seats. This meant longer transition processes because the former rulers could keep some degree of influence.

Transitions by agreement implies a certain control of the direction of the transition. This is not the case in revolution. According to Colomer, this sub-type generally leads to a limited democracy, including constraints on the activity of certain parties and an electoral system that deviates representation to the favour of the former leaders. There will be a continuity of certain institutions. By controlling and establishing the premises, the authoritarians can demand amnesty and avoid being persecuted for human rights violations as a premise for accepting the process. When the transition is from a socialist system, the nomenclature will stay in control of a certain part of the productive apparatus.

Basing their conclusions on an inductive strategy, Karl and Schmitter construed merely that imposed and reformist transitions may or may not give democratisation (Karl and Schmitter 1991: 280). They concluded that a revolution is the transition mode least likely to give democratisation. A pact implies the best preconditions and an imposition has a middle position. They referred to the following characteristics for explaining the advantages of a pact: First, all relevant political actors are included in the process. Second, the processes in which they are included are mutually dependent. Third, these

processes emphasise rulemaking and a bargaining culture that, in turn, are requisites of a healthy democratic culture. Fourth, and negatively, a pact will secure the survivability of traditionally dominant classes. These classes will try to weaken the possibilities for other actors to participate. A transition from below, as a reform or a revolution, means loss of control of the transition process. Most problematic are the cases where transition modes are mixed.

“Agreed reform within the ruling block” and “controlled opening to the opposition” by Colomer can be compared as sub-types of transitions by agreement. A revolution resembles Colomer’s rupture. Karl and Schmitter observed that these have “only rarely evolved into patterns of fair competition, unrestricted contestation, tolerance for rotation in power and free associability”. Where authoritarian regimes have been removed by force and replaced with an elite representing the masses, emergence of a democratic regime is only rarely the result. On the other hand, regime-led transitions more often resulted in democracy, with the agreed reform within the ruling block more often successful, to use the terms of Colomer.

Three types of transitions have been presented. Most cases involve characteristics of more than one. A transition and its power relations may also change underway as a result of unforeseen incidents or actors changing preferences and/or strategies. The actors depend on credible threats for achieving an agreed-upon reform. If the opposition does not possess credible threats, the transition path might be changed, depending on the actors’ preferences.

Colomer’s approach to game theory provides for voluntarism in the Integrative Perspective. The actors participate in games with preferences formed by funnel variables. The games are found at the spout of the funnel.

## Game theory

Tsebelis defined a game as “a triplet composed of a set of players, a set of strategies for each player, and a set of payoffs for each player” (Tsebelis 1990: 93). The payoffs were understood as functions of the strategies each player selected. In turn, these strategies depended on available moves and on information available before each move. Tsebelis defined rules of the game as the set of players, the set of permissible moves, the sequence of these moves, and the information available before each move is made. It was characterised as a two-person game or an n-person game. The latter one includes three or more players. According to Hovi and Rasch, a player was an actor who could make decisions. He could be understood, for instance, as an individual, an enterprise or a state (Hovi and Rasch 1993: 37).

Game theory’s methodology lies in the formulation of purpose and making a reductionist move (Tsebelis 1990: 39): Through the statement of purpose, the scientist uses decision theory or game theory to arrive at the same results as was the case in the game. Through mathematical formulae for rational action he constructs a game as being composed of a set of players and a set of strategies for each player that are associated with payoffs (Tsebelis 1998: 93). The payoffs are functions of the selected strategies and result from interactions with other players. Technically speaking, the strategies depend on the available sets of moves, on the sequencing of these moves and on the information available before each move. The outcomes are explained as results of optimal choices of actors in given situations. He describes the relevant institutions and the context, thereby enabling the reader to identify with the players. He will conclude on whether their acts were rational or not, given these actors’ preferences (Tsebelis 1990: 44).

Utilitarian rationality forms the basis. Essentially, the reader does not need to share the values and rationality of the actor in order to understand his moves. The actors interact by posing implicit or explicit threats. Hovi defines a threat as “a random statement that signals an intention to hurt somebody either physically, economically or in another way if the threatened party does not act according to the wishes of the threatening party.” Damage can be done to the threatened or to a third party. A player

needs effective threats in order to have the counter-player adhering to his wishes, stated implicitly or explicitly. Effectiveness behind the threat depends on the instigator's understanding of the threatened party's situation. He must be able to identify with the threatened party's reaction. The threatened party's understanding of the process decides if the contents of the threats will be understood and is thus a requisite for the threat to be effective. Using Elster's terms, it will reflect if he answers to the "thick theory of rationality" or "the thin theory of rationality" (Hovi and Rasch 1993: 23).

For the threat to be effective, five conditions must be fulfilled: Firstly, it must be relevant. Relevance allows the one threatened to change his acts according to the threatener's desires. The threatened party must also have the incentive to act defiantly to the threatener's desires. Secondly, the threat must be sufficiently severe for the threatened party to prefer changing his actions according to the demands of the threatener instead of acting contrarily.<sup>[6]</sup> Thirdly, the threat must be credible. This means that the threatened party really believes that the threat will be carried out if he does not adhere to the demand. The fourth requirement is that the threat must be complete. The threatened party must believe that the threat will not be carried out if he fulfils the requirements. Finally, the threat must be sufficiently clear for misunderstandings not to arise. If not clear, the threatened party might suffer unexpected punishment by not acting in accordance with the threat. Alternatively, he might also as a result of misunderstandings act as preferred by the threatener, but in this case his behaviour would not result from the threat (Hovi 1998: 13).

Game theory has been criticised from an epistemological position for involving symmetry between explanation and prediction. According to Tsebelis, game theory would be scientific by predicting outcomes even if it could not explain why the particular outcomes occur. This statement may involve problems for transition studies: Different phenomena are analysed as cases-studies and one cannot sort out which characteristics are unique and which are common to other cases. The ability to explain how one actual outcome occurred does not necessarily give generalisation possibilities for transitology. The Integrative Approach demonstrates a case's characteristics. Actors' choices depend on preferences formed by structure and more or less chaotic transition settings. This applies to game theory in general and not only in connection with transitology. Several case studies enable qualified statements to be made on the probabilities of different outcomes. Accumulated knowledge enables predictions. Searching for rationality is a scientific process. It forces the analyst to look for information that might be overlooked in other types of analysis. This accumulation of knowledge is thereby in itself a scientific process. Comparison of cases may thereafter give an overview of similarities and differences. It may give new, interesting perspectives on transition processes, to be exemplified by this analysis. Through experience, the researcher may improve his qualifications as he learns to explore essential features in a process.

## **Sequential games**


A static game means that none of the players can react to other players' moves. The players cannot use strategies and the moves taken are expressions of their preferences. The outcome is a Nash-equilibrium if information is complete: No player has an incentive to change his choices (Gates and Humes 1997: 3). If information is incomplete, the outcome is a Bayesian Nash-equilibrium. Static games can be displayed on normal form as matrices.

In a sequential game, on the other hand, the players follow strategies as plans for prescribing actions in different situations. They imagine the choices that will be made by any counter-player through "backwards induction": A player thus starts with what he supposes will be the ultimate move in the process as a whole, and goes back step by step to the first move. He may try to persuade the other player(s) to perform acts that will serve him optimal payoffs. In order to enforce them he needs credible threats.

## Incomplete information

The analyst must know counter-players' available information in order to understand the rationality behind their moves. A game has got complete information if the players' strategies and preferences are common knowledge, meaning that all parties know them and all parties know that everybody knows them, and so on. In a dynamic game, the outcome will be a sub-game perfect equilibrium: The players know each other's preferences and calculate outcomes according to these. The move taken by the initiator of the game decides which sub-game is being played. Incomplete information is the case in all other games (Hovi and Rasch 1993: 40). In the case of insufficient information, player A moving first will provide player B with sufficient information so that A makes the move that best serves his interests without relying on uncertainty. Tsebelis' definition of a sub game is a "game between two or more players that can be completely isolated from the games around it and can be solved (that is, the equilibria can be computed) on its own" (Tsebelis 1990: 55).

Nature is introduced as a technical tool to decide between possible sub-games when information is incomplete. "Nature" may be a technical description of such varying contents as, for example, nature in a biological sense or a number of individual acts understood through the aggregated level. One or more elements of the rules are unavailable to one or more players. He must decide his strategies by considering sets of rules specific for each sub-game.



**Figure 2: A game of incomplete information on extensive form. Nature decides if the left-hand or the right-hand sub-game is played. Player y moves first and Player x may or may not have information on Player y's choice.**

Every "junction" in Figure 2's game tree forestalls a choice and is called a node. The left-hand and right-hand sub-games display different game rules. The players calculate on the chances of each of the sub-games responding to reality and make their choices according to such considerations. For the technical analysis, "nature" is here introduced to display this uncertainty. Exactly how each player calculates on nature's values must be demonstrated. Which sub-game responds to reality can also be subject to unpredictability. In all situations, each player prepares a strategy that consists of particular choices at the nodes, serving him the best possible payoff. If nature chooses L, the left-hand sub-game will be played. If nature chooses R, the right-hand sub-game will be played.

Nature may be an expression of an aggregate. Each of the members of the aggregate may be rational. The sum of the individuals' acts, however, may be or not be predictable. Accordingly, the counter-

player or all players in the game may be unable to predict nature's choice.<sup>[7]</sup> If the analysis of the game takes place simultaneously with the game itself, the observer will use his information and analytical skills to try to predict the characters of the leaders. If the analysis is conducted afterwards, however, he will have additional information on their "soft" or "hard" profile. The analyst must not confuse his available information with what the actors have access to.

The initiator of the game may also be involved in other games in addition to this one. Players y and x do not know his situation in the other game(s). A sub-optimal choice in this particular game might serve his interests.

Players y and x must take both sub-games into consideration and base their moves on the possible outcomes. Player x, in this example, may have sufficient information because he knows the moves made by nature and Player y. Player y may lack such information. However, if he knows Player x's preferences and knows that he is rational, he can calculate the move that Player x will make after Player y himself has made his choice. Through "backwards induction", Player y, in this case, can predict each sub-game's outcomes: Given his own choices, he knows which move Player x will make. If Player x knows Player y's preferences, he can also use backwards induction to predict the outcome of each sub-game.

The foregoing version is a simplified one. Both player y and player x may be involved in other games. The other players may or may not have information on their preferences in these particular games due to these circumstances. Player y or Player x may also be expressions of aggregates. The choices made can also reflect the player's characteristics as an optimist or pessimist or his willingness to gamble. As elaborated in Chapter Three, the player's dimension of pessimism - optimism may not be available to the observer. It depends not only on his knowledge of the players but also on other aspects of the game rules that may or may not be accessible. If the analyst knows which information was available to the players, he can judge whether their moves were rational or not.

## **Contingent strategies**

Contingent strategies are at hand if the players communicate; if they write a contract in advance; or if they interact as reiterated games (Tsebelis 1990: 69). The outcome can be negotiated through communication. In this case, a contract must be founded on the basis of mutual threats. If the interaction is repeated, experience is used to update impressions of the counter-player's preferences and/or strategies. Iterated games can generate correlated strategies. According to Tsebelis, if the players know that the number of games to be played is finite, they will make choices that for the process as a whole secure them maximal payoffs.

Written contracts prescribing mutual co-operation using the prisoners' dilemma will not, according to Rasch and Hovi, give contingent strategies: Departing from the contract for a single round, as isolated, would secure a better payoff for the player who leaves the agreement and a worse payoff for his counterplayer. Backwards induction shows that in the case where Player One breaks with this agreement in the last round, this could serve him a better payoff. Player Two would not have the possibility to punish him. As both players understand each other as rational, they will expect the other one to follow this line of thought. The implication is that both know there will be no co-operation in the last round and thus choose defection in the penultimate round. Consequences of departing from the contract would not be relevant, since mutual defection would occur in the last game anyway. This logic must be extended and includes in the end also the first round. Departing from the contract will be both players' strategy in all rounds (Hovi and Rasch 1993: 84). There is, however, according to Tsebelis, a solution to this result that will secure better payoffs for both: It is achieved by securing a punishment for breaking the promise through changing relative distance between payoffs<sup>[8]</sup>.

The question must nevertheless relate to resources: The likelihood that a player chooses defection

depends on how much he can afford to lose. The actual punishment for breaking an agreement will have different impacts for actors: In trying to predict a counter-player's strategy, one must therefore consider how much he can afford losing and/or is willing to risk as a result of speculation. Additionally, the potential spreading of rumours must be taken into account. Enterprises speculate this way by trying to estimate each other's strength and possibilities of surviving, for example, price wars. Losing money on particular goods might be a means of earning more on the total. This risk may be affordable to some and unaffordable to others. The risks combined with available payoffs form bases for strategies.

All these problems associated with strategy analysis refer to the effectiveness of threats. Bayesian updating offers a means of updating impressions throughout processes.

## Bayesian updating

Bayesian updating illustrates players' evaluations of counter-players' preferences and sets of strategies in static games involving incomplete information. Such information is unavailable on at least one player. A Bayesian perfect equilibrium involves the players' subjective understanding, which is updated throughout the game with the help of Bayes' rule. A precondition is that the players follow equilibrium behaviour, which gives a set of strategies that form the best answers for the players (Hovi 2000). The following table shows equilibria associated with complete/incomplete information and static/dynamic games:

	<u>Static games</u>	<u>Dynamic games</u>
<u>Complete information</u>	Nash-equilibria	Sub-game perfect equilibria
<u>Incomplete information</u>	Bayesian Nash-equilibria	Bayesian perfect equilibria

**Table 2: Equilibria under different sets of information in static and dynamic games (Gates and Humes 1997)**

Figure 2 showed sub-games where nature chooses between game rules. Game theory uses backwards induction in order to show how players at every node can calculate on counterplayers' rational choices. The players need to find sets of choices that will be rational given incomplete information and the payoffs in dynamic games. Different moves may result in optimal payoffs, depending on which sub-game is being played.

Figure 2 is used as the basis for an example: Both Player y and Player x use backwards induction to predict the outcomes of sub-games L and R, under the assumption that both of them expect each other to follow equilibrium behaviour. The first variant is where Player y observes nature's choice, makes his move, and Player x must act without this information. The second one is where neither player knows which sub-game nature has been chosen. Their moves may thereafter have static or dynamic order. In the first situation, Player x calculates a certain probability for each of the sub-games to be played. This is called his "prior belief". After this round is finished, he updates his beliefs for the next round on the basis of this particular game's results. The following example illustrates:

A = probability that L-game is played;

B = probability that player y chooses a;

a = probability that R-game is played;

$p(A)$  = prior probability for L-game,  $q$ ;

$p(a) = (1-q)$ ;

$p(B|A)$  = probability that Player y would choose a if he knew that the L-game would be played;

$p(B|a)$  = probability that Player 0 would choose a if he knew that the R-game would be played.

After this round, both players have updated their information. Player x uses this information to calculate expected utilities of different moves for the next game. He uses Bayes' formula, which in this case is expressed as follows:

$$p(A|B) = \frac{p(B|A) \cdot p(A)}{p(B|A) \cdot p(A) + p(B|a) \cdot p(a)}$$
, where

$p(A|B)$  = conditional probability that an event, A, will occur given the occurrence of B;

$p(B|A)$  = conditional probability of B given A;

$p(A)$  = prior probability of A's occurrence, and

$(p(B|A) \cdot p(A) + p(B|a) \cdot p(a))$  = marginal likelihood for A given either B or not B.

(Based on Gates and Humes 2000: 122).

Player x now calculates the expected utilities associated with choosing c or d as strategy.

The payoffs must be given on an interval scale. This means that the players and the analyst need to include relative distances between payoffs. Deciding these particular numbers and evaluating conditional probabilities are rational processes based on informed subjective impressions of situations. The interval scale numbers showing payoffs in the Romanian transition mirror the analyst's hermeneutic identification with preferences of the dictator, the internal conspiracy, and society. The numbers used are not finite but illustrate how actors' subjective evaluations laid preconditions for rational action. The outcomes of Bayesian calculus for this case could vary. No result is "correct" in the sense that it would occur regardless of variables related to personality. This precondition shows the illustrative character of this methodology. The result of a calculus thus depends on the analyst's abilities and available information. This procedure illustrates rational action when information is insufficient or in the case of iterated games: In the latter case, the actors update their evaluations of the counter-player after each game and organise their strategies accordingly. Player x has updated his information in this particular example. Player y also updates his in such cases where he cannot observe nature before acting.

The previously elaborated example illustrated the case where nature chooses between two alternatives. Situations also occur where nature has a choice of three sub-games. More than two players could also be involved. The logic of Bayesian calculations would be similar. Calculations of conditional probabilities, however, would be more complicated and include a lower degree of predictability.

## Actors and preferences

For an understanding of different actors that may be involved in a transition process, this chapter presents interactions in static games with complete information. Games are thus exemplified in standard form.

The two main groups in Colomer's theory are the opposition and the ruling block. The opposition consists of revolutionaries and rupturists. The ruling block consists of soft-liners and hard-liners. The soft-liner group is composed of openists and reformists, whereas the hard-liner group consists of continuists and involutionists. Revolutionaries and involutionists do not compromise with other groups. Colomer called them maximalists. The other six groups are gradualists who are willing to compromise.



The revolutionaries' first preference is rupture. This means full confrontation with the rulers with the goal of overthrowing the dictatorship, followed by democratisation. Their second preference is continuity of the current regime, meaning an institutionalisation process of the authoritarian government. The third option is a limited reform of the regime. Limited reform gives "plurality of parties, free elections, but restrictions on the activities of certain parties" (Colomer 1991: 1284). The authoritarians will decide on an election law that deviates representation to their favour. This outcome would remove the basis of the revolutionaries' struggle: It limits possibilities for radical change in the near future. This preference order indicates their particular characteristics: Preserving their image of no compromise is regarded as preferable to reforms that would at least improve the situation with which they are dissatisfied. The second and third preferences of the revolutionaries have changed positions in the preference structure of the rupturists. As a democratic opposition, they are ready for peaceful methods and would use a limited reform as an opening, after which they will continue their work for a democratic transition.

The reformists are those closest to the opposition with regard to the future of the regime: They are interested in changing the present situation. Their first preference is a limited reform of the dictatorship. Through their positions they might have the possibility of keeping some degree of privileges after a transition by agreement. They see the continuity of the dictatorship as the worst possible outcome. A rupture would be preferable, even if it might lead to full democratisation. The second soft-liner group, the openists, also have a limited reform as first preference, before continuity as their second option and rupture last. If the danger for rupture is perceived as significant, they might join the continuists, whose preference order is C, r, R. Continuists, in turn, might join the openists if they fear that continuity is impossible. A limited reform, rather than a rupture, is regarded as serving their interests better.

The involutionists will use any measure to defend the dictatorship. Accordingly, they prefer continuity. Their second preference is rupture as a direct confrontation for establishing a new dictatorship. They prefer this option before limited reform. Risking all and loosing is better than having to share power. Thus, they mirror the revolutionaries by not being willing to compromise. Continuists that have given certain concessions to the transition with the unwanted result of having a rupture in store, might join the involutionists in order to regain control of the process (Colomer 1991: 1287).

Colomer's description of alternatives for action are rather general. Each case must thus be analysed through close identification and the alternatives must be described. Different individuals may understand the alternatives differently and to some degree have varying goals, even if they are members of a group that is analysed as an actor. The common denominator for the group as a whole must be found and nuances can be specified.

## OPPOSITION

Revolutionaries:  $R > C > r$

Rupturists:  $R > r > C$

## RULING BLOCK

Soft-liners Reformists:  $r > R > C$

Openists:  $r > C > R$

Hard-liners Continuists:  $C > r > R$

Involutionists:  $C > R > r$ .

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Revolutionaries:  $R > C > r$

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Involutionists:  $C > R > r$

Table 3: Actors in a transition process. The preferences are given in a ranking order

Revolutionaries that are dissatisfied with the results of their struggle might, in certain circumstances, surrender to the possibilities of compromises and join the rupturists. This could happen, for instance, after a lost civil war or when they lack resources for continuing their armed struggle. Rupturists who have realised that their first preference is too costly or otherwise unreachable can join the reformists. Nevertheless, they are still interested in getting rid of the dictatorship.

### Possible outcomes

The preferred negotiated outcome for an actor is the combined pair of transition alternatives that best corresponds to his first preference. Furthermore, the second best option is the pair of transition alternatives that best corresponds to his second preference. The preference orders of preferred transition alternatives are as follows:

## OPPOSITION

Revolutionaries: RR, Rr, CC, Cr, RC, CR

Rupturists: RR, Rr, rR, rr, RC, rC

## OPPOSITION

Revolutionaries: RR, Rr, CC, Cr, RC, CR

Rupturists: RR, Rr, rR, rr, RC, rC

## RULING BLOCK

Softliners      Reformists: rr, RC, rR, Rr, RR, rC

Openists: rr, CR, rC, Cr, CC, rR

Hardliners      Continuists: CC, Cr, rC, rr, CR, rR

Involutionists: CC, Cr, RR, Rr, CR, RC

**Table 4: Preference orders of pairs of transition alternatives. All groups except for revolutionaries and involutionists will participate in negotiations. (The pairs' first letters indicate the particular actor's preference)**

These preference orders form the bases for the actors' strategies. Negotiations between actors belonging to the opposition, to the softliners or to the hardliners respectively, will normally proceed without conflict. This is because these actors' preferences are close together and problems associated with possible benefits or risks can more easily be overcome. The strategies used for achieving first preferences, in some cases, may be the only dividing line when such a game is performed with a

common front to other groups. One single, highly stable equilibrium will be the result. When the interactions are between gradualists of different blocks, however, a single, highly stable Pareto under-optimal equilibrium is the result. This means that at least one of the actors will have the incentive to change it. Games between rupturists and continuists will give Pareto under-optimal results. With credible threats available on both sides, a limited reform can be within reach.

In games between maximalist groups, the strongest group will simply have its will. Continuity is the result if the involutionists win and democratisation if the rupturists win in games between these actors. A game between revolutionaries and involutionists clarifies the discussion: Whether continuity or democratisation will be the result depends on the effectiveness of the actors' threats. A limited reform will not occur.


The pair of transition preferences  $rR$  will present single, threat-vulnerable result games between revolutionaries and reformists or openists and involutionists. The effectiveness of the actors' threats will decide whether a reform or a rupture occurs. In the game between openists and involutionists, the order of available pairs of preferred transition alternatives for the former is  $CR > rC > CC > rR$ . The involutionists order these preferences the following way:  $CC > rC > rR > CR$ .

		Involutionists	
		C	R
Openists	r	3,3 ←	1,2 ←
	C	2,4 ↑	4,1 ↓

**Figure 3: A game between involutionists and openists on normal form**


Continuity is the involutionists' dominant strategy. They will always go for this preference, regardless of the openists. The upper left cell is a Nash-equilibrium, where the openists go for a limited reform and the involutionists for continuity. This is a Pareto-optimal outcome. The result cannot be changed without at least one of the players becoming a worse payoff. The openists would prefer the lower right cell, which is unlikely to occur. The most preferred outcome for the involutionists is the lower left cell. With interactions between the most distant groups of neighbouring blocks, there is no predictable equilibrium available. These are the ones between revolutionaries and openists, and between reformists and involutionists. The games have no solution, which is also the case when maximalists are included. Interactions between other groups of distant blocks, including maximalists (revolutionaries or involutionists), result in single, threat-vulnerable equilibria. This means that at least one of the players will have strong incentives for having the final result changed. The outcome depends on the effectiveness and strength of the actors' threats.

Only three games can lead to a peaceful transition in the form of a pact, namely rupturists - continuists, reformists - continuists, and rupturists - openists.[\[9\]](#) Also in these games, these practical solutions present the worst possible outcomes for the counterplayers of the games. The second player is forced to follow these dictates. The rupturist-openist game has the following standard form:



**Figure 4: A game between rupturists and openists on normal form**

The rupturists have a dominant strategy in rupture, indicated by the parallel arrows. The openists have a mixed strategy. The upper left cell is the Pareto under-optimal Nash-equilibrium. The openists threaten with continuity, which would be the worst possible outcome for the rupturists, who have to accept the openists' dictates and follow the outlines for a reform. A transition to democracy may also occur in games between rupturists and involutionists. This game's outcome is explained by the strict either - or strategies of the actors as referred to above. Round table discussions give the former authorities to preserve their privileges, for instance securing election laws and seats reservations.[\[10\]](#) In the other games with equilibria, the confrontational results shown in the game matrices are Pareto optimal. With a departure from the equilibria, one of the parts would obtain a worse result. This makes negotiations more difficult, and the part having credible threats available will have his will if the other one cannot answer to them. The cyclic games between revolutionaries and openists, on the one hand, and reformists and involutionists, on the other, have no equilibria. The result may be political instability:



**Figure 5: A cyclic game between reformists and involutionists on normal form. (The game has no Nash-equilibrium)**

The outcomes connected to different games as outlined by Colomer may look deterministic when the actors' characters have been classified. He gives a strict dependence of outcomes on preferences of the actors. The element of threats and how strategies are formed show us the voluntarist part. The solutions of the game matrices need not necessarily be equivalent with empirical results.

## Rational action framework for this analysis

### Individual rationality

Rationality perspectives are now examined in greater depth. Hovi used Harsanyi's classification of rationality. The definition of game theoretic rationality is compared with ethical rationality in the following way: Utility rationality is defined as "individual rational behaviour under certainty, under

risk, and under uncertainty”. Rational behaviour becomes utility maximisation or expected-utility maximisation”. This is the definition of utility rationality for an individual isolated. In game theory, two or more individuals follow this individual rationality, “selfish or unselfish, as specified by his own utility function....” in interaction. This second sub-type involves interaction on the premises for rational behaviour. Ethical rationality is the third subtype. Impartial and impersonal criteria form the axioms. Hovi and Rasch disclose ethical rationality for game theoretic analyses where each individual maximises his personal payoffs (Hovi and Rasch 1993: 23).

The definition of utility rationality may be further specified: According to Elster’s “thin theory” of rationality, acts must stand in a certain relation to the actor’s beliefs and desires, which together form his reasons:

*We must require, first, that the reasons are reasons for the action; secondly, that the reasons do in fact cause the action for which they are reasons: and thirdly, that the reasons cause the action “in the right way”. Implicit in these requirements is also a consistency requirement for the desires and beliefs themselves (Elster 1985: 2 – 3).*

This definition precludes weakness of will, intransitive preferences and contradictions. It encompasses all three of Harsanyi’s types. Hovi and Rasch use Elster’s “thin theory” as a basis for their understanding of utility rationality. This will also form the basis for this analysis.

According to the “thick theory”, on the other hand, the acts must result from reflected reasons and autonomy. Since they are reflected upon, means that they are not conducted without attention to all available information. Autonomy discloses extreme conformism and the possibility that the actors’ evaluations result from their particular positions. This could involve perspectives like “the grass is always greener on the opposite side of the fence” (Hovi and Rasch 1993: 24).

Weber gave two interpretations of “Verstehen”. One interpretation means simple observation and the other one requires explanations. The latter was not accepted by the positivists. They rejected the possibility of “empathetic identification”. However, it was embraced by the hermeneutic tradition. Tsebelis used the second interpretation. Explanation was based on “the strict rules of optimal behaviour under constraints” (Tsebelis 1990: 45). Concerning this analysis, the requirement presupposes rational actors that will maximise their outcomes in interactions with others. This implies an understanding of rationality similar to Hovi’s definition of it in game theoretic settings. According to Tsebelis, the individuals must be autonomous and able to range their preferences in a consistent way and through interactions with other individuals reach the best available possible outcome. Tsebelis admits that the rational choice approach is less applicable when goals have not been clear to the actors or when the rules of the game were fluid.

The Integrative Approach, likewise, is based on the hermeneutics where the analysis of events judges whether the actors had a consistent and well-defined strategy and whether the rules of the game were imprecise or clearly defined. The actor may be rational given his preferences and information as discussed above. If these requirements are not satisfied, alternative explanations must be sought. The Integrative Approach shows the socialisation that the individuals have experienced and gives a framework for the transition context where the observer identifies with the actor. After having focused on the complexities of the situation, the observer may even conclude that it was a chaotic situation that made the actor behave like he did. This explanation would not contradict the actor’s rationality, but explain why the rational actor was not able to serve his interests through strategic moves in the given situation. A complete overview of the actor’s background is found in the Funnel of Causality. This approach gives a better foundation for the understanding of rationality than what is shown in Tsebelis’ and Hovi’s and Rasch’s analyses: A close hermeneutic approach can be achieved through this analysis as the background to game theory.

The impossibility of contradictory beliefs and of intransitive preferences, and conformity to the axioms of probability calculus, form Tsebelis’ weak requirements for rationality. Two interpretations of the first requirement are relevant: Firstly, “the conjunction of a proposition and its negation is a

contradiction". Secondly, "anything can follow from a false antecedent". This implies that contradictory beliefs can lead to any outcome. Behaviour that follows this starting point is irrational. The second requirement is illustrated through transitivity: If an individual prefers a to b and b to c, he must prefer a to c as well if he is rational. The third prescription requires actors that multiply the utility of an event with the chance of its occurrence. "She may be optimistic or pessimistic but willing to accept fair bets" (Tsebelis 1990: 27).

The analyst identifies with the actors through hermeneutics and uses Bayes' Rule to determine the rational bases of their acts. Accuracy and thorough identification are needed in order to overcome important methodological challenges: Degree of optimism or pessimism, however, may only to a limited extent be understood by the observer. Former behaviour and the amount of information available give indications of how the actor will behave. However, whether the actor in the given situation is optimistic or pessimistic may change according to situational circumstances and in practice be outside the scope of analysis. In chaotic situations and where the decisions had to be taken quickly, the actors might simply not have had the possibility to reflect rationally on the situation. Actors can make choices that would be different if they had more time and/or if they were not involved in disturbing circumstances. The researcher, despite his complete overview, must identify with the actors and their availability of information. Behaviour may have been rational given the actor's available information, even if it did not maximise his payoffs, as relating to information. These problems are analysed in light of the requirements for rational action prescribed in this theoretical framework, the "weak" requirements for rational action.


## **Individuals versus groups**

Figure 6 displays an individual reflecting on whether to participate in a group with a certain goal or not. He understands that the greater the number of participants, the greater the chances for achieving the goal. On this basis, he regards a certain number of participants as necessary. By participating personally, he will contribute to the possibility of having the goal achieved, a goal that also serves his personal interests. Participation also implies loss of other benefits. These may be as diverse as loss of spare time or endangered security. As the graph shows, a utility-orientated individual in this situation must reflect upon the number of participants that he regards necessary for achieving the goal, if the premises of utility theory are taken to their logical consequences. If he assumed that the number of participants would suffice without his participation, he might act as a free rider and abstain from participation. If he did not consider the chances of having the goal achieved satisfactorily without his personal participation, he would join.

This contradiction can be applied to participation in demonstrations against a totalitarian regime. A revolution will be more likely to figure as an exclusive transition mode in a highly repressive regime. Revolts are less probable. The reason is the stronger degree of repression that has hindered the development of civil society organisations that could participate.

This would not imply that ethical rationality prevails in a revolutionary transition mode: Participants' personal preferences are motivated by the work for the common good, which in such situations represents the individual participant's highest payoff. Personal utility rationality must be defined here as striving for the achievement of this preference. This conclusion corresponds to the Folk Theorem (Hovi and Rasch 1993: 91) if the pre-revolutionary situation was sufficiently desperate. Any outcome of riots could be imagined as a better situation than the initial one.

### Individual sacrifice for the common interest



$y$ : probability of success

$x$ : number of participants

$z$ : optimal amount of success

$v$ : subjective interpretation of relation between number of participants and chances of success

$n$ : number of participants perceived as necessary for  $z$  to be realised

**Figure 6: Utility rationality for individuals sharing preferences on an aggregate level**

Hovi and Rasch gave three advantages of understanding states as unified actors, despite being in fact aggregated levels consisting of individuals (Hovi and Rasch 1993: 30).<sup>[11]</sup> The critique is as follows: In a situation where a group of individuals have to co-ordinate their strategies in order to secure the best possible outcome based on common interest, the sum of their actions might lead to outcomes that do not respond to their personal preferences. An aggregate might behave irrationally, based on rational individuals not understanding what the sum of their acts will be like. Are these acts to be judged as consistent and justifiable given the fact that individuals are rational when not having to co-operate? The members of the group have to calculate on the way their companions will act. They might succeed or fail in their considerations. Judging an isolated member of the group is complicated because a sum not maximising its interest as a whole might result from separate individuals acting irrationally, despite understanding the aggregated result. Individuals might speculate on the strategies of others and not understand their way of thinking. Thus, the extent and quality of communication between the individuals is essential. The same requirements as the ones that apply to each individual's understanding of the context must also apply to his understanding of companions if satisfactory information is available. If an individual behaves in an unexpected way from others' rational points of view, they are still rational, despite the outcome not responding to the interests of the group. Experience, if present, would help the group members in calculating the moves of the other players of the relevant group, should no communication exist between them.

A group might have a leadership or a flat structure. This applies to micro- and meso-levels. If there is a leadership, the relation between it and the group will be essential for the emerging strategies. An understanding of the relative restrictions imposed on the leadership from the masses and vice versa is needed. The common counter-players' understanding of these relations will influence his decisions. Again, room for calculations emerges on both sides, this time on the structure of a group. The situation can be complicated by the introduction of two aggregates as players. Controversies of internal relations will have to be applied to both actors. After checking the information available to the actors concerning these circumstances, the observer can conclude on their rationality.

Treating the groups as isolated units is insufficient. Information leakages from individuals would

change the information available to another group. The individual betraying his group could be considered rational if his personal benefits increase by this act. Ethical rationality relating to the group would be less important. Personal preferences in this case contradict those of the group. The individual is rational and attains his preferences independently of the group. This shows us the need to identify whether the personal interests of the single group members can be achieved only through co-operation, or if it is achievable through breaking with the group. These complexities show the importance to the observer of having complete information for analysing seemingly irrational group action.

Essentially, an analysis of a transition must necessarily locate factions within the leadership and different degrees of loyalty to varying policy goals. In this case, understanding the regime leadership does not correspond with the goals of the analysis. On the other hand, the dictator would try to give the impression of having coherent support if his interest lies in preserving his power. His strategy would follow Hovi and Rasch's logic.

Power is the obvious reason why a dictator can execute his policies exclusively. On the other hand, it cannot be taken for granted that a democracy and its members regard the need for showing a common orientation in all policy areas as a necessity. A democracy is founded on the rights of elected governments to execute their policies within the constraints of the constitution and with acceptance from the national assembly. A government may be a coalition and the rationality problems referred to above are relevant to this situation as well as to group interests that deviate from those of the coalition. The government must negotiate with other parties so that every one of them has a proportion of its programme realised. This goal is attained through more or less formal interactions. Hence, the analyst must understand a country's foreign policies as an outcome of these actions. To have influence, every party must be able to threaten and punish the other(s) with reference to a power base.

## Conclusions on rationality

The Integrative Approach's advantages and methodological aspects have been discussed. Funnel variables provide the background for understanding the actors' personal characteristics and the available moves, giving us impressions of payoffs. The analyst's ability to achieve closeness to context and actors through a hermeneutical approach decides the degree of accuracy with which he defines the context and the actors' rationality. For transition research, it is not only the choices made by directly involved participants that must be analysed: The preferences of those who did not participate but could potentially have been involved given alternative institutional settings need to be considered: The particular transition mode may have excluded their participation. Strategies explaining non-involvement if rational must also be searched for.

Individual rationality relates to the "thin theory". It may lead to sub-optimal outcomes on an aggregated level. For reasons of simplicity and for the sake of the focus of analysis, some aggregates are better understood as single actors. In other cases, the search for factions and negotiations will be necessary for understanding the aggregate as an actor. Hovi and Rasch argue for understanding states as unified actors. This approach may be unsuitable for transition research where documenting leadership fragmentation is part of the focus..

The Integrative Approach provides the link between structural background and transition mode. Structural background and transition mode decide the actors' contexts and how their preferences are analysed.

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[6] Hovi exemplified this in a situation where Liechtenstein disagrees with the American sanctions against Iraq. Liechtenstein threatens not to import American apples. This threat would not be sufficiently severe. Sufficient severity could be secured if the European Union decides to join Liechtenstein.

[7] An example is where demonstrators against a totalitarian dictatorship do not know whether the regime has the fortitude to carry out a threat that includes using live ammunition on the crowds. In this case, "nature" may be totally unpredictable, or experience might provide room for prediction.



- [8] This breaking of the agreement-strategy may in one example be given a payoff of 6. Mutual co-operation would give 5, whereas both players receive 2 if they break the agreement. If a player were cheated, he would receive 1. The first payoff is termed Temptation, the second Reward, the third Penalty and the fourth the Sucker's payoff. (The initial situation was associated with the payoffs 4, 3, 2, and 1 respectively). If a player chooses to break the agreement, he will gain 1 point in this round and lose 3 points in each and every one of the following games because his counter-player will not choose co-operation anymore. Breaking with the agreement would be irrational.
- Example two has different values: Temptation = 6, Reward = 4, Penalty = 3, and Sucker = 1. The player who breaks with the agreement will earn two points in that particular round. In each of the following games he will lose one point. This shows that the loss from breaking the agreement is greater in the first example than in the second one in the long run. This implies a greater chance of co-operation in the first example. In fact, one iteration is sufficient for securing co-operation in the first game, but more than two iterations are required in the second one.
- [9] The equilibria of the games are Pareto sub-optimal. Reforms depend on each actor's performance of credible threats. In the first game, the first preference of each player presents the worst alternative for the other one. A peaceful transition will fail if one of the parts fails on one or more of the requirements to credible threats as listed by Hovi and Rasch (Hovi and Rasch 1993). In the two other cases, the reformists and openists, respectively, will use their second alternative to force their counter-players to co-operate.
- [10] In round table discussions, representatives of the former regime aim at securing for themselves a certain proportion of representation. The opposition may consist of a unified group or of several, more or less co-ordinated, units. These variables, together with the transition context in general and the actors' preferences, will decide the effectiveness of threats they are able to perform for achieving their goals. The former regime may be strong enough to secure for themselves a certain proportion of representatives in the organs later to be elected. Additionally, the introduction of a threshold will influence the possibilities of a fragmented opposition appearing. The former rulers can go for discriminative election laws if their first preference is a limited reform of the former regime. Introducing an election law that is unfavourable for the opposition would be an example of acts that diminish popular sympathy among the electorate and secure critical attitudes from the international community. The regime representatives would speculate on the opposition's strength. If they were regarded as weak, the regime would not have to take this risk. However, if the opposition offered credible threats to secure benefits for themselves in the founding elections, they would have to use the measure of going for an election law that would favour the biggest party if they wanted to preserve their privileges.
- [11] The first reason is given by means of reference to individual preferences in the context of general social welfare. This common goal is what politicians and bureaucrats try to reach in co-operation. The second solution is to accept that, in practice, power is concentrated in a state. This is obvious in a dictatorship. On the other hand, they refer to the necessity of a democratic state having a unified foreign policy. For this reason, the government is left to take responsibility for it. Thirdly, using this approach is scientifically strategic. Understanding the simplified version of complexity is a better starting point. After having gained an overview, the researcher will analyse the more realistic version of the situation. Finally, Hovi and Rasch refer to the lack of alternatives to game theory for studying international politics. This is a justification for using this theory concept.



# CHAPTER 4

## Introduction

This chapter examines first of all the organisation of the research and methodological problems associated with first- and second-hand sources. These include the use of interviews and other pertinent sources of information. The interviews include those that I conducted and material from professional journalists. Obstacles and advantages involved in using personal statements and the relevance of practical barriers that appeared are discussed. For both types, general considerations must be taken of the ability and will of the informant to give objective and correct information. Contradictory information from different informants, for instance, might not necessarily mean a lack of ability. On the contrary, such incidences might support a search for preferences and the attempt to locate alliances. Game theory is used for this task.

Next, the historical background for the Romanian transition through the “Funnel of Causality” is presented. The funnel structure and logic have been adapted from Ugelvik Larsen (Ugelvik Larsen 2000) and Mahoney and Snyder (Mahoney and Snyder 1994). The identification and ordering of variables refer to this model. Historical facts needed to illustrate the variables of the funnel are included. Others are excluded. The variable characteristics have been chosen on the basis of transition theory and general knowledge of Romanian history. Communication between the model and empirical data was necessary for finding important aspects and sorting out those data that in the end turned out to be less important. The purpose is to show why imposition or revolution were available transition modes in Romania. That these were the available modes is shown through the path-dependent strategy and reduction of variance in the funnel variables. The study’s hypotheses are presented at the end of the chapter. (The transition itself and its games are analysed in Chapter Five).

## Organisation of the work and source critique

This research was started in Bucharest in November 1999. The Royal Norwegian Embassy had contacted former Prime Minister Petre Roman and former President Ion Iliescu in advance, with the purpose of arranging meetings for me. I had forwarded questions directly to them three weeks in advance. The meetings did not materialise, however, I met Professor Vladimir Pasti at the National Institute for Opinion and Marketing Studies. He was Iliescu’s adviser before the 1990 elections. I also met Christian Preda, political scientist and adviser to the former President Emil Constantinescu. My interviews with Professor Vintila Mihailescu at the Institute for Political Science, University of Bucharest and Amalia Herciu, who was a Project Co-ordinator at the Asociata Pro Democratia (The Pro-Democracy Association), gave me insights into transition problems from the perspectives of science and civil society respectively.

The main purpose of the trip had been to gain first-hand information on hypothetical conspiracy groups against Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu, and gather details on the formation of the National Salvation Front. I discovered the fact that no official documentation exists. I had hoped to get information from the involved actors that could help my construction of preference orders for the game theoretic analysis. My lack of success in arranging appointments with former nomenclaturists was therefore disappointing. Likewise, my search for personal statements, Party non-coherence and possible alliances between Party and Securitate officials was in vain. Still, the interviews I made gave me a more realistic impression of the situation.

New interesting perspectives also occurred. I had realised limits and possibilities and now arranged a framework for the analysis.

I went to Romania again in April 2000, having sent requests for interviews with Roman, Iliescu, and Bishop Laszlo Tökes, three weeks in advance. The former leading conspirator and National Salvation Front member, Silviu Brucan, was also contacted. Only Ms. Iliescu's secretary replied, and we arranged for a meeting with him.

After arriving in Bucharest, I went directly to Oradea where Tökes is bishop. I got in touch with the Reformed Church and spoke to his assistant. It was important for me to have them suggest the time and place for an interview at his convenience. Tökes met me two days later in his office. He gave me convincing and detailed information on his dissidence and preferences in the transition process. This interview provided me with invaluable material for the analysis.

My train left for Cluj-Napoca the following day. I had been told that former dissident, Doina Cornea, lives there. Neither her address nor her telephone number could be traced. (As infrastructure is still being built up in Romania, finding individuals and institutions is problematic). I was informed of her address at the National Liberal Party office. The secretary at the office agreed to come with me as a translator. I had not asked Cornea in advance but she accepted it. As perhaps the most important Romanian dissident, she provided me with insight into the regime and its repressive procedures, her personal and other dissidents' activities, and their preferences. Like Tökes, she would have no rational reasons for concealing important information since she has never been accused of unlawful or immoral acts in the fields of human rights and politics. I could place confidence in her information and use it in my analysis without major reservations.

Before leaving Cluj-Napoca, I called the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and spoke to Roman's secretary, who told me to come to his office the following day to arrange a possible meeting. I waited in the ministry for two days and was eventually told that he did not have time. Next, I went to the office of the Romanian Social Democratic Party for my appointment with Iliescu. He had unfortunately left the country and would not be back before my departure. At Pro TV, where Brucan works, I was told that he was not interested in giving interviews. I had hoped that first-hand information from a former NSF member with nomenclaturist background would be possible. I did not succeed.

On returning home, I started searching for alternative ways of gaining personal statements of former nomenclaturists. I contacted the newspaper Bergens Tidende for a transcript of an interview with Brucan published on 28 November 1999, without success. I did, however, find an interview with Roman in *Der Spiegel* no. 37, 10/9-1990 (Appendix). The questions raised in the interview were useful to me since they present the best available substitute for contact with nomenclaturists that I did not manage to get in Romania. The questions cover a large part of my interests. Considering the fact that it was to be printed in *Der Spiegel*, I could take it for granted that Mr. Roman had given himself sufficient time for the interview and that he regarded the journalists as being well informed. This would strengthen his efforts to give correct information.

I found the transcripts of the closed trial of Nicolae and Elena Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu and the Proclamation of Timisoara on the internet. The same source critique requirements would apply to these documents as documents published in books if the publisher could be traced. Anyone can construct an internet site and include any type of information. The sites used here contain e-mail addresses through which the constructor might be reachable. Testing the constructors' ability and will to reproduce information correctly would however demand unavailable resources. The sites have to be treated with caution. The readers of this thesis have the possibility to visit these sites themselves and trace the information extracted from them. This is a minimal requirement in scientific work. In the moment of writing, no social science norms have been created to regulate the use of internet sources. The possibility to trace the information used is sufficient for justifying the methods that are used here.

## The interviews

To make the informants feel at ease, I started every interview by explaining the contents of my study, which information would be of interest to me, and why. I also asked in advance if they would mind my using a tape recorder. None of them objected. This was a great advantage since I could make a verbatim report and avoid misunderstandings.

Pasti and Preda followed my interview sheets and answered the questions one by one. Cornea and Tökes chose instead to give relatively independent personal versions of their dissidence. This made the interviews less structured than initially planned. It had the advantage, though, of letting the informants recapture the events and structure their thoughts. This would lead to more accurate information. As far as Tökes and Cornea were concerned, they allowed me relatively much time and most of my interests were covered. By talking freely and not relating strictly to my questions, the informants could cover aspects that they regarded as important and what I had not necessarily understood the importance of. I raised questions afterwards in order to acquire information that had not been given.

Pasti, on the other hand, as a scientist has been researching into the Romanian transition. He did not need this process as he was engaged in analyses of these issues daily. Preda considered his English to be insufficient for expressing facts and opinions accurately, which clearly involved serious weaknesses in the interview.

The Roman interview took place in September 1990, when he was Prime Minister. He was bound by his position when answering questions and clearly had personal interests that would interfere with his answers. Attention had to be directed to other members of the NSF and their goals and statements. The interview provided answers that contradicted with statements by former NSF members, Stanculescu and Brucan, in respect of justification of measures taken. Contradictory information was given to questions critical of the strategies and roles of the NSF. This at least justified the conclusion that one or more of these persons concealed information or was not willing to give objective versions. Two major problems appear in the Roman interview: The first one is where Roman admits that the NSF had made a mistake by encouraging miners to repress demonstrations in Bucharest, whereas Iliescu had defended these methods. Roman afterwards tries to defend Iliescu's statement when confronted with it by Der Spiegel. He says that using the miners was the only way to have them leave the city. (After all, the NSF had transported them there). He contradicts the conclusion that this action was a mistake. He also defends extra-legal measures.

The second major problem is where Der Spiegel refers to Militaru and Brucan, who stated indirectly that a coup d'état had been planned by party functionaries and Roman denies it. We cannot judge who is not giving the right information here. However, the observation that central actors give contradictory information is valuable in itself.

As Roman's information on these central issues contradicts with other NSF members' statements, the interview does not generate an objective picture of the events. The conclusion that the nomenclature was interested in a limited reform through which they would be able to secure benefits for themselves is, nevertheless, strengthened. Contradictory statements on coup plans and the act of using miners to repress demonstrations support it. Furthermore, since Roman cannot answer to accusations of election manipulation, this reinforces our conclusion.

Tökes and Cornea were not bound by obligations to any groups and they did not have any official positions that might bias their versions. Tökes was working as a bishop when I interviewed him and he was not involved in politics anymore. Cornea had retired from her position as Professor in French at the University of Cluj-Napoca. They did not have positions in the Romanian transition that have been subjected to criticism from democratic forces or political scientists and historians. The conclusion is that their will to give correct information was present. The only methodological issue that could provide any problem was relative time. The interviews took place more than ten years after the revolution. The interviewees were asked to give information also on pre-revolutionary events. The

possibility of details being forgotten might be present. Interviewing them at that time, however, provided me with the most reliable information available from the dissidents' side. I acquired first-hand information and had the possibility of asking for certain information that I regarded relevant. Cornea was very enthusiastic and I did not interrupt her very often. I regarded it important to let her recount her version. Her information gave me a good impression of her preferences as a dissident. A Romanian student translated the interview to English. This was my only possibility: The interview was relatively long and arranging with an official translator would too expensive. I returned transcripts of the interviews to Preda, Tökes, and Cornea afterwards, and asked them to make corrections or extensions where necessary. After receiving no reply, I concluded that they had accepted the versions and that nothing was to be added or corrected.

## **Variable one: Geo-political position and historical watersheds**

### **Strained state/nation building**

Moldavia and Wallachia saw the first attempts at adopting liberal principles in 1848. Their leaders had planned for separate revolutions in each of the two provinces. The Moldavian attempt was repressed immediately. In Wallachia, reforms in the fields of civil liberties, improvement of the peasant situation, end to class qualifications for voting, support for cultural development, and certain economic and administrative aspects were introduced. These reforms only lasted until the Russian / Turkish invasion of the Danube principalities in September the same year.[\[12\]](#) The Russians and Turks reserved for themselves future rights to appoint princes through an invasion of Moldavia and Wallachia. The occupation lasted from 1848 until 1851. The Crimean war meant the return of Russian occupation for one year, succeeded by Austria until 1857.

The Russian loss of the Crimean War gave better working conditions for the nationalist movement, but Moldavia and Wallachia were not free. The treaty of Paris placed the two provinces under the authority of seven European great powers in 1856. With regard to integration, England and France agreed upon a compromise of one state with separate institutions in 1857. Austria and Turkey were clearly against, England not clearly opinionated, and the others supported the idea. Autonomy of "The Unification of Moldavia and Wallachia" under the great powers' protection was recognised in 1858. There was no room for a common nation, as indicated by the name.

Prince Carol 1 of Hohenzollern declared the constitutional monarchy in 1866. He was king from 1881 until the outbreak of World War One. The Prince represented the centre of power by selecting the government and running the country, guided by the parliament. The government handled the elections, arranged every three or four years. The country experienced relative stability until World War One, after which the two territories were unified. The anarchic leaders of the political elite gave up their struggle for power. Parliamentary leadership shifted between the liberals and the conservatives. Foreign relations, however, were bad at the time.

The national movement, consisting mostly of young intellectuals, had achieved its main goal with the unification. The parliamentary system, however, was not considered satisfactorily democratic.[\[13\]](#) The parliament declared itself a constitutional assembly in 1914, aiming at finding a solution to this problem. The war and foreign issues, however, were given higher priority, and this problem was to be suspended until more peaceful times.

Nationalism in Romania generally, and particularly in Transylvania, had coincided with the shifting of borders in the nineteenth century. Transylvania joined a union with Hungary in 1848 but Vienna made the region autonomous again in 1860. Transylvania was again under Hungarian authority between 1867 and 1918. Considerable Magyarisation was the result, visible in cultural life and in schools. This led to a deterioration of Budapest relations. Anti-Russian sentiments also increased in strength, easily

recognisable in cultural life. The anti-Austrian attitude had important roots in the suppression of the 1848 revolution and the Austrian occupation of the Danube from 1853 to 1857. Diplomatic attention was intensified towards the Balkans in an effort to secure backup and alliances against Russia, Austria and Turkey. Petitions were written in major Western European newspapers in order to attract the attention of Western leaderships.

With power relationships changing, alliances had to be changed as well, regardless of public sentiment. A treaty was signed with Russia in 1877 that gave them the right to march through Romania for the Austrian border. This could be a helping hand in the fight against the enemy in the north-west. The Turks attacked again and Bessarabia was lost; Dobrudja, however, was regained. In 1883, Romania was allied with Austria-Hungary. Germany and Italy joined later. The alliance was directed against Russia. But as World War One drew closer, attention was turned to the Triple Entente. Romania signed a mutual defence accord with Italy in 1915. Alliances took a further turn in 1916, as England, France, and Italy agreed to give Romania Transylvania, the Banat, and Bucovina back. Carol 1st was supposed to attack Austria-Hungary with the support of this alliance.

The war resulted in disaster for Bucharest. Dobrudja and certain mountainous areas of the Carpathians were lost and the Germans took control of economic life. On the other hand, a Bessarabia largely keeping its Romanian character was returned, despite yearlong Russification (George<sup>o</sup>cu 1991: 171). Transylvania was united with Romania in 1918.

Struggle for the authority over Transylvania, Bessarabia, Dobrudja and the Banat complicated the state/nation building process in Romania. The national movement for unification had coincided with shifting alliances with or directed at Austria - Hungary and Russia. Bulgarian, Greek, Albanian, Ottoman, and Jewish immigration had been considerable, and by 1930 71.9 per cent of the population was Romanian. In the Old Kingdom, the population composition had been roughly homogeneous. In Transylvania, 57.8 per cent were now Romanian, 24.4 per cent Hungarian, and 9.8 per cent German.

## **End of the democratic experience**

The Romanian Communist party emerged from an internal Social Democratic Party split. They performed an anti-Romanian political line, securing them support in the districts formerly under foreign rule as their main electoral platform. They attacked the unification of the country, did not recognise Bessarabia, and supported Bulgaria's annexation of Dobrudja (George<sup>o</sup>cu 1991: 193). The Liberals were the strongest single party in an inter-war fragmented political landscape. 1921 saw the emergence of extremist leftist and rightist parties, the former practically out of support and influence, in contrast to what was the case in other Eastern European countries. The rightist Iron Guard, formed in 1930, was to introduce the decline of the fragile Romanian democratisation process. Their politics were to a certain extent similar to those of their European counterparts, consisting of nationalism, anti-Semitism, Messianism, and with a cult of the leader (George<sup>o</sup>cu 1991: 194). The party was also anti-Western. According to George<sup>o</sup>cu, its growth stemmed from the economic depression in the early 1930s, popular anti-Semitism, corruption of the ruling classes and the other parties' incapability of handling problems.

Members of the Iron Guard killed Prime Minister Duca in 1933. The fear of their strategies was proven. The National Peasant Party joined this extremist camp in an alliance for the 1937 elections, resulting in about 20 per cent of the votes for the former and 16 per cent for the Iron Guard. The Liberals gained 36 per cent, but the King chose the fourth largest party, the National Christian Party, to form a government. The imperfect democracy ended in 1938 with King Carol 2nd introducing a royal dictatorship. He outlawed the "historical parties" under the fear of a right-wing take-over. He formed the "National Renaissance Front" as the only legal party in January 1939 with 3.5 million members. Membership became a prerequisite for social advancement. A "cult of personality" was for the first time part of Romanian rulers' measures with his "Royal Sayings" of 1939 (George<sup>o</sup>cu 1991: 208).

Carol initiated a game with the Western superpowers. His attempt to forge connections with Paris and London paralleled a pro-German attitude that stretched only as far as considered necessary for keeping relations reasonably peaceful. But the Third Reich pressured him towards the right. This change of direction, in practice, meant a moderately anti-Semitic policy. Execution of Iron Guard members strained his relations with Berlin. Carol balanced a thin line in relating to Germany.

Romania was neutral as World War II broke out. Stalin took Bessarabia in 1940 and northern Bucovina after the agreement with Hitler of dividing Eastern Europe between them. The treaty of Craiova returned southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria. Transylvania was returned to Hungary. The fall of France came as a surprise to the Romanian leader. Hopes of successful resistance against the Nazis waned. He was forced to withdraw his country from the League of Nations and change the party name to the "Nation's Party". The Iron Guard was invited to join the government and the pro-German Ion Gigirtu was given the Prime Minister post. Carol granted General Antonescu dictatorial powers in August 1940. On November 10, 1940, the Germans were admitted access to Romanian territory. On November 23, Romania signed the Tripartite Pact. Hitler preferred a stable military dictatorship to the anarchic Iron Guard, and gave Antonescu a free hand to eliminate them.[\[14\]](#)

Antonescu brought his country into war with an official reason of re - conquering northern Transylvania and Bessarabia. The army soon joined the Germans in their eastern expansion. He informed the British and American governments in 1942 of his intention to stage a coup d'etat and change the strategies of the army towards fighting Germany. The Red Army had retaken northern Bessarabia in March. The National Liberal Party, the National Peasant Party, and the Social Democrats together formed a Democratic Parties Block, intended as an interim government that was to function until the elections could be arranged. They would have to wait for the allies to accept this. Meanwhile, the king staged a coup d'etat and formed a government consisting almost exclusively of military personnel. The Iron Guard and their supporters pressured the Romanian king into a situation where he was forced to approach the country to the fascist / nazi axis. The allies decided to divide Romania into spheres of influence after the war. Following Churchill's proposal, the Soviet Union was granted influence over 90 per cent of Romanian territory.

Linz (Linz 1980) gave four explanations of the emergence of Fascism in inter-war Europe. The first one was the presence of ethnic minorities connected to cultural conflicts within the state. Related to it was the nationalism variable, connected to state/ nation building. The Romanian nationalism was rooted in the wish for unification of Moldavia and Wallachia, which had already been achieved. However, the strained neighbour relations created territorial problems concerning Transylvania, Bessarabia and Bucovina. Borders had been frequently shifting since unification. The fate of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania and the province itself caused tensions with Budapest and hostility in the Romanian population. The Jews were victims of discrimination and the Germans had gained control of economic life. Tensions in Romania were also based on the fear of foreign aggression. "Only when religion, nationalism, anti-Semitism, and the rejection of cosmopolitan cultural dependency become fused can a strong non-secularist and distinctively fascist movement appear in full force" (Linz 1980: 164). These requirements fit this case. The majority of ethnic Romanians were orthodox, whilst the Hungarians and Germans were largely of protestant or catholic belief. Table 6 documents the ethnic changes before the second world war. Ethnic minorities were a considerable part of the population in 1930. Most notable are the demographic changes in Transylvania.

	<u>Bessarabia</u>	<u>Bukovina</u>	<u>Danube princ.</u>	<u>Transylvania</u>
Austria			1854-'57	
Hungary				1848 – '60 1867- 1918 1940 - 1947
Russia	1940-	1940-	1848-'51 1853-'54	
Turkey	1877-1918		1848-'51	

**Table 5: Romanian provinces formerly under foreign authority**

Humiliation or loss of territory after World War I is the second variable giving rise to fascism in inter-war Europe, according to Linz. Romania had gained more than it had lost after the war. One cannot say which of the factors were more important. Borders had changed during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Pressure from the superpowers was significant. The Romanians clearly felt threatened by neighbouring states.

Linz' fourth variable was the presence of left-wing radicals. The Communist Party did not grow in strength like the communist parties in several other European countries. The rise of the Iron Guard is not to be understood as an answer to or a defence against left-wing radicals. The fear of a rising left-wing extreme camp may have been present as a result of general European tendencies. The potential should, however, logically be stronger in other European countries.

Romania 1918: Approx. 100 per cent Romanian

1930: 71.9 per cent Romanian, 7.9 per cent Hungarian, 4.4 per cent German, 2.3 per cent Russian, 4 per cent Jewish, 1.5 per cent Gypsy, 8 per cent others

Transylvania 1930: 57.8 per cent Romanian, 24.4 per cent Hungarian, 9.8 per cent German

Romania 1918: Approx. 100 per cent Romanian

1930: 71.9 per cent Romanian, 7.9 per cent Hungarian, 4.4 per cent German, 2.3 per cent Russian, 4 per cent Jewish, 1.5 per cent Gypsy, 8 per cent others

Transylvania 1930: 57.8 per cent Romanian, 24.4 per cent Hungarian, 9.8 per cent German

**Table 6: Ethnic compositions (George<sup>o</sup>cu 1984: 189)**

From Linz' theory the conclusion must be that the rise of fascism was primarily grounded in domestic ethnic and cultural hostilities plus strained state/ nation building that had caused demographic and cultural changes. Its rise brought the country into the fascist axis. On the other hand, it is unpredictable whether the Soviet army would have invaded the country or not, given other domestic political conditions or different alliances in Romania. In October 1944, Churchill proposed that 90 per cent of Romania be under Soviet influence as a temporary condition. The basis for Churchill's proposal was the fact that Romania had been fighting on the German side. Nevertheless, other Eastern European countries were accountable to the Soviet Union after the war despite having been direct victims of the German expansion. The conclusion is that geographic position made the country an easy target for



communist invasion, whereas political culture inherited from its uneasy history facilitated it.

## **From Moscow-orientated to “national” communism**

The Soviet Union used the same tactics in Romania as in the rest of Eastern Europe: A coalition government was at first accepted. The communists, together with the social democrats and other leftist groups, formed the National Democratic Front in October 1945. As a result of constant pressure, however, the democratic structure was abolished. The coalition parties were gradually forced out of the way with the support from the Red Army and massive propaganda. The first parties to be neutralised were the National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party. Officially, the 1923 Constitution was again in effect, but in name only. Soviet censorship was introduced in September and the communists secured for themselves all key positions. Gheorghiu-Dej was chosen Minister of Communications. On March 6 the following year, the Groza government, consisting only of communists, succeeded. King Mihai refused to sign decrees and laws, but the government ignored him.

The new government executed Antonescu, a new electoral law was introduced, the government was reduced to a unicameral body, and trials were arranged against people who had fought the communists in the war. The National Democratic Front acquired 80 per cent of the votes in elections marked by widespread fraud, according to Western observers. At least three quarters of the votes were cast for opposition parties (George<sup>o</sup>cu 1991: 230).

The installation of communist dictatorship had its strongest support among the minorities. The communists initially gained a stronghold among Hungarians and Jews, thus securing support from the same segments as the rightist extremists formerly. Parallels to the rise of the fascists regarding bases for support of extremists are thereby documented. The installation of Communism proceeded more smoothly among these segments. The communist ideology may have given an impression of equality that could secure better living conditions for the minorities. Hostility against internal minorities would, however, in the coming decades facilitate “national communism” that was to distance the country from the communist block with respect to domestic culture and international position:

The 1950s and ‘60s showed a process where the Romanian leaders secured relative independence from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The removal of Soviet forces from Romanian territory in July 1958 favoured the position of the nationally oriented party wing. The Soviet Union showed more concern about uprisings in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Romania voted independently of the Soviet Union in the United Nations in 1961. Diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany were established in 1967 and those with Israel were maintained after the Six-Day War. Romania was absent in Warsaw Pact manoeuvres and established closer connections with the expelled Yugoslavia. It was also the only Warsaw Pact country not to join the Prague Spring repression. Ceau<sup>e</sup>scu even criticised it openly. This exit policy was accompanied by a charm offensive towards the West. The open criticism of the Prague Spring secured Western goodwill. Membership of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were signed in 1972. Trade was re-directed towards the West in the same period and Romania gained a relatively independent position between the cold war blocks.

This relative independence was exceptional. According to George<sup>o</sup>cu, Romania had less strategic importance for the Soviet Union than that of other Eastern European states. Being surrounded by satellite states, it was supposed to be under control. He raised the hypothesis that Bucharest was used in order to get information about the West that would not have been accessible without agents that could give the impression of being relatively supportive of Western ideas. Agents from Kremlin therefore infiltrated the Romanian administration. The nationalistic-minded leaders pretended to be loyal as a parallel to the independence process. Gheorghiu-Dej had started it by refusing the total adherence to Khrutshchev.[\[15\]](#)

## **Funnel entrance**

The general implications from macro politics were problematic state/nation building primarily in the form of changing ethnic/cultural composition and strained relations with neighbours and superpowers. This produced border disputes and uneasy relations between ethnic Romanians and minorities. Religious dividing lines followed the ethnic ones as the majority of the Romanians are orthodox and the Hungarians and Germans are protestants or catholics. The Jews formed another segment and ethnic Turks were concentrated in Bessarabia. Religion alone may not have had a causal effect on the hostilities. Nevertheless, it always generates collective identities among members of the same belief, for the case of the minorities over the borders. Hungarians and Germans were concentrated in the disputed Transylvania and a Bulgarian minority was situated in the south.

Although Rokkan did not include Romania in his model for state/ nation building (Rokkan 1987), this thesis includes his variables for the macro–historical analysis. Romania’s strained state/nation building is seen as giving two major streams of influence on democratisation possibilities: The most visible one is the lack of a liberal tradition that could foster a political culture of compromise and give understanding between societal segments, as well as ethnic / religious groups. Romanian provinces were occupied and ethnic and religious hostilities emerged. The first nation-building element was the national movement that emerged before the state’s borders had been finalised. Nation building was later complicated by the emergence of ethnic and religious minorities. This emergence in itself would not have had a strong impact had it not been for Ceau°escu’s “national communism”. This process can be viewed as a second nation building process in Romania. However, it excluded minorities and provoked hostilities, after first having been more easily accepted by such groups. Additionally, this second process involved tensions between the Moscow-oriented and the nationally oriented factions. The shifts in educational orientation confused the process. The disputes over state borders and national identity differences were tempered and not clarified as the electoral process was introduced again. Following Rokkan (Rokkan 1987), state building, nation building and introduction of voting rights must come in this referred order and not overlap for democratisation to be successful. Nation building was in this sense not finished as the transition started in 1989. State/nation building coincided and remained unstable throughout Romanian history. The Communist Party’s isolation process revived the country’s tradition as isolated between the Ottoman, Russian, and Habsburg empires. Romania was not part of an international catholic network and did not have ethnic bonds to the Slavic area. As a country relatively isolated in its area, developments in neighbouring countries would have less importance. The leaders could even use hostilities towards neighbours as a strategy to create common external enemies, thus securing support for themselves by the communist leaders, Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceausescu. As shown later, Iliescu used the same tactics in exploiting anti–foreign sentiments in the transition that had been frozen and provoked during the Ceausescu era.

Transylvania is the area having the largest concentration of minorities. It was a disputed area after the revolution. The second, positive, impact of the strained state/nation building processes is the fact that minorities were sufficiently excluded and exploited to be the ones to start the transition after encouraging regime dissent. The minorities were the ones who had maintained bonds with Western European countries that were democratic, and Eastern European countries that were undergoing transition as they started the Romanian one.

*Variable 1: Problematic state/nation building leading to cultural hostilities that were provoked by the authorities under the communist dictatorship would have a moderately negative impact on the chances of a democratic consolidation in Romania. Presence of ethnic minorities, however, was the deciding factor for the location of the revolution’s introduction.*

## **Variable two: Economic development and distribution**

## **From boyar dominance to nationalisation**

The boyars had traditionally dominated the Romanian economy and the affluent class. They formed the main part of the Conservative Party and preserved political rights for themselves throughout the nineteenth century. The middle class was weak. These factors were the main causes of the late ratification of universal suffrage in 1917 and agrarian reform in 1921 (George<sup>o</sup>cu 1991: 187). As universal male suffrage was introduced in 1917, the change of power process started and the Liberals got stronger. Protectionist laws ratified between 1924 and 1936 also secured industrial growth. Thirty-five per cent of the 1929 gross value output was secured by industry, despite the fact that only 10 per cent of the population were employed in this sector (George<sup>o</sup>cu 1991: 201). Depression hit the country with the world economic crisis in 1929 – 1933. Only in 1936 were the pre-World War I levels reached. The Germans were preparing for war and their imports and investments were a strong growth factor also during the late 1930s.

The economy was governed by Stalinist plans after 1945 when the total power of the party had been secured. The purpose was then to distribute land to the peasants according to Marxist theory. The 1946 agrarian reform affected only one fifth of Romanian farmland, but those who benefited from it supported the Communist Party. Seventy-six per cent of all farmland was divided into plots smaller than five hectares afterwards. Privileged groups lost their positions as other parts of the economic sector were nationalised.

Ninety per cent of total production had been nationalised by 1948. The first one-year plan was set in power that very year, the second one in 1950. For the period 1951 – 1955, a five-year programme had directed the economy. The uprisings in Hungary and Poland, on which the population was informed, spread fear among the rulers of similar problems in Romania. The government reduced its ambitions in an attempt to avoid similar protests. The planned rate of growth was reduced from 10 – 12 per cent in 1956 to 4 per cent in 1957 (George<sup>o</sup>cu 1991: 235).

Industry and energy were the main targets of the 1960 - 1965 plan, receiving altogether 78 per cent of total investments. Further nationalisation of agricultural land was paralleled, with a rise in percentage nationalised from 18 per cent in 1958 to 96 per cent in 1962. This process was now completed.

An economic collaboration treaty and a trade agreement had introduced the economic connection to the Soviet Union from 1945. COMECON membership was signed in 1949. As Maurer, Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu were to make up the ruling troika of the Party from 1958 onwards, things were, however, to take another turn: More liberal economic policies were introduced. Attention was directed towards the West, from which the value of imports was 21.5 per cent of the total in 1958 and 40 per cent in 1965. From the Soviet Union, the numbers decreased from 53 per cent to 38 per cent during the same period.

The economy was on Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu's side between 1966 and 1970, with rapid industrial development and a growth rate of roughly 12 per cent. These conditions sustained the regime's legitimacy. Thirty-four per cent of the 1971 – 1975 national income was reinvested (George<sup>o</sup>cu 1991: 253). Rapid industrialisation gave outlets for urbanisation and brought apparent prosperity. This economic development secured relative stability and helped legitimise the regime.

Stalinist methods were based on strict planning and ignored economic theory in favour of ideology. A process had been started that sooner or later would have to bring recession and poverty.

Institutionalised Marxist economic policies had replaced the basic theories of supply and demand.

Romania underwent a period of growth between 1970 and 1985, however a weaker one between 1980 and 1985 than in the previous decade. Poor outputs were coming to the fore already in the 1970s. The five-year plan for 1976-1980 had set unrealistic goals of 30–32 per cent rate of growth. During this period, Romania had become the most centralised Eastern European economy, disclosing initiative and flexibility. There were food shortages from 1974 and prices rose considerably for food, services, public

transport, clothing, wood and wood products from 1978 without an equivalent rise in wages. Petrol, gas, oil and electricity followed in 1979 and rationalisation of food was introduced in 1981. Reliable data are only to a limited degree available. Calculations made by the IMF, however, provide an example for 1983: The standard of living fell by the extent between 19 per cent and 40 per cent, according to the report. 2.5 million school children and university students were forced to quit studies and work in the agricultural sector in 1981, 2 million in 1982 (George<sup>o</sup>cu 1991: 261). New Stalinisation, like in the 1950s, had been introduced with total leadership control. The industry had failed. High production rates of machinery, chemicals, and steel could not be sustained in a country lacking raw materials. Expensive imports of those were necessary instead. Plans were set at 9,9 – 10,6 per cent growth rates for net material production, and 13,3 – 14,2 per cent in gross industrial product for the 1985 - 1990 plan (George<sup>o</sup>cu 1991: 268). Ceausescu blamed his failed dispositions publicly on the world economic crisis as the population saw only a decline of living standard. The only solution was a reorientation of trade towards the Soviet Union. Trade with the Soviet Union made up 17 per cent of the total in 1982, increasing to 34 per cent in 1986. Thus, orientation had changed again.[\[16\]](#)

## **Implications for democratisation possibilities**

The modernisation paradigm includes economic development as a major variable for democratisation (Huntington 1968, Lipset 1959). Lipset used it as exclusive predictor variable for the needed differentiation of society. This analysis of Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu's Romania does not include detailed and reliable data on economic development necessary for testing these theses. It has not been possible to retrieve such data. Pasti also stated that data on economic development in Romania before the revolution are unavailable. Those published by the regime were manipulated (Pasti 1999). This problem occurs in every totalitarian and sultanistic regime. Repression of voices that counter official versions of reality are repressed and the governments issue manipulated data. These problems raise serious methodological concern with the uncritical use of GDP per capita data in Lipset's theory. As an alternative, qualitative assessments should be made of the economic situation, combining this variable with other variables in order to have a broader analysis.

Pasti concluded that economic development and distribution were the main causes of the mass uprisings in 1989. Desperation was fuelled by relative deprivation after Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu had announced in 1998 that all foreign debt had been paid off and better times were to come (Pasti 1997: 88). Tökes supports Pasti's conclusion with reference to the last period of Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu's reign, where the people only got poorer. According to Tökes, this is why the revolution came about. Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu had deprived the people of everything. No electricity, no bread and no butter were available. "This misery was so general and so overwhelming that it made people revolt against Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu. Not only for some strata of the people was the situation bad, but for everybody, except for the Communist nomenclature" (Tökes 2000).

Still, privileges were reduced. The militia, the army, the Securitate, and even Ceaucescu's personal guard experienced it. Privileges were becoming less significant, and as the lower echelons of these institutions suffered from economic deprivation, they started identifying with the working class. In the end, the regime fell because there was no one to support it anymore (Pasti 1997: 77). Lack of support from these units was what gave the revolution such a short duration. A private army, excluded from the economic problems, is what hypothetically could have saved Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu (Pasti 1997: 85). Securitate privileges had become higher than army privileges. Opposition between army officers had occurred and the lower echelons had started identifying with the working class (Pasti 1997: 77). These units were necessary pillars of regime support. Bureaucrats started resisting the dictator's policies. The population and the institutions had been increasingly frustrated by the state of the economy.

Long-lasting economic deterioration favoured the occurrence of uprisings. With reference to Przeworski and Limongi's critics of Lipset's thesis, it is concluded that economic variables cannot explain why the revolution came at this particular moment in time. Estimates by the International Monetary Fund provide an example for economic conditions by quoting a fall in living standards between 19 per cent and 40 per cent for 1983 (George<sup>o</sup>cu 1991: 260). Food rationing had existed for years in 1989. The economic level in the pre-transition phase cannot be documented. Despite the lack of data for using Lipset's thesis, it is evident that the economy was deteriorating and that it contributed to people's general desperation.

A focus on class for an analysis of non-democratic Romania would necessarily have to divide between those receiving privileges from supporting the regime and those who did not. The development of an independent middle class is impossible in a sultanistic regime because privileges are reserved for those working for the Party, the army and the security police. This fact contradicts modernisation theory's explanatory power for sultanistic regimes. People belonging to these units will constitute the privileged class. These strata are the closest answer to a middle class, in respect of material standards. The decline of these groups' material standards facilitates the chances for a transition, successful or not. Chances of the development of an independent middle class are at their lowest in a sultanistic regime. The implication is that waning privileges had a positive impact on the chances of a transition. It had to be initiated by the masses. Lack of loyalty within the supposedly supportive pillars made these strata less loyal to the former regime. The time span of the revolution was shortened since these units would be more likely to join the masses. Disloyal units of the army and security are a precondition for a transition to succeed. A revolution, in turn, is a necessary factor for a democratic consolidation, but not sufficient. The economic conditions were unfavourable for democratic consolidation, according to the modernisation paradigm.

Lipset identified the strains for the consolidation phase in the following way:

*The greater the importance of the central state as a source of prestige and advantage, the less likely it is that those in power – or the forces of opposition – will accept rules of the game that institutionalise party conflict and result in the turnover of those in office (Lipset 1994: 4).*

This definition gives a negative causal connection between sultanism variables and consolidation tasks. All economic privileges are concentrated in the regime units in a sultanistic regime. Thus economic features of this regime have a relatively strong, negative impact on the chances for democratisation. Privileged groups dominated Romania's economic history. The liberalisation of voting rights was late as a result of the boyars' dominating role and the weak middle class. The war interrupted the liberal process and the communist dictatorship halted the development of an independent middle class for a period of 54 years. Communism and its economic features were imposed by geopolitical variables. This co-variation is strong. Geo-politics also facilitated neo-Stalinisation, since the country was of relatively minor strategic importance. Neo-Stalinisation hindered aspirations of tendencies towards independent middle class development and also halted the liberal process that had been initiated.

*Variable two: The economic history of Romania hindered the development of a liberal tradition and the emergence of a relatively independent middle class. It facilitated revolution as a possible transition mode, which in turn had a strong negative impact on the chances of a democratic consolidation.*

This variable is inspired by Karl and Schmitter's conclusion that revolutions "rarely evolve into patterns of fair competition, unrestricted contestation, tolerance for rotation in power and free associability" (Karl and Schmitter 1991: 280). Economic deterioration was not the only factor that brought about the transition. Such a conclusion would be contradicted by society's first response that came from Timisoara. This city belongs to Transylvania, a district that had higher economic standards than the rest of the country (Rady 1992: 83). Economic deterioration may have been the factor that

made this population initiate the revolution. Economic development, however, can neither explain why it started in this particular area nor explain its time point. Brasov workers had rioted also in 1987. The Securitate repressed the demonstrations. The conclusion is that an analysis of the regime's institutions is necessary. Regime coherence was sufficient for preserving the dictatorship in 1987 but not in 1989.

## **Variable three: Degree of coherence in pre-democratic institutions**

Huntington analysed the institutional character of political organisations with reference to the scope of support and level of institutionalisation (Huntington 1968: 103). This thesis examines his arenas in order to shed light on Romania's pre-democratic institutions. With "scope of support", Huntington referred to the strata from which the organisation seeks support. Since the aim of political organisations aim is popular support, according to the theory, the organisations referred to differ. This thesis' institutions not only aimed at the repression of the people, but also depended on support; otherwise they would have to use resources on further repression, which in turn will weaken their legitimacy. Strong popular illegitimacy may strain their survivability. "Level of institutionalisation" shows an organisation's process of acquiring value and stability. Strength of organisations is comparable through four aspects: The first one refers to adaptability-rigidity. It encompasses an organisation's ability to adapt to changing environments. The stronger this ability, the higher the organisation's adaptability. An organisation with a large number of sub-units and tasks has better possibilities of maintaining loyalty and is more able to adapt if it loses part of its purpose. Thus high complexity means high degree of institutionalisation. More autonomy means better ability to achieve the organisation's purpose. Degree of autonomy is the third aspect. The institutions covered in this thesis are objects of the dictator's personal wishes. Level of institutionalisation thus means degree of loyalty to his wishes. The dimension coherence of procedures is understood through level of consensus. As the dictator decides the aims, opposition to these aims means less coherence. The less opposition present, the higher its coherence and thus the higher its level of institutionalisation.

### **The Communist Party**

Popular support was strongest among the minorities in 1945. The four central leaders Ana Parker, Vasile Luca, Teohari George<sup>o</sup>cu, and Gheorghe Gheorgiu-Dej, who was appointed first secretary in October 1945, all performed a pro-Soviet image. Their anti-Romanian propaganda attracted support from minorities. The Russification of Romanian institutions was introduced, most visible in schools and in universities. The name, however, was changed to the Romanian Workers' Party in 1948, which would avoid anti-Soviet sentiments of ethnic Romanians. Communism was associated with the Soviet Union and Russification would be easier implemented as a "hidden agenda". Membership rose from less than 1000 in 1944 to more than 800.000 in 1947 (George<sup>o</sup>cu 1991: 226).

The post-war period witnessed strong tensions between "Moscowites" and nationally- minded Communists who favoured independence from Kremlin. Parker represented the former group and Gheorghiu-Dej the latter one. He had initiated the power struggle with his refusal of adherence to Khrushchev. In 1955, the Kremlin objected in vain to Gheorghiu-Dej taking the Prime Minister post in addition to being first secretary.

The development took its major turn at the party congress that year. Talks concerning a "Romanian road to socialism" and "adapting Marxism to local circumstances" occurred for the first time. Sovereignty of states and non-interference in the affairs of other states was emphasised by the nationalist faction. They referred to the uprisings in Poland and Hungary. Gheorghiu-Dej and his group won the battle. Their victory was facilitated by Stalin's illness, his anti-Semitic outbursts and bad

impressions given through his performance in the Korean War, according to George<sup>o</sup>cu. These factors strengthened popular anti-Soviet sentiments, in addition to enlarging the Party's nationalist faction. The removal of Soviet forces from Romanian territory in 1958 strengthened the nationalists' confidence in the possibilities of realising their strategy without provoking conflicts with the patron. Maurer, Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu formed the ruling troika after 1958. "Romanisation" of the party and more liberal policies were introduced. In 1965, completed de-Russification and "Romanisation" was visible in schools where Russian had been replaced by English, French, and German as primary foreign languages. Attention to literature had also been changed from the Slavic tradition to the Romanian one. The country was now economically orientated towards the West. Membership had risen from 720,000 in 1950 to 1,450,000 in 1965 (George<sup>o</sup>cu 1991: 237). This development progressed and showed a total of around two million in 1970, about 10 per cent of the population. Membership of the Party had become a prerequisite for career possibilities.

The Party changed its character from dominance by academics to dominance by workers during the 1970s, in this sense following communist ideology. Ideological purity with reference to the "dictatorship of the proletariat" was the official justification of it. Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu's strategy consisted, however, of eliminating potential opposition. The new leadership characteristics combined with rotation of posts should eliminate alternative bases of power. This anti-intellectual strategy implicated bad economic policies and gave a gradual deterioration of the economy. Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu managed to centralise authority from Party secretariat to his person. The "cult of personality" was again a dominating aspect. All economic dispositions were subject to his wishes. His family was installed in prominent positions. These "family dynasty" features classify Romania as both a strong sultanistic and a strong totalitarian regime between 1974 and 1989 (Linz and Stepan 1996: 356). By 1987, the level of party membership had reached 3.6 million.

Eighty per cent of the party members and 78 per cent of the party apparatus had a working class or peasant background.

For an analysis of the Romanian Workers' Party's autonomy a definition of its purpose is needed. It can be defined as the introduction of a classless society, in line with communist ideology. The question is through which institutional aspect(s) we can identify the failure. The answer lies first and foremost in its lack of autonomy. Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu's personal interests finally won over the communist ideology and the purpose of the organisation was subsequently changed. The loss of communist ideology's predominance was possible through the lack of coherence grounded in the disputes between the "Moscowites" and the nationalists. Gheorghiu-Dej won and autonomy from the Soviet Union was achieved. The Party gained institutional complexity throughout the period as it became established in all sectors of society and was active in the workplaces, in educational institutions, and in all other societal sectors. The first sign of institutional non-coherence was visible with Brucan and six former high-ranking Party officials addressing the critical "Letter of Six" at Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu in 1987, which is covered in the next chapter.

## **The Securitate**

The Securitate was formed in 1948. Its functions were shared with those of the army, the Ministry of the Interior, and, until the early 1980s, the Patriotic Guards. As a sub-unit of the Ministry of the Interior, its main responsibilities consisted of intimidation and harassment of political opponents, diplomatic surveillance, investigation of crime in general and manipulation of official statistics. The First Directorate was established in every county, city, and village as administrative units.[\[17\]](#) The command structure of the Securitate is not clear. Estimates on the number of full-time and part-time workers and informants vary from 15,000 to 70,000, according to alternative Western estimates (Rady 1992: 56), so the extension of it is unclear.

An institutional analysis of the Securitate must divide between the period from 1948 to the mid-1980s

and the following mid-1980s – 1989. The unit was not dissolved after the revolution, but that period does not belong to this analysis. In the first period the Securitate had a high degree of adaptability, as it was able to perform its tasks despite the regime changing its direction from pro-Soviet Union to relative independence between the Western and the Communist worlds. The Securitate remained loyal and performed its tasks in periods of Stalinisation, liberalisation and national Stalinisation. Its ability to adapt to these changing circumstances indicates a high degree of institutionalisation for the first period. The mere overview of the unit's directorates proves a diversified scope of tasks. The estimates of involved employees and informants vary. Nevertheless, if we use the lower estimates, the organisation still consists of a large number of people performing tasks that covered all areas where opposition could occur. The Securitate remained loyal to the dictator throughout this period and showed no signs of autonomy.

The exact dividing line between the two Securitate periods will necessarily be a subject to discussion. It is not certain when opposition to the official tasks occurred or its exact contents, though it is obvious that disloyalty was what made the revolution succeed. Some point to a lack of coherence from the mid-1980s (Pasti 1999). Others say that the process started in the mid-1970s (Ratesh 1991). What is concluded is that this arena weakened the organisation's degree of institutionalisation. However, lack of ability in adapting to the harsh repression orders in a poorer country was what inspired it. Weakening adaptability and coherence in the Securitate enabled the removal of Ceau°escu. An interesting indication of this institution's development can be observed in the fact that the Securitate repressed riots in Brasov in November 1987 with great brutality whereas the Timisoara and Bucharest riots in December 1989 were not. This fact proves a weakening coherence in this period. Conspiracies may have organised the unit's development.

## **The army**

The Romanian army, like all other sectors of society, became personalised and ideologised as Ceau°escu introduced the sultanistic characteristics to the country. This change created frustration among segments that understood the role of a legitimate military unit solely as a defender of national borders. The economic problems of the 1980s heightened frustration. Privileges were becoming less significant. The lower echelons started identifying with the working class as these institutions started suffering from economic deprivation (Pasti 1997: 77).

Defence Minister Milea did not act resolutely as the revolution was initiated in Timisoara. It is not known if this lack of loyalty was an expression of a conspiracy or if it reflects decisions taken in that phase. The NSF, after its official establishment, promised an investigation of the army's role in the revolution in 1990. The result, however, was limited to the incidents in the Timis province and it was never published (Nelson 1992: 99). Deputy Minister of Defence and army Chief of Staff General Militaru has described a conspiracy in which he himself took part for years in co-operation with Maurer (Ratesh 1991: 91). This statement forms a part of the basis for Ratesh's conspiracy theory. Their goal was to remove Ceau°escu from leadership, but not necessarily to replace the communist system. The plotters had planned an uprising for the summer 1990. According to Pasti, the army was all the time loyal to the organs that had the power. Ceau°escu was arrested after his escape because the army started to obey the new authorities (Pasti 1999). Although this conclusion might indicate high degree of coherence, it may also indicate that the army leaders participated in a conspiracy.

The Romanian army in the Communist era cannot be termed a highly institutionalised unit if we use the common definition of an army's purpose, namely the defence of the national borders. The Romanian army was not fully autonomous as it gradually had its tasks shared with the Securitate. The army neither adapted to a worsening national economic situation nor managed the relative decline of privileges. The lack of loyalty during the riots in Timisoara shows the lack of consensus on domestic



tasks. Ratesh's conspiracy theory says that a coup had been planned. Pasti, however, states that the army stayed loyal to those in power at all times. If this is the case, the army managed to adapt to the new environment of having a new authority and a new regime. This applies to the leaders. Lower echelons, however, failed to support Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu. They did not adapt to him as an authority when the societal environment changed into uproar.

Lastly, the tasks of a military unit are not complex. In a democracy its single task is to defend the borders of the country. Although the Romanian army was given a new task in defending the dictator, it cannot be regarded complex in its institutional features.

## **Institutions and facilitated transition modes**

The communist dictatorship was imposed by the superpowers after the Second World War as the Soviet Union was given authority over the country. Ethnic minorities accepted Communism more easily since they were attracted by the anti-Romanian contents. Geo-political variables, likewise, secured relative independence for the conspirators from external involvement before the revolution and gave society the hope that the Soviet Union would not interfere if they rioted against the regime. Gorbachev's Doctrines One and Two (see Chapter Five) gave national governments greater elbow-room while enabling Romanian leaders to continue repressions.

Geo-politics provided the framework for possible Party, army, and Securitate non-coherence. Economic deterioration of the 1980s facilitated it. This provided a major incentive for society to riot. The next chapter demonstrates that conspiring groups were waiting for sufficiently low economic performance in order to have society side with them.

An army defends the borders of a democratic state. The Romanian army shared tasks with the Securitate. As will be illustrated, the army co-operated with the Securitate as Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu was kidnapped. Pasti states that an army's responsibility is to obey a country's authorities at all times. If the Party and Securitate conspiracy group with which the army co-operated in the kidnapping of the Ceau<sup>o</sup>escus are defined as legitimate rulers by this time, we conclude that the army followed its purpose as Pasti defines it (Pasti 1999). Alternatively, it may be stated that kidnapping the Ceau<sup>o</sup>escus contravened Romanian laws at the particular time. Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu was still the country's dictator. That interpretation would contradict Pasti's conclusion. This approach decides whether the army is to be understood as autonomous or not. The analysis will demonstrate the relatively high likelihood that the army co-operated with conspiracy groups before the revolution. The army this way showed an increasing degree of autonomy. The next chapter examines the anti-Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu conspiracy and gives a definition of its rationale.

Like the army, the Party and the Securitate also showed increasing degrees of autonomy by freeing themselves from Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu's dictates. These processes were necessary for a transition in the form of an imposition to occur. Lack of liberal traditions, however, would have negative impacts on the roles of these institutions throughout the actual transition process. Romanian history recounts that only a short democratic intermezzo had existed. An essential element for a democratic consolidation is involved actors' ability and will to compromise. Such traditions were not present. The Romanian Workers' Party stopped such aspirations, which would necessarily complicate a consolidation process. The Securitate, likewise, created widespread fear and hindered civil society development. The conclusion based on Variable One was that a revolution could be an available transition mode in Romania. As conspiracy groups developed with the intention of removing Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu, it follows that an imposed transition would also be available, as would a combination of both. The lack of a liberal tradition, however, would present relatively low chances of an imposition to give a peaceful transition to democracy: Conspiring groups would be tempted to secure continuity of power privileges.

*Variable three: Increased army autonomy and decreased Securitate and Party coherence enabled a transition in the form of an imposition. The long duration of the Communist Party's authority and particularly the effectiveness of the Securitate would have a strong, negative impact on the chances of democratic consolidation in Romania, as liberal traditions were limited.*

Upward funnel influence from the institutions variable is documented on the economic development variable: The communist system considered ideology to be more important than economic performance. This led to a relatively worsening economic performance. After the mid-1960s, attention to ideology was replaced by the "cult of personality". The dictator's personal wishes decided economic priorities.

## **Variable four: Civil society development and roles**

### **Repressed protests**

The first signs of total repression of civil society was the liquidation of the Antonescu regime's leaders and later of the members of the National Peasant Party. The only resistance aspirations in the post-war era occurred in the Transylvanian Mountains (Cornea 2000, Appendix). The Securitate repressed them.

A few attempts at workers organisation occurred from the mid-1970s. 35,000 miners in the Jiu valley went on strike in 1977. The Free Union of the Working People of Romania was founded in 1979 but only existed for two weeks. Anti-regime protests had a general upturn with thousands of workers on hunger march in Brasov in 1987, followed up by protests in Iasi, Timisoara, Cluj-Napoca, and Bucharest.

Hyde-Price claims that the Helsinki Final Act from 1975 had meant better living conditions for dissidents and civil society throughout the Eastern European region (Hyde-Price 1994: 239).<sup>[18]</sup> The fact that Ceau°escu intensified his repression in the following period shows that he did not feel obligated to the treaties, exemplified by the brutal repression of the hunger strike. Independent organisations, however, existed within religious communities from 1978 onwards, most notably in Orthodox, Baptist, and other evangelical communities. Political perspectives and aims were formulated. Fundamentalist Christian movements counted more than 500,000 members. Religious dissent, however, by 1984-1985, had been reduced to the issues of religious matters as a result of harsher measures chosen by the authorities. Political overtones had disappeared. Common reactions included imprisoning leaders or sending them to psychiatric hospitals (George°cu 1991: 277).

Neither intellectuals nor the clergy expressed moral support for the societal uprisings of the 1970s and the 1980s. Cornea construes this as demonstrating the lack of collaboration between these groups (Cornea 2000Appendix). Laszlo Tökes, who started the 1989 revolution in Timisoara, exemplifies the lack of organisation behind the dissidents. He made his struggle for religious and ethnic rights alone without relying upon an organisation with other dissidents (Tökes 2000, Appendix). This statement is supported by the fact that none of his fellow clergy joined his protests in 1989 (Rady 1992: 88). No united movements were formed despite Tökes having friends seeking similar goals and being aware of other dissidents' existence. Co-operation with fellow believers in Hungary and Germany, for the purpose of exchanging religious material, was the only form of cross-border collaboration that occurred. A foreign reporter smuggled out material on Ceau°escu's March 1988 announcement of his plan to destroy villages. Hungarian television broadcast it and spread the news across the Carpathian basin (Tökes 2000, Appendix). Nonetheless, no support occurred.

All schools, universities and cultural institution had to adapt to the official ideology. This meant a pro-

Slavic orientation after the war, later to be replaced by the nationalistic one. Literature not responding to the pro-Slavic direction regarding the first period and the pro-Romanian in the second one was censored. Some writers protested against this policy and against political procedures generally: Dimitru Tepeneaz presented the first major attempt in the early 1970s. The university professor in Cluj-Napoca, Doina Cornea, was the most well-known critic among the intellectuals. She wrote letters to Radio Free Europe and international radio stations were her vital weapons for spreading news on the repression in Romania. Others included Dan Desliu, Dan Petrescu, Gabriel Andreescu, and Doriu Tudorau (Cornea 2000). Like Tökes, she highlighted the lack of organisation and the isolated positions of the dissidents. Cornea claimed that the immediate period after the change of power from Gheorghiu-Dej to Ceausescu in 1968 to have included greater freedom. This conclusion is supported by Tökes, who considers 1968 – 1970 as being a liberalised period, followed by the introduction of, in his terms, Chinese-like dictatorial methods.

The conclusion is that the OSCE achievements may have generated more attention to the Romanian dissidents and provided necessary international support. Nevertheless, it was insufficient for the founding of a dissidence movement in Romania. Further, there was a lack of alliances between workers, intellectuals, the clergy and other groups. Segments of the urban population listened to foreign broadcasts and were informed about international events in the pre-revolutionary phase (Pasti 1999, Preda 1999). They also had a source of information in visitors from other countries, sometimes bringing newspapers with them.

## **Implications for democratisation**

White defined “civil society” as organisations that are “representing interests that can be modern or traditional, formal or informal and legal or illegal” (Diamond 1994: 379). These organisations reflect different social, cultural, political and economic structures and thereby the distribution of power. According to Diamond, civil organisations are separated from political organisations because they do not seek political power (Diamond 1994: 6).

The liberal tradition, as represented by Putnam, sees these organisations as positive for democratisation (Strømsnes and Selle 1997: 5). They co-ordinate the people’s will through horizontal networks that accumulate social capital. Bayart understood civil society as opposed to the state (Diamond 1994). This thesis intends to combine these civil society definitions into one that captures the relevant features necessary for this study. Thus “civil society” is understood as “organisations where social capital is accumulated through horizontal networks in opposition to the regime”.

The Marxist perspective, as represented by Hegel, interpreted the state as a reflection of society’s organisation (Diamond 1994: 94). This tradition sees civil society as characterised by the confrontation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Applied to this study, the crucial dividing line concerning material and social standards in Romania was between those having privileges through connections to the Party, to the Securitate, or to the army on the one hand and the rest of the population on the other. The privileged groups were the representatives of the state structures. The most important dividing line was thus following the Marxist definition of the one between the people and the state. The privileged class repressed all attempts at independent organisation against these privileged groups.

As an implication, no civil society existed in Romania. The Securitate had repressed it through sultanist policies. Pacted transitions involve negotiations between the authorities and independent groups. This transition mode would be unlikely. A revolution could be possible by means of involving spontaneous uprisings by individuals with the common goal of removing the repressive class from power. On the other hand, privileged groups would have easier access to the power apparatus if the dictator could be removed, since no civil society organisation would be available to counter such a process. Thus imposition is also facilitated as transition mode.

*Variable four: The complete repression of civil society implied revolution, imposition, or a combination of both as available transition mode in Romania. The absence of civil society would have a strong, negative impact on consolidation tasks since organisational experience needs time to develop.*

The lack of a Romanian civil society additionally implied a lack of experienced representation of societal watersheds during and after a consolidation process. This includes also organisations that could work for mutual understanding between ethnic groups and their integration. Potentials for development of liberal traditions would have a weak starting point. As far as the economy was concerned, there were no organisations present capable of countering economic policies and work for alternatives under the dictatorship. Such organisations would have to be developed.

## **Variable five: Aspiring nomenclaturists and dissidents**

### **Nicolae Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu**

Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu was born in 1918 in the Olt County. His parents were poor peasants of ethnic Romanian origin. He was General Secretary of the Union of Communist Youth after World War II. Thereafter, he advanced to head of the Romanian Communist Party Organisation Bureau, was member of the Party Secretariat, Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces, and Secretary of the Central Committee in 1955. He appointed friends during his advancement and thereby secured support. His ethnic and class background, combined with an anti-Semitic and a nationalist profile, attracted the rank-and-file of the Party. Ceausescu stayed loyal to Gheorghiu-Dej throughout the 1940s and 1950s and supported his pro-Moscow policies.

Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu advanced to Party leader on March 19 1965 on the death of Gheorghiu-Dej, who had appointed Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu as his successor. Authority was shared with Prime Minister Ion Maurer and Chief of State Chivu Stoica. His first goal was achieved as most of the “Moscowites” were neutralised at the ninth party congress. This was his first success in narrowing the bases of power. Stoica was forced out in 1967–1968 and Maurer had to abandon any ambitions for leadership positions. Effective leadership was concentrated in Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu’s hands by 1969. His next move was to change the law to enable the posts of Secretary-General and President of the State Council to be combined. Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu soon controlled the Executive Committee and the Defensive Committee as well.

Romania did not participate in the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia. Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu criticised the manoeuvre and attempted to create a popular fear that Romania might be the next target, thus attempting to gain loyalty. Through strict Stalinisation, the party leadership had eliminated internal opposition. Relative geo-political independence, combined with homogenisation of the Party leadership, was used for distancing it from its satellite position. Romanisation of culture and anti-Soviet propaganda were motivated by the goal of controlling the population’s mentality. Anti-Soviet sentiments were encouraged. Through liberalisation, increased wages, and relative freedom of intellectual and cultural life he enhanced his popularity. Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu managed to achieve a middle position between east and west, and started the process of neo-Stalinisation after gaining control of the Party leadership. This process took place within an environment of economic progress. The last hindrance in his power struggle was Maurer. Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu criticised him openly for refusing socialist ideas. Maurer was forced to leave his positions in 1974. The end of the power struggle can be placed in 1974, with Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu becoming president of Romania. His Stalinist methods were kept secret from the Western world until the mid-1980’-s. Vice president Bush praised Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu as a “good communist” in 1984.

The nationalist strategy was used again as the Eastern European block was becoming increasingly unstable by the end of the 1980s. Ceaușescu made anti-Semitic, anti-Hungarian and anti-Russian statements after riots in 1987 and attempted to distance himself from the other communist leaders, instead of identifying with former national leaders. Myths were worshipped in order to give him a position amongst great heroes. He showed an obsession with history and attempted to implant it in people's minds as well.

Ceaușescu adopted the cult of personality characteristics that had been introduced to Romanian politics by Antonescu as he appointed himself Conducator (leader). Not only Nicolae, but his closest family as well, was meant to be an object of worship. Elena was promoted as a great scientist. Mass demonstrations -that were becoming more superficial in the 1970s - were arranged for popular support of the Ceaușescus.<sup>[19]</sup> His defiant attitude to Moscow earned him high popular status. Not only was the leader extraordinary; a myth of the Romanian population as biologically superior through athleticism, industry, and revolutionary spirit was also attempted.

### Three opponents

Ion Iliescu was born in 1930, the son of communist parents, and became a Communist Party member in 1944. He had met Ceaușescu in a Second World War prison camp and proved to be a loyal supporter. After his return, Iliescu was Chairman of the Romanian Union of Student Associations. He repressed the supportive demonstrations of the 1956 Hungarian uprisings. This act made him secretary of the youth organisation of the Party. He advanced to Central Committee member in 1964, responsible for propaganda and ideology. In this position, part of his role was to promote the Ceausescu cult. At some stage, disagreements emerged and Iliescu was sent to the Timis County in the 1970s. He was stripped of all his Party and government positions in 1984. According to his personal statements, the reason was opposition to Ceausescu. He claims to have opposed Ceaușescu since the early 1970s, after Ceaușescu's trip to North Korea in 1971. According to Iliescu, this trip inspired Ceaușescu to introduce a Cultural Revolution in Romania (Ratesh 1991: 50). As a result of his protests, Iliescu was accused of "intellectualism" and banished to the countryside. Officially, however, no signs of opposition prior to his protests against the Brasov repression in 1987 can be traced.

Gilbert raises the theory that Iliescu may have been Gorbachev's preferred successor of Ceausescu because of his perestroika-like preferences (Gilbert 1990: 123). Iliescu did have a certain protection in his international connections and Ceausescu had restricted possibilities of controlling him. Not only did he have connections to the Soviet Union, he also had many allies and friends within the Romanian Communist Party. Iliescu, however, was later able to exploit this outsider position in order to gain popular sympathy. Did Iliescu support such liberalisation? Ratesh suggests the hypothetical existence of a conspiracy group within the Securitate, led by Virgil Magureanu, Stefan Gheorghiu, and Iliescu. In collaboration with plotters in the Party, their goal is presented as the removal of Ceausescu from leadership, but not necessarily replacing the communist system. According to Militaru, these conspiracy groups were in fact inspired by Gorbachev's liberalisation. The plotters had planned an uprising for the 1990 summer (Ratesh 1991: 91). Georgecu describes Iliescu as a reform communist who wanted a looser form of the one-party system. He refers to Iliescu's 21 December 1989 speech to students where he called political pluralism "an obsolete ideology of the nineteenth century" (Georgecu 1991: 289).

According to Preda, Iliescu, through his role in the revolution and in the consolidation phase, has not shown himself as being a convinced democrat. His stating in 1989 that the ideas of socialism had been rejected by the communist regime provides an example. Preda claims that Iliescu saw himself as the successor of Ceaușescu. His intention would be to change the system, seeking instead something like the socialism of the 1960s and 1970s.

Silviu Brucan was born in 1916 and became a Communist Party member in 1944. He subsequently

advanced to the position of Chief Editor of the Party paper, *Scinteia*. He was ambassador to the United States and the United Nations between 1956 and 1962. By being Jewish and having an intellectual background, he annoyed Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu. He worked for a brief period in television from 1966 and was thereafter professor of Marxism at the University of Bucharest. After criticising the repression of the Brasov riots in 1987, he was placed under house arrest. However, Brucan was also one of those who could use his international network of contacts and could not simply be extinguished.

Brucan claims to have been dismissed from his diplomatic career as a result of uneasiness with Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu. He gave the Radio Free Europe an interview and directed the “Letter of Six” (Appendix) at Ceausescu in 1988, through which his alternative views to those of Ceausescu can be identified. His views on the relation between Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu’s Romania and “true socialism” is illustrated by his describing the NSF as a “supra-ideological body above the old terms like Socialism, Marxism, Communism, Leninism, and capitalism”. There would be no need for other parties to exist, according to Brucan (Nelson 1992: 23). The “Letter of Six” included the co-signatures of several former leading figures of the Party. Addressed to Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu, it created a platform for potential internal opposition in the Party, but it did not create a dissidence group (Ratesh 1991: 11). The BBC and RFE broadcast it in March 1989.

Dimitru Mazilu used to work as a Professor of Law and as a delegate to the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations. As he wanted to make Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu’s abuses of human rights public in 1987, he was dismissed from his position in Geneva. Despite this, he was able to smuggle out reports.

## **Two central dissidents**

Laszlo Tökes, born in 1952, belongs to a two-century-old family dynasty of pastors in the Calvinist Reformed Church in Timisoara. He criticised the cult surrounding the bishops in Cluj - Napoca and Oradea, and fought for human and religious rights for the protestant Hungarians in Romania (Rady 1992: 85). He characterised his own bishop as his second major target and as a pro-communist (Tökes 2000). This led to his dismissal as deputy bishop and lecturer in 1983. He contributed throughout the 1980s to the dissidence publication, *Ellenpontak*, and gave interviews to Hungarian radio and television, spreading news on human rights violations. These activities brought him into conflict with the Department of Cults. His opposition intensified by the end of the 1980s and in 1989 he was dismissed from all church duties. Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu’s so-called “modernisation plan”, consisting of the destruction of 8000 villages (International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights 1989), was also a main target of his opposition. The plan was announced in March 1989. Tökes struggled openly against what he characterised as a corrupt church leadership for the church community every Sunday from April 1989 onwards. He revealed the persecutions waged by the secret police and tried to breach the wall of silence on the destruction of the villages. This brought him support in the local community from people who helped him and his family through oppressions they had to suffer from the Securitate (Tolnay 1995: 158). On December 16 1989, he protested publicly in front of the church and was joined by crowds of people. This started the riots that escalated into a revolution.

Tökes maintains that his opposition had evolved gradually. He claims not to have been in contact with any potential allies from the regime structures but was safeguarded by international attention. The Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate tried to put pressure on the Romanian government after he had lost positions in 1983 (Rady 1992: 86). Likewise, the Hungarian government paid attention to his activities. The Hungarian parliament even proposed him as a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize. In order to avoid accusations against Tökes as having “nationalist” or “revisionist” motives, they changed the proposal and included Doina Cornea (Rady 1992: 88). According to Rady, international publicity saved him (Rady 1992: 88).

Doina Cornea worked as Professor in French at the University of Cluj-Napoca and was a member of the outlawed Greek Orthodox Church. She claims that all church communities were objects of oppression,

against which she protested. Elimination of all religious thought and practice was an official political goal manifested in the Romanian Constitution. Cornea was placed under house arrest from 1982 for recommending religious and philosophical texts to her students. She supported the rioting Brasov miners in 1987 by putting up papers stating her moral affiliation with them. Unlike Tökes, she was in contact with Party leaders who had protested against Ceau°escu's policies, amongst them Brucan (Cornea 2000, Appendix). She supports the conclusion about the lack of collaboration between workers, intellectuals, clergy, and other societal groups. Intellectuals seldom publicly supported workers when they went on strike or tried to organise.

Her resistance consisted basically of sending messages to Radio Free Europe during the last three years before the revolution, which were broadcast all over the country and the region. In these letters she criticised the regime and helped spread news that the regime tried to conceal. Writing in 1988, she requested Ceau°escu either to cede power or to implement reforms. Like Tökes, she put special emphasis on Ceau°escu's modernisation plan, which she called the "destruction of Romanian cultural traditions" (Rady 1992: 74). She had also experienced a gradually growing dissatisfaction with the regime (Cornea 2000). Radio Free Europe was her most important weapon in fighting the regime. It enabled her to spread her views and get in touch with the rest of the population and with foreign countries. This gave her support from the British, Belgian, and French governments. Additionally, she was awarded the Rafto price in Norway in 1989. This international support also protected her from eviction by Romanian authorities.

## Conclusions

The lack of liberal traditions in Romania and the absence of a civil society resulted in a situation where the focus of society would be more closely directed at dissidents in the event of a transition.


Nomenclaturists would also have easier access to power in such a situation. These advantages were facilitated by the fact that no organisations could counter their power. In turn, the central nomenclaturists who had protested against Ceausescu's policies were formed by the confrontational political culture. The "Letter of Six" shows that Brucan was interested in reforms of the communist system but not in democratisation. Iliescu, likewise, has made statements that underline such statements. He participated in the repression of the 1956 supportive demonstration of the Hungarian uprisings. Both of them were supporters of a socialist system. It is therefore concluded that neo-Stalinisation meant too harsh conditions and that this change in institutions' characteristics may have contributed to dissatisfaction. Like Ceau°escu, they belonged to a confrontational culture. The dictator himself, however, was able to use stronger measures and the economic downturn as a result of these policies may also have contributed. The repressive system was so harsh that only those who had an international name or were observed by the international community could continue protesting. These nomenclaturists and dissidents would be likely to figure as central participants in a hypothetical transition, most likely to occur in the form of an imposition or a revolution.

Variable five: Nomenclaturists and dissidents would be likely to have central positions in the case of a Romanian transition. The nomenclaturists would have access to the power apparatus. Their pro-communist allegiances would be likely to complicate a transition, implying at least a moderately and potentially a material adverse effect.

On the contrary and as documented, the change of international orientation from pro-Soviet via pro-West to relative independence resulted from the independence strategy of Ceau°escu and the coherent leadership. The Romanian transition involved ethnic hostilities that had been provoked by this regime under the dictatorship. The dictator's personal wishes were given precedence over economic programmes as expressions of ideology in the neo-Stalinisation period. Likewise, he was able to

repress attempts at forming an independent civil society that could pressure for change of course.

## Funnel and co-variation



**Figure 7: The Romanian Funnel of Causality**

Figure 7 shows the Funnel of Causality for Romania's structural background to the transition. The narrowing shape demonstrates variance reduction through the path-dependent strategy. Relative time duration in the values of variables that are regarded as influencing the outcome is indicated. To start with Variable One, the 1948 national project failed. Ethnic constellations changed in the following period, followed by intensified hostilities. Again, the nation building process was interfered with as cultural institutions experienced Russification after 1945 until 1965, when Romanisation was institutionalised again. The country was increasingly isolated after World War II. This process was supported by the removal of Soviet forces in 1958. Other European states had experienced similar state/nation building problems. The Romanian process, however, was put on hold from 1945 onwards, by the introduction of communist dictatorship. Accordingly, this year has been selected and this variable is given a relative duration of approximately 55 years. The numbers are not absolute but meant to indicate intensity in this variable's implications for the transition process.

The occurrence of the Romanian transition was facilitated by the economic downturn during the last 20 years of the dictatorship. Reliable data is lacking, nevertheless, it can be assumed, with a relatively high degree of confidence, that the population experienced adverse changes in this period. These experiences favoured revolutionary sentiments.

Communist institutions were introduced after World War II. Totalitarianism was mixed with Sultanism from 1974 onwards. The following 25 years approximately have been selected as particularly important because this process motivated institutional non-coherence, which had implications for the transition in favouring an imposition as transition mode in the form of a coup d'état. Civil society was repressed immediately by the introduction of communism and never recurred during its presence. This absence lasted about 55 years. A transition initiated by the masses would have to take the form of a revolution since no organisations were present that could negotiate. Thus these two transition modes were likely. No collaboration existed between intellectuals, authoritarians, and society, except from minor communication like between Brucan and Cornea. Involvement by Ceausescu and his loyalists would be impossible as these were non negotiation-minded. They would do their uttermost to repress



conspirators and society. Nevertheless, communists who favoured the totalitarian regime type of the pre-1974 era, without those dynastic institutions, performed protests with the “Letter of Six”. This was a rational act given geo-political and economic development, to be elaborated in Chapter Five. A transition as imposition could in this situation be possible if the conspirators would succeed in committing a coup d’etat without involving the masses. The masses, on the other hand, could revolt and remove the dictatorship with or without help from the conspiracy. A united force would however not occur, given the political culture and institutional and economic structures of the country. These conclusions are not definite. Structure cannot explain the total amount of variance. The conclusions show likely transition modes and a framework for actors’ choices.

## Hypotheses

The hypotheses that orient the analysis are anchored in the funnel. They are meant to shed light on connections between available transition modes given by the funnel and the actors’ roles. They are not central to this thesis’ analysis but shall open perspectives on alternative approaches oriented at structure-actor considerations. The hypotheses are inspired by Karl and Schmitter’s conclusions. The approach of this analysis, however, involves closer evaluations of the actors: Each actor has a self-interest that he seeks to maximise. Historical variables and the transition context form his preferences. Whereas Karl and Schmitter gave generalisations on transition modes, this analysis intends to find the structural conditions that formed actors’ preferences that, in turn, were unfavourable for democratisation in Romania. Thus, they are meant to broaden the structure-actor perspectives of this thesis and help the elaboration of transition theories.

*H1: The more exclusive the pre- transition regime leadership, the weaker the chance that all relevant actors will be included in interdependent accords.*

Such an exclusive regime has repressed alternative thoughts. Liberal traditions are weaker. This leads to the second hypothesis:

*H2: The weaker a country’s liberal traditions, the less likely the chance that participating actors in the transition process will maximise preferences that involve broad participation, a bargaining culture, and in turn democratisation without continuity of dominant classes’ privileges.*

The main interest lies in explaining how certain groups are excluded from positions in a transition from a highly repressive regime and why certain participating actors are not democratically minded:

*H3: Structural variables decide the available transition modes and the participating actors’ self interest in the transition.*

The intention is not to generalise. Conclusions will refer primarily to the case under scrutiny. Similar approaches to other cases, however, would give possibilities of making generalisations. Table 7 shows the relations of covariance that formed the funnel and gave the variables included in it.

Variable One

Downward influence

On V2: Communist economy imposed. On V3: Communist institutions imposed, easier among

minorities. Increased independence enables neo-Stalinisation. On V5: No culture of compromises. International attention necessary for performing protests.

#### Variable Two

##### Downward influence

On V3: Deterioration stimulated non-coherence. On V5: Incentives for nomenclaturists to protest.

##### Upward influence

On V1: Economic western orientation enforced geo-political reorientation. Economic deterioration enforced reorientation to the Soviet Union .

#### Variable Three

##### Downward influence

On V4: Hindered civil society development. On V5: Nomenclaturists could resume power if able to gain control over institutions during transition. Dissidents dependent upon international support. On V5: Spread resistance without organisational support. Stronger focus on dissidents.

##### Upward influence

On V1: Repression of liberal development. Nationalisation and repression of minorities. Relative geo-political independence. On V2: Ideology before economic theory gives deterioration.

#### Variable Four

##### Downward influence

On V5: Spread resistance without organisational support. Stronger focus on dissidents.

##### Upward influence

On V1: No representation of cleavages. No integration process between minorities. No development of liberal traditions. On V2: No pressure for alternative economic programmes. On V3: Inspired non-coherence.

#### Variable Five

##### Upward influence

On V1: Hard-liners took the country from a pro-Soviet position to relative independence and provoked ethnic hostilities. On V2: Dictator's personal wishes ranged before national economic concerns. On V3: Dictator changed institutions' purposes and provoked non-coherence. On V4: Dictator eliminated civil society through institutions.

### **Table 7: Variables' co-variance**

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[12] The Russian Tsar had expressed his concern to the European leaders over the development in Wallachia. A unification of Moldavia and Wallachia was also feared by European superpowers.

[13] An important hindrance was a class requirement for voting. Of greater importance was the literacy requirement that shut even more people out. Leaders of the liberal and conservative parties feared that voting rights to the uneducated might result in dictatorship.

[14] The Iron Guard was probably unaware of Antonescu receiving support from Hitler as they rebelled and demanded Sima for Prime Minister and their own representatives to form the entire government (George<sup>o</sup>cu 1991: 214). Antonescu put down the rebellion. Hitler offered him support but he refused.

[15] Major implications for national culture were a new constitution and tendencies of economic liberalisation. French, English, and German replaced Russian as school and university languages. History and sociology were allowed academic freedom and competence in natural sciences would be a necessity for the planned economic growth. Priority was therefore given to such subjects in universities. De-Russification was completed in 1963, with all the pro-Slavic institutes established between 1946 and 1948 closed. Nationalisation had applied to all societal sectors. Russian influence on Romanian cultural life was almost neutralised in 1965 with the death of Gheorghiu-Dej.

[16] Trade with socialist markets grew from 33.8 per cent of the total in 1980 to 57 per cent in 1985, with the Western share decreasing at an annual average of 27 per cent between 1981 and 1985. Annual state expenditures on housing decreased by 37 per cent, health care 17 per cent, and education, science, and culture by 53 per cent between 1980 and 1985. Limits for energy consumption were lower and the use of energy consuming tools was discouraged (George<sup>o</sup>cu 1991: 270).

[17] The Securitate was divided into seven directorates: Directorate One for internal newsgathering, economic information, counter espionage, military counter intelligence, guarding and order, criminal investigation, and Directorate Seven was responsible for informer networks. The UMO666 Presidential Protection Squad was accountable to Directorate Five, responsible for guarding and order. The Presidential Protection Squad had a practical function as the president's private army. (The USLA Anti-terrorist troops formed the other sub-unit of this directorate). The second branch of the Ministry of the Interior was the militia, of which the riot squad was a sub-unit.

[18] The Helsinki Final Act included meetings, seminars, economic co-operation, and human rights statutes, stating that such issues should be of international concern, not reserved for internal authority exclusively. The next step was the founding of the Office of High Commissioner of National Minorities in Copenhagen in 1990, meant for preventive diplomacy and normative standard setting.

[19] We gaze with reverence and with respect at the harmony of this family life. We attach special moral significance to the fact that his life, together with that of his comrade for life, the former textile worker and young communist militant, member of the party since the days when it was banned, today hero of Socialist Labour, scientist, member of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, Madame Comrade Elena Ceau'sescu, offer exemplary illustrations of the lives of two communists. And we should know that the three children of the President work, like all of us, to follow the example of their parents, to bring socialism to Romania.... (*Omagiu Presidentului Nicolae Ceau'sescu*, Bucharest: Editura Politica, 1978).



# CHAPTER 5

## Introduction: Actors and transition process

Karl and Schmitter's rather schematic approach is criticised in this chapter. The categorisation of transitions as either from above or from below, and as compromise or force, fails to examine interactions between actors performing strategies. The Romanian transition involved elements of several transition modes. The failure of conclusions that give fair possibilities of competition after a revolution when the institutions of the former regime have been formally removed will be scrutinised. Pasti and Skocpol's definitions (see Chapter One) are referred to. The Romanian transition depended on the rioting masses that could remove Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu from power with support from regime institutions. The focus is on the fact that a group of nomenclaturists, who were interested in liberalisation under their own supervision, controlled this process. Riots had been provoked and they intended to appear as exclusive alternative. A reform-minded nomenclaturist faction had earlier criticised Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu and given the impression of being negotiation-minded softliners. They lost an internal power game with softliners who turned out not to be so. These nomenclaturists manipulated society by pretending commitment to a fair and just democratic transition. Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu understood that his power was at risk, and acted rationally throughout the process, given his preferences. Society and the dissidents lost. The nomenclaturist group that firstly appeared as Brucan and the signatories to his anti-Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu protest "Letter of Six", were the "Reformists". Society was informed about their existence on March 11, 1989. The next time this group appeared was with the formation of the National Salvation Front on December 22, with Iliescu, Roman, and Mazilu as its leaders. Following Ratesh's conclusions, Dumitru Mazilu, Stefan Guse, Iliescu, Roman, Brucan, the Securitate generals Nicolae Militaru and Victor Stanculescu, the Commander of the special troops Colonel Ardelanu are also included in this group. Likewise, Party member Alexandru Birladeanu, who was a signatory to the "Letter of Six", and the two former executive secretaries of the dictator Dumitru Apostoliu and Vasile Nicolcioiu are included (Ratesh 1991: 54). About 200 people later joined this leadership and they are categorised as Reformists. Authority was vested in the self-appointed Executive Office of the NSF. All these people had seemingly similar preferences and supported the NSF. These conspirators enjoyed support from unidentified groups in the Securitate, the army, and the Party Executive Committee. Those present at the Ceau<sup>o</sup>escus' trial are also included. These are Deputy Minister of Defence at the time of the trial Gelu Voican-Voiculescu, Professor of Marxism Virgil Magureanu, and Stefan Gheorghiu, who had read the first NSF proclamation on TV after Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu's flight from Bucharest. Stanculescu arranged the false escape and the kidnapping of the Cea<sup>o</sup>escus. He was thereafter Minister of Defence after a brief period. Voican-Voiculescu was to be number two in Roman's forthcoming government and in April that year. Magureanu was appointed director of the newly created Romanian Intelligence Office. The NSF was further extended in the spring of 1990.

The Reformists needed society's support in order to perform a coup d'etat, since a power vacuum emerged during the revolution. In the "Letter of Six", they had presented themselves as interested in reforms of the socialist system. During the revolution they presented themselves with a pro-democracy image in order to secure popular support. The letter came at a time when increasing popular dissatisfaction with the regime was emerging. Thereby, they had first secured societal support for having the Involutionists removed. After Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu had been removed from power, a nomenclaturist faction appeared that was not so committed to negotiations as the other involved groups believed. They had joined the NSF and spread the rumour of being reformists in order to gain access to the competition for positions. These individuals were non negotiation-minded openists who wanted to

promote liberalisation, but not as extensively as the Reformists. Whereas the exact form of liberalisation would come through negotiations as following the Reformists' preferences, the Openists wanted to decide on these matters without involvement by the Reformists and Rupturists Three. Iliescu, Militaru, and Stanculescu formed one faction after the NSF internal split, and Mazilu and Brucan a second one (Pasti 1997: 213, Ramesh 1991: 139). Mazilu was eliminated from leadership positions and Brucan was forced out shortly after street riots on 12 January 1990 (Ramesh 1991: 129). The first group is analysed as Openists. Their initial belonging to the Reformists was an expression of a strategy, whereas their preferences followed the order of openists. The second ones represent those who were in fact Reformists. Preferences of reformists reflected their preferences.

The "Involutionists" are defined as Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu and those members of the PEC and army and Securitate leaders who in different periods supported him. This group changed through the three first games. For reasons of clarity, members of the PEC and leaders of the army and the Securitate are classified as belonging either to the Involutionists or to the Reformists for the period prior to the revolution. This analysis examines how power was changing from the former to the latter group throughout the process, as individuals changed loyalty towards the Reformists. Involutionists that left the Involutionists through the process joined the Reformists in the three first games. The Reformists were united by the common goal of having Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu and his supporters removed from power. As that task had been accomplished, true preferences appeared. In the fourth game it is likely that most of the former Involutionists-supporters joined the Openists rather than the Reformists, as the former's preferences are closer to those of involutionists.

Society was interested in a democratic transition and the removal of Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu from power. The situation of the Romanian population had become desperate. Limited reforms and better living conditions would have been preferred to continuity in the case where democratisation would not have been achievable. Rupturists One, Rupturists Two, and Rupturists Three represented society in the games. The demonstrators in Timisoara are Rupturists One and the demonstrators in Bucharest are Rupturists Two. Rupturists Three involved the dissident faction of the NSF plus the other members who did not have backgrounds as nomenclaturists. These included the dissidents Mihai Sora and Andrei Plesu as the NSF was formed on December 22, 1989. The dissidents Doina Cornea, Laszlo Tökes, Ana Blandina, and Mircea Dinescu were included during the first week of its existence. Societal interests were shown by the demonstrators in Timisoara and Bucharest, and by the dissidents of the NSF.

Table 8 gives an overview of the transition games. The Involutionists as an actor were weakened in number and strength to the advantage of the Reformists from Game One through Game Three. The Openists appeared in Game Four as individuals who supported the Reformists in the three first games, revealing their true preferences in Game Four. Rupturists Three gradually lost numerical size after NSF formation.

The identified games were connected. The actors' moves in each particular game should be understood as expressions of strategies for the process as a whole. Through Bayesian updating the actors' changing impressions of counter-players and of the process are illustrated. The games were dynamic: In every one of them, one player reacts to moves taken by another one. They all involve insufficient information for at least one player. Nature chose between sub-games since at least one of the players does not know the payoffs.

Brucan and the signatories opened the Romanian transition by addressing the sharply critical "Letter of Six" at Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu. It was written in the wake of the mass demonstrations in Brasov in November 1987 and broadcast on 11 March 1989. This last datum indicates the opening of the transition because this was when society was informed about possible liberalisation. Society received the signals and interpreted them as indications of seemingly non-coherence within regime institutions. Living conditions had become increasingly harsh in Romania. Society gained hope in possibilities of having Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu and his supporters removed from power. Society's moral support could be the necessary

factor.

Opposition		Soft-liners		Hard-liners		
Revolutionaries	Rupturists	Reformists	Openists	Continuists	Involutionists	
		Brucan and signatories to "Letter of Six" + supporters in the PEC and in army / Securitate leaderships			Ceausescu + supporters in PEC and army / Securitate leaderships	<b>Game One: Regime opening</b>
	Rupturists One: Demonstrators in Timisoara				Ceausescu + supporters in PEC and army / Securitate leaderships	<b>Game Two: The Timisoara uprising</b>
	Rupturists Two: Demonstrators in Bucharest				Ceausescu + supporters in PEC and Army / Securitate leaderships	<b>Game Three: Confrontation with the masses in Bucharest</b>
	Rupturists Three: Former dissidents and non-nomenclaturist NSF members	The Brucan/Mazilu-faction of the NSF	The Iliescu/Militaru/Stanculescu-faction of the NSF			<b>Game Four: The NSF's internal power game</b>

**Table 8: The actors and their preferences in the Romanian transition games**

The Involutionists could choose continuity or rupture as a response to this letter. Continuity would mean ignoring it and rupture could for example mean prison sentences. They chose the former option. On 2 March 1988, Ceau°escu announced his plan to destroy 8000 villages as part of an urbanisation process. This added to society's already high degree of frustration. Rupturists One rioted in Timisoara between December 16 and 20, 1989. The Involutionists secured continuity of their privileges and no reforms were given. Rupturists One, however, observed army and Securitate disloyalty as the repression was not total. The Romanians could now update their information. They concluded that the Reformists had won increased power, to use analytic terms. The riots by Rupturists Two in Bucharest between December 21 and 25 were also not repressed totally. Ceau°escu escaped on 22 December, and the NSF was formed. He was captured and executed on 25 December. The Involutionists had become a smaller group to the advantage of the Reformists, who now had sufficient support for performing a coup d'etat. Rupturists Two believed they had achieved a rupture that would imply democratisation. Rupturists Three interpreted the Reformists' preferences as including all members of this group. Rupturists Three would not have joined the NSF if they had had information on the outcome of the internal power struggle. Mass demonstrations against the NSF occurred on January 12 and 28. The NSF announced on January 23 that they would run for election. The faction analysed as the Openists had now taken power. They arranged the miners' attacks on the opposition on the 28th and 29th. The NSF attacked opposition parties' headquarters on February 18 and 19. On 6 February, the NSF evolved as a political party. Rupturists Three-members left the NSF during the spring. The result was thus continuity of the Openists' privileges. Elections were held in May 1990. The Openists could manipulate the election campaign and repress the emerging civil society.

Nature is used as a technical tool that decides if the Reformists would be strong enough to gain leadership control in Games One, Two, Three, or Four. Nature also decided which group would be the stronger part in Game Four: the Openists or the Reformists. Bayesian updating shows the rationality behind the Involutionists' choosing not to react to the Reformists' move in Game One. Thereafter, society and the Reformists updated their information. The analyses of Games Two and Three show that rupture presented rational choices for the Involutionists in both games, for Rupturists One in Game Two and for Rupturists Two in Game Three. Rupturists Three updated their perception of the Reformists before Game Four on the basis of the former games' results. The question was if their reformist image reflected reality or if constellations could be more complicated. Rupturists Three miscalculated in this game. The analysis will show whether they acted rationally or not by joining the

NSF.

## **Game One: Regime opening.**

### **Previous spread resistance**

Religious resistance had existed since the 1950s with Father Gheorghe Calciu Dumitreasa, whose anti-communist sermons brought him prison sentences from the start and throughout the 1980s. Intellectuals united in the Goma Group, behind the writer Paul Goma, writing critical letters from 1977. Some of them were signed by as many as 200 people. International pressure compelled the Involutionists to give these people emigration visas, thereby most of this dissidence disappeared from Romanian resistance work (Ratesh 1991: 11) [\[20\]](#).

More than 2000 Romanian workers from different parts of the country had tried to resist the regime by forming the Free Trade Union of Working People in Romania in March 1979. Some members disappeared, some were imprisoned, whereas others were forced to emigrate after the movement's two weeks of existence (Ratesh 1991: 12). Vasile Paraschiv, who was later killed (Cornea 2000, Appendix), led the movement. The most famous dissidents, Doina Cornea and Laszlo Tökes, were active in the 1980s.

Apart from these incidents no united resistance movement occurred in Romania before the workers' riots and strikes in Brasov of 1987. These strikes formed the pretext to the first manifest dissidence from former leading personalities, namely the "Letter of Six".

### **Funnel impacts on preferences and opening.**

Funnel Variable One examines a lack of liberal traditions in Romania. With no culture of compromises present, fighting for personal privileges without concessions was favoured in the political culture. This variable illustrated the Involutionists' preferences. The lack of liberal traditions in Romania facilitated the development of the Involutionist leadership. Ceau°escu was a result of this tradition and developed it through his rule. His Stalinist procedures did not give room for any liberalising measures, even after the Brasov riots. Ceau°escu and his supporters defended the regime with the sole motivation of maintaining all privileges intact. Romania was ruled under Stalinist principles in the 1980s. The Involutionists' preference order is verified by Games Two and Three developments. Only after realising in Bucharest that repression would not succeed, did Ceau°escu propose a limited reform, his last preference.

The Openists supported the regime as long as it served their privileges sufficiently. They saw that the regime was becoming unstable and participated in the removal of the Involutionists. They would benefit from a coup d'etat and the possibilities to secure power privileges. They would not opt for thorough liberalisation in the case of a transition. Thus their first preference corresponded to a political culture where securing personal privileges would represent the main goal.

Silviu Brucan wrote the "Letter of Six" in November 1987, after the Brasov riots. The BBC and RFE broadcast it on March 11, 1989. The letter presented the first visible signs of disloyalty from people who had been positioned within leadership structures since Pirvulescu, one of the signatories, had criticised Ceau°escu for putting personal interests before those of the country at the Twelfth Party congress in 1979 (Shafir 1989). The "Letter of Six" criticised Ceau°escu for discrediting "Socialism, for which we have fought". The main charge addressed the failure to follow the Constitution in practical policies, the problems associated with international isolation, and bad economic performance of the country. Text analysis shows that Brucan gave the impression of being the people's representative. He also advocated minority rights. He clearly supported the Securitate's existence,

which had been created in order to “defend the socialist order against exploiting classes”. Ceau°escu was accused of not using the Securitate in accordance with its purpose. A petition for policy reforms thus presented the essence of the message (Appendix). The signatories were those who had formerly occupied top positions in Romanian political life: Gheorghe Apostol had been President of the General Confederation of Trade Unions, First Deputy Prime Minister and had also pursued a diplomatic career. Likewise, Corneliu Manescu had been Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the UN General Assembly. Alexandru Birladeanu was a former Deputy Prime Minister. Mircea Raceanu had been a diplomat, whereas Grigore Raceanu and Constantin Pirvulescu had been members of the Party Executive Committee. Other high-positioned officials probably supported the writer and signatories of the letter (Shafir 1989). This group, at any rate, represented the Reformists at this stage. The “Letter of Six” thus bore considerable weight and prestigious representation by those who had contributed to the founding and practising of the Stalinist system. This shows that they were both founders and results of the non-liberal tradition. Despite them being reform-minded in the transition, this could be interpreted as a means of securing privileges. What distinguished them from the Openists and the Involutionists was the will to use repressive measures.

Variable One thus had a strong, negative impact on the possibilities of groups emerging that would be compromise minded. This situation was unfavourable for a democratic development.

Waning economic performance (Pasti 1999, Appendix) was a factor that motivated conspiracies the same way as this variable inspired societal unrest. Declining economic conditions did not affect the convinced Involutionists. Their maximalist preferences as formed by Variable One could not be changed by the situation. The Involutionists were reduced in quantity during the process as an expression of a higher value in the positive direction on Variable three. It is likely that most of the dissenting Involutionists joined the Openists, since the latter group’s preferences were closer to those of involutionists. The lack of a civil society was a direct result of the Involutionists’ preferences. Variable two was a necessary factor that had to reach a certain value for the transition to be set in motion. Benefits from staying loyal decreased sufficiently for society and nomenclaturists to protest or conspire respectively. The Openists would have sufficient support for a coup d’etat as the population was becoming increasingly desperate. Riots in Brasov and strikes gave the relevant indications of potential support. The Reformists had been waiting for the right context for a transition. The economic development of the 1980s provided the conditions.

The degree of institutionalisation cannot be stated accurately as the exact magnitude of conspiracies is unknown. Variable three, however, clearly showed decreased institutional coherence. This gave the necessary process for the Reformists to gain support in the Communist Party, the Securitate, and the army before and during the revolution. This variable strengthened both the Reformists’ and the Openists’ possibilities. So did Variable Four: The lack of a civil society strengthened their positions as potential leaders. The causal relation between Variable Four and Variable Five was thus strong. The available outcomes - imposition or revolution - decided possible strategy options.

The essential fact is that the conspirators were not strong enough for performing a coup d’etat alone. They needed societal support and a stronger position relative to the Involutionists. The Reformists tried gaining this support. The Openists chose limited reform as *strategy* for motivating society to support the group that was understood as having preferences of reformists.

The first three games treat the conspiracy as a unified group having the preference order of reformists. Only in Game Four, as the Iliescu faction departed, is the analysis of the conspiracy broadened. Thus the references to the Reformists in the three first games imply the conspiracy understood as a unified unit. Internal power struggles and differentiation of preference orders and strategies are only analysed in Game Four.

**Probable international attention gives rationality**



The Reformists did not pose a threat directly. However, by spreading the rumour that they were interested in reforms over the radio, the Involutionists would understand the contents as a threat to commit a coup d'état either alone or with societal support. The threat was relevant: The Involutionists had freedom of action and would have the possibility to introduce reforms. They also had the incentive to act contrarily, since concentrating power in leadership echelons was their first preference and maximalists do not compromise. The threat was sufficiently severe as it could involve their removal from power in this unstable period. It was not sufficiently clear: It could be interpreted as a mere protest against the leadership without an agenda of having the Involutionists removed from power. Degrees of credibility and completeness must be regarded as having been of greater importance: The Reformists would depend on non-coherence in the PEC and in the Securitate. The Involutionists did not know the degree of non-coherence. The extension of the Reformists' support in these units presented fluid game rules and the degree of credibility would necessarily have to be speculated on. Likewise, these circumstances implied that the Involutionists did not know whether the threat was complete or not.


The Involutionists' threat was likewise not stated directly. The Reformists could rationally interpret the context and the Involutionists' preferences: They would expect imprisonment and removal from positions as probable reactions to a protest. They had freedom of choice and could abstain from writing the letter and not perform protests. They had an incentive to act contrarily as they were interested in replacing the leadership. Society was getting "ripe for a revolution" to use Brucan's words. This could be the right period for provoking riots and institutional non-coherence as the Eastern European Block was loosening up. The threat was sufficiently severe: Imprisonment would remove their chances of committing a coup d'état. It was complete: The Reformists would not expect such reactions if remaining silent. The threat was as clear as the Reformists were able to understand the context through "reflexive monitoring": There should be no reason for them to misinterpret the contents of the threat. The most important feature is the fact that the threat was not credible: Brucan had an international name. Reactions against him and the group would result in international attention and pressure, implying decreased legitimacy for the dictatorship. This feature of the threat was what made it ineffective, and is the reason why the letter was sent.

### **The conspirators versus the tyrants**

Game One was characterised by incomplete, asymmetric information and uncertainty. It was a two-person game involving the Involutionists and the Reformists. The Brasov riots may have influenced the Reformists' decision to write the letter. Following this text's definition of a transition, however, it is when liberalisation occurs from the side of the regime that a transition is initiated. The transition was not initiated in the 1970s nor at an earlier stage of the 1980s. This was because the Reformists did not follow the societal protests up or were not consolidated as a group at all at these stages.

The Involutionists did not know the payoffs. Zero indicates status quo, no change of the regime. Negative payoffs for the Involutionists indicate that the particular result would mean decreased legitimacy. Any change would be positive for the Reformists. As the Reformists initiated the transition process, they had more information than the Involutionists. The game was uncertain because no one knew for certain whether a repression would succeed. Nature decided whether the majority of the Party Executive Committee would support the Reformists in the case where they would opt for a limited reform or not. The first situation is called a "Reformist Regime" and the second one an "Involutionist Regime". In both circumstances the Reformists would have the choice between continuity or limited reform. Continuity would mean not publicising the letter. The Involutionists' response could be rupture or continuity to limited reform. Rupture would mean that all those who belonged to the Reformists would lose their positions and possibly receive prison sentences. Continuity meant ignoring the attempt. This could be a result of the Involutionists regarding it as unimportant. To react to the letter

and the radio broadcast might also provoke those who were potential sympathisers with the Reformists to change sides. Brucan, with his international contacts, would also serve the Involutionists negative attention in the case of punishment, which in turn might further influence potential disloyalty.



**Figure 8: Game One on extensive form. “Reformist regime” in the left-hand sub-game indicates the case where the conspiracy would have sufficient support for overthrowing Ceau’escu, whereas “Involutionist Regime” indicates the opposite option.  $(1-q)$  is the probability for having a Reformist regime, depending on the actors’ rational calculations, whereas  $q$  is the probability for an Involutionist regime.**

Interval scale numbers have now replaced the ordinal numbers, necessary for using Bayes’ rule. Distances of 20 are used to indicate larger differences in payoffs than those where 10 is used. This is an illustrative tool intended to show the different importances of actors’ choices. The numbers show intervals between the payoffs varying from -50 to 50 as maximal values on the positive and the negative sides. In this game tree, zero is used to indicate status quo. In the left-hand game, Reformists choosing continuity would mean no change. The Reformists preferred R to C as a reaction to opting for a limited reform. The interval between  $(r,R)$  and  $(r,C)$  has been shorter than the one between Continuity and  $(r,C)$ , in order to include the importance for the Reformists of having a change. Opting for a limited reform would open the transition process, regardless of societal responses or lack of such. In the right-hand game the order is the same, but the numbers for  $(r,R)$  and  $(r,C)$  are lower. This is because chances of having a process started are less in a situation where the Involutionists have full confidence. Returning to the left-hand sub-game, the Involutionists preferred going for Rupture instead of continuity, if the Reformists would initiate a limited reform. The latter case might result in a coup d’etat. The Involutionists would need a rupture in order to confront those groups acting disloyally. Negative numbers are used because both outcomes would be worse than status quo. Relative payoff distances are also shown. The Involutionists preferred Rupture to continuity in the right-hand sub-game where they had full control. International attention might be problematic. Backwards induction shows that the Reformists had a dominant strategy in  $r$ .  $(r,R)$  would be the result of the left-hand sub-game and  $(r,C)$  results from the right one. The Involutionists’ subjective evaluation of degree of PEC coherence and international influence would decide their choice of R or C. The

empirical result was that they regarded their power to be sufficient for continuity after the Reformists had opted for a limited reform. As the Reformists had a dominant strategy in limited reform, the Involutionists had to find out in which situation they would be better served by choosing a rupture and when continuity would be a preferable choice. They would opt for rupture if they subjectively regarded the power base of their supporters to be strong enough to overcome the Reformists' threats. A rupture would be the best choice in the left-hand sub-game and continuity would be the rational choice in the right-hand one. The chance of the right-hand sub-game being played is called  $q$ , and the chance that the left one was played is  $(1-q)$ . The Involutionists calculated expected utilities for both situations and decided which choice would be rational:

$$EU_{Inv}(R) = ((1-q)(-20)) + q(-30) = -20 + 20q - 30q = -20 - 10q$$

$$EU_{Inv}(C) = ((1-q)(-50)) + q(-10) = -50 + 50q - 10q = -50 + 40q$$

$$EU_{Inv}(R) > EU_{Inv}(C)$$

$$-20 - 10q > -50 + 40q$$

$$-50q > -30$$

$$q < .6$$

The Involutionists would choose Rupture if they believed that the probability of having an Involutionist regime was less than .6, and C if they regarded this probability to be higher than .6. The Involutionists' choice of continuity was rational because the chance that the conspiracy had any power was minor.

This was the first sign of illoyalty and previously had no signs occurred that could contradict the situation that the Involutionists had full control.  $p(A)$  is set to .9. Following the empirical outcome, society and the Reformists learned that the Involutionists had self-confidence. No one, however, knew for sure how strong they really were.

After Game One, society and the Reformists updated their evaluations of the likelihood that the regime was an Involutionists-controlled one:

A = Involutionist regime

B = Continuity

a = Reformist regime

$p(A)$  = prior probability of having an Involutionist regime,  $q = .9$

$p(a) = (1-q) = .1$

$p(B|A) = 1$

$p(B|a) = .2$

$p(B|A) = 1$  indicated the chance of continuity given Involutionist control. This is not an exact or a universal number; it results from the analyst's reflexive monitoring of the process and ability to interpret the actors' situation. However, there was practically no reason for the Involutionists to choose another reaction than continuity if they would have control. Another reaction would be irrational.

$p(B|a)$  is set to .2. Reformists in charge of power would be likely to introduce reforms as soon as possible. The probability that they would go for continuity of the then current system could not be regarded likely after they had given the impression of being interested in reforms by publishing the "Letter of Six". The situation could however be imagined where this was an expression of a strategy for resuming power and securing continuity of a totalitarian regime. The chance was however minor, set to .2.

The interval numbers in the game tree also result from the analyst's identification with the situation. Experience had shown society and the Reformists that the Involutionists would use the measure that could best serve their own goals, regardless of the consequences for other groups. All groups knew that repressing the Reformists in this situation would imply decreased legitimacy for the Involutionists.

$$p(A|B) = p(B|A)p(A) / ((p(B|A)p(A) + p(B|a)p(a)) = (1*0,9) / (1* 0,9) + 0,2* 0,1) = 0,98.$$

The Involutionists could regard the probability that they were in charge of power to be .9. Choosing continuity would be rational if this probability was higher than .6. This shows that their choice was rational.

Society regarded the probability that the Involutionists were still in control to be .98, a number indicating that no other option was likely. A conspiracy had however shown its presence. By supporting the conspiracy, society could now hope that the conspiracy would gain necessary strength for removing the Involutionists for power.

## **Game Two: The Timisoara uprising**

### **Major changes in rules**

The “Letter of Six” gave the Romanian people hope on the existence of conspiracy groups within leading echelons of the Party from March 11, 1989. International events gave additional changes of game rules before the Timisoara riots: Gorbachev pronounced his Doctrine No. 1 first in his 1988 Prague and Belgrade speeches, and later at the Bucharest meeting of the Warsaw Pact leaders on July 7, 1989. He intended to give the national governments greater scope for liberalisation if the frameworks of the former rule were followed. According to Àgh, this doctrine cannot really be understood as an innovation, but rather as a response to the developments in Hungary and Poland (Àgh 1998: 28). Gorbachev’s Doctrine No. 2 was announced at his meeting with US President Bush on December 2-3 1989, before the riots in Timisoara. Here, Gorbachev officially limited his geo-political ambitions to saving the internal empire and not necessarily the external one, which would mean continued authority over the Soviet Union’s territory and not necessarily over the East Central European states.

Whether this information was available at all to the Romanian population, or if manipulation of it was publicised, is a matter for speculation. In the case where it was available, it might have had an impact on the events that were to take place in Timisoara. A safe conclusion cannot be drawn. The Involutionists certainly considered their position to decide Romanian politics sovereign. If these doctrines had any impact at all, it would be in giving them better self-confidence in following usual Stalinist policies. The Reformists, in contrast, would probably interpret this change of game rules as strengthened possibilities of having the Involutionists overthrown. With external threats overcome, they only had to win society’s sympathy and gain sufficient support in the Party, the army, and the Securitate.

Riots broke out in Timisoara on December 16. The priest Laszlo Tökes in the Reformed Church was to be removed to a smaller county as a result of opposition to his bishop. He protested against this but did not intend to start a revolution (Appendix). Tökes had been protesting at church confessions since April, working for a limited reform of the communist system. He started a demonstration in front of the church, initially surrounded only by the congregation. The demonstration was joined by people from other ethnic minorities and escalated into a demonstration against the regime, demanding Ceau°escu’s removal and democratisation. At the start, the demonstrators were left in peace, which came as a surprise to them. Around 10,000 people participated by midnight. Tökes was arrested and beaten up during the night. On 17 December, around noon, the demonstrators managed to get into the Party headquarters.

Meanwhile, Defence Minister Milea and Minister of the Interior Postelnicu were targets of Ceau°escu’s

fury for not repressing the demonstrators and not arming the soldiers with live ammunition. Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu asked the PEC for support to dismiss the two ministers but the PEC decided to give them another chance. Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu even asked them to elect another Secretary General if they would not support him. By not removing Milea without consulting the PEC, Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu obviously wanted to keep those of his supporters that now could be in the process of changing loyalty affiliation towards conspirators as his power basis. The Involutionists now tried to manipulate the PEC.

Simultaneously and secretly, the supposedly Involutionist, Goman, was sent to Timisoara to carry out the rupture as a brutal restoration of order. A parallel hard-liner military leadership was thus set up with the intention of regaining control of the process. Ratesh reported that reluctant officers and soldiers directed most shooting in the air or at the ground. This waning coherence not only made declining loyalty more obvious to Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu with supporters, but also increased the hopes of the present demonstrators. Around 9 o' clock: in the evening of 17 December as Coman arrived, the army opened fire directly at the crowds. This took the demonstrators by surprise. On the 19th, however, Coman proved to be unreliable as repression stopped. He thus revealed himself as not being an Involutionist. This gave society increased confidence in the probabilities of having at least reforms and hopefully democratisation as the result of another rupture. Western media broadcast the news. The regime tried isolating Timisoara from the rest of the country by cutting telephone connections, but failed in these attempts. The Romanian population followed the happenings via radio transmissions. Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu followed his plan of flying to Iran on December 18, in the midst of the most serious challenge to his power hitherto. Ratesh termed this decision as one of the dictator's most serious mistakes (Ratesh 1991: 30). The alternative conclusion, which is a matter of conjecture, is that he had been arranging his escape in the case of an overthrow. This suggestion of rational action is based on the hypothesis of co-operation with other states (Ratesh 1991: 33). According to Dinca, a member of the NSF, there was a treaty with five other states to ensure support in case of a military putsch (Ratesh 1991: 60). Brucan claims that foreigners were supporting the Securitate in Timisoara and later in Bucharest; Palestinians forming the largest faction. Iliescu denied this. Later, he has, however, claimed lack of information. General Vlad, former head of the Securitate, maintained in the trial that external powers had been involved in the revolution, but did not specify who and how (Romania Libera Dec. 21, 1990). The Bulgarian government reported suspicious ships and helicopters off the Black Sea coast. The first aircraft to land on the 25th at the closed Otopeni airport was a Libyan one. Rupturists One, at any rate, understood the departure as a sign of weakness (Ratesh 1991: 62). The Reformists could now perform their agenda more easily.

The army openly showed disloyalty while the dictator was in Iran. The firing at the crowds came to a halt by midnight on December 19. On the 20th the army even allowed the people to gather and did not repress demonstrations. Slogans like "The army is with us" appeared. "Down with Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu!" "We want elections!" "Democracy!" "Liberty!"

On the 20th, at 3:00 pm, Prime Minister Dascalescu summoned representatives from the crowds for talks. Vague promises of reform were made. To the demand for Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu stepping down, he responded that this issue would have to wait until the dictator's return. He was obviously in disarray. These vague promises were signs of a clearly waning Involutionist group. The crowds must have understood the fact that a delegation was summoned for negotiations as a sign of weakening coherence. For others, it was not of great significance since not all participators were equally informed. By 7:00 pm, Dascalescu went back to Bucharest, and Timisoara was in the hands of the enraged inhabitants. Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu aired his version of the events on the radio in the evening, but the true version was already common knowledge in urban areas of the country. He addressed the rebels as "hooligans and fascists instigated from abroad" on television and radio. Budapest was pointed out as main enemy. He simultaneously took full responsibility for the massacre, which raised population's rage further. The Timisoara riots are analysed as Game Two. The demonstrators formed the actor Rupturists One. At this stage, those loyal to Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu were the Involutionists. The Involutionists, however, was a

group decreasing in number during this game. Neither the Involutionists nor Rupturists One had secure information on the existence of the Reformists. Rupturists One hoped that the signs of dissidence from Game One indicated a conspiracy group with reformist preferences. Execution of the Involutionists' strategies depended on soldiers who did not know the Reformists' preferences. The extent to which they would carry out orders was a subject of speculation for the Involutionists, the Reformists, and Rupturists One. The players did not control this factor. Nevertheless, it was influenced by a combination of their moves and factors beyond the players' control. Probabilities of loyalty from these lower echelons must be included in the actors' estimates on the chances of having their preferences attained. C was the outcome of the game. The Involutionists were still formally in power. The Reformists' growing strength implied weakened regime foundations. New societal demands for liberalisation or further rupture initiations would be more likely to give intended results after the proceedings in Game Two.

### **The Involutionists: Neither complete nor severe threats**

The Involutionists' threat implied using violence against protesters, a possibility of them being killed. Their threats were complete despite the fact that terror had an element of unpredictability. Potential reactions at a rupture must be distinguished from these. No significant chance of a reaction to non-participants existed. The situation was different for Tökes: He was already registered as a dissident. On starting the mass protest he knew that he was to be moved to another county. He could not know for certain whether the reaction would be limited to this measure. For him, participating in an uprising could imply a stricter punishment. He was supported by international organisations, hence stronger reactions would imply relatively high costs for the Involutionists. The fact that the international community supported him made harsh threats less credible. Violent reactions against him would be more expensive for the Involutionists than what was the case for other participants. No room for misunderstandings existed. The threats were clear.

The combination of insufficient credibility and severity is important: Rupturists One needed to calculate on the risk for being killed. Harsh living conditions, making the threats insufficiently severe, combined with the hope for soft-liners' existence, making the threats insufficiently credible, made Rupturists One initiate the game. They could freely choose between rioting or abstaining. Thus the threats were relevant. Rupturists One also had full information on the repressive habits of the Involutionists, based on experience. The threats were therefore clear.

### **Rupturists One: Neither credible nor complete threats**

Rupturists One did not express a threat explicitly. Implicitly, however, they demanded the Involutionists to retreat and arrange democratic elections. If not, conspirators would side with Rupturists One and force the Involutionists out of power. This explicit threat was relevant. The Involutionists could choose between stepping down or defending their positions. They had, however, an incentive to act contrarily. They would use any measure to achieve their first preference of continuity without liberalisation. The threat was also sufficiently severe. If forced to step down, the risk would be high concerning imprisonment or death penalty. Lack of credibility illustrated the Involutionists' hope: It included the question of who would have the necessary power. Ceau°escu ordered repression without taking measures to avoid a situation where it would not be executed, which shows that he did not consider non-coherence to be probable. The "Letter of Six" had given signs of non-coherence. The Involutionists did not consider it possible that such segments could have become a real threat to his power in Game Two. If that had been the case, Ceau°escu would have taken necessary steps to remove them.

Rupturists One's threats were not considered credible by the Involutionists. By not being complete, this is what made them ineffective.

## **Rupturists One's preferences and rationality**

Rupturists initiated Game Two with a hope that the Reformists were ready to introduce a just democratic transition as soon as sufficient control of the leadership could be achieved. Rupturists One hoped that Brucan's "Letter of Six" would imply a conspiracy that could participate in negotiations leading to democratisation. The analysis of Games Two, Tree, and Four shows that only by concluding that the Reformists had succeeded in creating such a profile can the behaviour of the three rupturist groups be explained as rational. All these societal expressions were based on successful manipulation. They did not understand the presence of Openists and their strategies, and put their faith in this group as sole alternative to the Involutionists' rule.

With reference to funnel impacts, it is obvious that society knew the elite culture of no compromise in Romania. An informed understanding of both the Involutionists and hypothetical conspiracies would give the conclusion that none of them were interested in democracy if this option would not give optimal outcomes in the form of power access. The initiation of Game Two, however, can be explained as rational. Rupturists One saw no other possibility of changes. Going for rupture instead of limited reform would have a stronger effect in demonstrating support of a conspiracy. Rupturists One thus understood rupture as a necessary supporting of a transition process where these alternative leaders would try to defend their privileges. This option, after all, would be the best alternative. Society put its hopes in democratisation, even if the process underway would be complicated.

Timisoara had belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire until 1919 and was part of an area of unstable borders, implying ethnic and religious heterogeneity. The local population had access to Yugoslavian and Hungarian television. The German minority had maintained their family connections in Western Germany. The area had a Central European flavour and higher living standards than in the rest of the country. Its turbulent history and the Securitate's special attention paid to minorities in the district, combined to make the Banat a region for protests. Neo-Stalinisation had implied less toleration. However, this area was also experiencing economic decline, underlining the role of Variable Two as a contributory factor. Variable One was, however, more important for explaining why the revolution started here. Transitions were proceeding in other Eastern European states without external interventions, and in that respect, Romania could not be expected to be a special case.

Rupturists One's first preference was rupture, meaning the retreat from power of the Involutionists and democratisation. If not possible,  $r$  would be preferred to  $C$ . All outcomes would be better than the current harsh living conditions and  $r$  would have secured some degree of liberalisation. Support from a conspiracy would be a necessary weapon. This hope made their choosing rupture as strategy a rational act for gaining this support, despite information on the Involutionists' preferences. Rupturists One valued the possible overthrow of the regime, combined with the chance of success, as being higher than the risk of a failed attempt and continuity with the problems it would cause for future attempts.

Tökes underlined that his goal was a limited reform (Tökes, Appendix). No opposition group in Colomer's theory has this first preference. One cannot disclose the hypothetical existence of opposition groups preferring a limited reform to rupture. This could be the case for certain groups having reasonable material standards in a non-democratic regime. They might criticise the dictatorship. Still, they could believe that democratisation would imply worse economic conditions. Colomer has not taken this possibility into account. Tökes' first preference, on the other hand, was rupture and democratisation. His statements must be understood as expressions of strategy rather than as expressions of preferences. He did not regard his first preference to be realistic and considered reforms as a necessary first step.

Rupturists One had to take the chance of an armed repression into consideration. This would mean a high probability of imprisonment or being killed. Critics of game theory might, on this basis, maintain that personal interests motivated their strategy. Rupturists One members' actions would be expressions

of preferences for the common good, such as the best result for the country as a whole or for those not receiving benefits from supporting the Involutionist regime and not participating in the rupture. That would mean a basis in ethical rationality. Game theory only gives room for personal interests as motivation. Hence this group must be separated from the rest of the Romanian population. The conclusion is that those who did not participate did not have the same preferences or would not choose the same strategy (and are also not actors in the game). The motivation for belonging to Rupturists One was based on personal interest in having a rupture and the goal was democratisation that would serve the interests of each participant. The participants may in fact have considered the best for such institutions as their family, their local community, or the country. Some may have considered the Reformed Church's interests as being those of the Hungarian minority. Game theory would maintain that an individual's personal interest in such a situation was equivalent to the best for a certain group with which he identified.

Chapter Three's Figure 6 illustrated personal utility rationality considerations that apply to Rupturists One. The participants personally reflected upon the number of participants regarded as necessary for the rupture to be successful. If an individual assumed that an already existing number of participants would suffice without his participation, he would act as a free rider and abstain from participation. If he did not consider the chances of having his personal preferences satisfied without his personal participation, he would join the group.

The next issue is whether Rupturists One's strategy was consistent and well grounded. An aggregation problem appears. In this revolutionary battle, some individuals based their activities on rational evaluations, being aware of potential possibilities and dangers and the chances of achieving their goal. In a revolutionary battle including individuals desperate due to repression and food shortages, a certain number of individuals will be included that have not considered the consequences. This means that their actions might be neither consistent nor well grounded as they do not think the situation with its possible gains and risks carefully through. However, by taking part in Timisoara and the possible bloodshed it shows that they saw no possibility of leading a good life under the Involutionists. This is why these acts should still be termed rational. They were therefore consistent and well grounded also for those who had not considered the consequences thoroughly.

## **The Involutionists' preferences and rationality**

The Involutionists' preferences were unchanged from Game One. Their first preference is defined as the continuation of Ceau°escu's rule with the supporters' privileges. Ceau°escu's reactions at the emergency meeting of the Political Executive Committee on the 17th are referred to. The Involutionists were confronted with the Reformists' growing strength but did not know their preferences. Defence Minister Milea had not armed his troops with live ammunition. Ceau°escu was furious:

"I told you to arm them all. Why did you send them unarmed? I discussed with you many times during the night, at 2:00, and at 3:00, and at 4:00 in the morning what you had to do....What did your officers do, Milea? Why didn't they intervene immediately? Why didn't they shoot? ...What kind of Defence Minister are you? What kind of an Interior Minister are you, Postelnicu?" (Ratesh 1991: 27)

Ceau°escu ordered the following response:

*"to immediately, right now, arm the troops (with live ammunition) and have them carry out the order (to shoot).....Therefore immediate measures must be taken to rapidly liquidate what is happening in Timisoara, bring the army in a state of alert, in a fighting state, both the units of the Interior Ministry and those of the Defence Ministry and wherever there is an attempt of (antigovernment) action, liquidate it radically, without a word"* (Ratesh 1991: 28).

These statements prove the preference order  $C > R > r$  for the Involutionists. They would use all



measures for defending their power and privileges. Reacting with rupture was intended for reinstalling order and institutional coherence without any concessions. Bucharest Radio announced in the morning of the 22nd that Milea had committed suicide. If that was true, it demonstrates the fear present. The announcement might also have been a lie. The classification of the Involutionists is in that case supported.

The extension of loyalty towards the Involutionists at this stage is unclear. Ceau°escu had asked the PEC for acceptance to dismiss Minister of Defence Milea and Minister of the Interior and the Commander of the Securitate forces Postelnicu. They decided to give them another chance. On the other hand, they approved to putting the army in a state of alert and introducing live ammunition. Ceau°escu gave them the ultimatum to follow hard-liner practices or elect themselves a new Secretary General. The PEC knew that Securitate forces were waiting outside to ensure the fulfilment of his wishes. This situation leaves the analyst to speculation: Either the PEC approved Involutionist strategies out of fear, or a conspiracy had already been formed, thus reducing their approval to being merely of a formal character. Given the “Letter of Six” and the insufficient support of the Involutionists in the phase prior to this meeting, the latter seems probable. As a unit, the PEC must at this time have been on the Reformists’ side as they decided to give Milea and Postelnicu another chance. A rupture would not serve the Reformists’ interests at this stage. Dismissing the two ministers and replacing them with individuals supportive of the Involutionists would, for this reason, not have responded to their preferences. The relatively smooth way in which the Ceau°escus later were kidnapped and executed also supports this conclusion.

Reacting with a violent suppression was equivalent to common leadership strategies of Involutionist regimes and was common practice in Romania. In the first phase of this game The Involutionists did not have secure information on any hypothetical conspiracy. However, they had kept Brucan’s letter in mind and must have taken events in neighbouring countries into consideration, including the possibility of the population being aware of it and encouraged by it. The Involutionists knew that it would be unlikely for the Soviet Union to intervene militarily in Romanian affairs. A Warsaw Pact or a Western intervention would be unlikely<sup>[21]</sup>. The Involutionists knew that they could repress Timisoara without risking military involvement from either the Soviet Union or the West. They were acting rationally, given their maximalist preferences.


Gorbachev’s doctrines and the Eastern European transitions underway gave effects in the form of diffusion. The former one influenced Rupturists One because they had knowledge of the events in the region. The latter one, however, did not influence the Involutionists in any other way that they could regard a repression to be an increasingly secure method as Gorbachev had announced that he would not intervene. The Eastern European “Zeitgeist” of liberalisation and democratisation did not influence them.

## **The deprived versus the tyrants**

Game Two had asymmetric information. It was a two-person game involving the participants, Rupturists One and Involutionists. The Reformists, unlike the Involutionists, knew who supported the conspiracy. Foreign intervention was unlikely but soldiers might not execute orders, implying uncertain information. The actors speculated on who was de facto in power. Information was incomplete.

Figure 9 shows Game Two on extensive form. Distances of 20 are used to indicate larger differences in payoffs than where 10 is used. Intervals of five imply smaller differences. Thus identification with the actors’ ranking of alternatives has been attempted. This is an illustrative tool designed to show the different importance of actors’ choices. The game tree’s right branch shows the situation that corresponds to the Involutionists’ calculations, the version closer to true realities. In this case, the conspiracy would not have sufficient power to replace the Involutionists. The latter group would not

need to consider which preferences such conspirators could have. As maximalists they would in any case mobilise every available measure for defending the power and prefer a bloody rupture to admitting liberalisation. The left branch of the game tree displays Rupturists One's true understanding or exaggerated hopes. They gambled on the possibility that a rupture would enable reformists to take power and introduce democratisation.



**Figure 9: Game Two on extensive form. “Reformist regime” indicates the situation where the conspiracy would have de facto power and a preference order of reformists. “Involutionist regime” indicates the sub-game where the Involutionists would be in charge of power**

A combination of backwards induction and Bayes's rule shows payoffs associated with each choice and possible pairs of transition alternatives. Backwards induction shows that in the case where reformists had gained sufficient power to replace the Involutionists, they would choose reform regardless of Rupturists One's choice. Rupturists One would calculate on payoffs from choosing limited reform or rupture as strategy. Rupture would also increase moral support of reformists. Rupturists One therefore initiated the game and expected or hoped that reformists in charge of power would introduce liberalisation.

The game tree's right branch shows the realistic version of the proceedings. The Involutionists played this branch. So did also Rupturists One, but with the hope that there was a hope for the left branch to respond to realities. The Involutionists were still in charge of power. The Reformists' preferences did not matter because they would at this stage not be executed anyway. Rupturists One initiated a game against Involutionists, whose rational answer was rupture. The outcome also served Rupturists One the best payoffs available given the Involutionist regime, despite the Involutionists' repression. Rupturists One intended to give the Reformists moral support and encourage hard-liners to join the Reformists. Rupturists One made rational choices given their understanding of conspirators as reformists. Going for rupture was supposed to accelerate democratisation in the case where reformists would be in charge of power. According to the real situation, stronger measures would increase reformists' power. Rupturists One had a dominating strategy in choosing rupture. The answer would be a limited reform if reformists were in power, for which Rupturists One hoped and strove for. Rupture would be the answer if Involutionists were in power. The basis for explaining the rationality behind Involutionists' choice lies in the calculations made after Game One: Involutionists regarded the chance that they would be in charge of power to be .98. Choosing rupture in Game Two was a rational choice.

In the left hand sub-game (RR) is the outcome that would best serve Rupturists One's interests. Reformists would by that outcome introduce reforms that eventually would lead to democratisation. This would proceed far quicker in this case than with the outcome (RC) because here non-coherence would not be demonstrated. The distance in available payoffs for Rupturists One after the reformists having opted for a limited reform was not very long. Still, incentives for the reformists to support the process were lower because of weaker societal support. (RR) in the right-hand sub-game was far better than the other outcomes because here non-loyal factions would have a far weaker position and the strongest support available would be necessary for convincing those in doubt.

The payoff associated with (R,C) was far worse than other outcomes for the Involutionists in the left hand sub-game. This outcome would be equivalent to surrender because reformists would take power without resistance from the Involutionists. The numerical distance to (RR) is therefore set at 10. In the right hand sub-game (RC) the outcome was singled out as being far worse than the second-worst outcome, thus the long relative distance. The expected utilities associated with limited reform and rupture for Rupturists One, and from Continuity and rupture for the Involutionists, are as follows:

$$EURup\ 1\ (r) = (0,02*15) + (0,98*20) = 19,9$$

$$EURup1\ (R) = (0,02*50) + (0,98*40) = 40,2$$

Given Rupturists One's choice, the Involutionists could reach the following expected utilities:

$$EUInv\ (C) = (0,02*(-50)) + (0,98*(-40)) = -40,2$$

$$EUInv\ (R) = (0,02*(-40)) + (0,98*(-20)) = -20,4$$

The numbers underline the fact that Rupturists One choosing a rupture was positive for Rupturists One and negative for the Involutionists. Rupturists One had a dominating strategy in choosing rupture. The Involutionists had a dominating strategy in choosing continuity.

Prior probability for having an Involutionist regime had been .98, based on Game One's results. The Involutionists' preferences had not changed from Game One, where the probability for continuity was 1 given Involutionists' control. Rupturists One's choice of rupture in Game Two could escalate into a country-wide movement, which might remove the Involutionists' power. This is why the rupture needed to be answered by the Involutionists with rupture. Common for Games One and Two was the probability that the Involutionists' rational answers would be executed if the Involutionists had de facto power to do so.  $p(B|A)$  was set to 1 in Game One, where B would be continuity. In Game Two, B would mean rupture and the probability for it would also be 1. The probability that Reformists in charge of de facto power would repress was low. This number is set to .2, corresponding to Game One.

The Involutionists' choice in this game would not depend on nature's choice. They would have a dominant strategy in rupture for securing the dictatorship's control in both sub-games, simply because escalating riots could not be answered with continuity. This fact separated this game from Game One where the Involutionists did not have a dominant strategy. Rupturists One observed the Securitate illoyalty. The probability that the Involutionists had de facto power after Game Two could not be calculated. It was nevertheless obviously lower than after Game One, which means lower than .98. Society saw that the conspiracy gained relative power to the disadvantage of the Involutionists. Rupturists One's acts had given positive results. Now they needed to continue the process of supporting the Reformists. Game Three would provide the possibility to do so.

## Game Three: Confrontation with the masses in Bucharest

## The Reformists seize de facto power

The Involutionists decided to address a mass rally in front of the Central Committee building in Bucharest on the 21st. The rally was met with jeering. Suddenly Ceau°escu was cut off in mid-sentence by shouts of disapproval. Momentarily, the dictator faltered. The event was broadcast but the transmission came to a halt. Ceau°escu attempted to continue his speech by promising better living standards. Meanwhile, anti-Ceau°escu demonstrations spread around the city. The police used gunfire and armoured cars in an attempt to crush the demonstration. The programmed cries of support were replaced with jeers like "Down with Ceaucescu!" After a while, the televised broadcasting was interrupted for about three minutes. The viewers could see a leader in disarray as it resumed, promising the angry crowds higher wages and other benefits of minor relevance to the demands they were raising. Hundreds of thousands demonstrated elsewhere in the city throughout the night. They also took control of the television studios with help from army units.

The rupture was intended to confront non-coherence and force the PEC, the Securitate, and the army to stay on the Involutionists' side. Violence would be used against the crowds in the case of protests. The Involutionists had seen the waning institutional coherence in Game Two. This move did not reflect their losing touch with the development or not understanding the realities of a regime experiencing a serious threat. It was a move intended for consolidation of power. An attempt at demonstrating power might scare the crowds not to protest anymore and de-motivate non-coherence.

Demonstrators began assembling again on December 22 in front of the Central Committee building. The Ceau°escu's were inside. Rumours circulated about General Milea, the Minister of Defence at the time, who allegedly had been forced to commit suicide by Ceau°escu for refusing to use live ammunition in Timisoara. At 11.30 am, Bucharest Radio announced that the "traitor" Milea had committed suicide. As thousands of people moved towards the Central Committee building, the Securitate continued to draw back. Around noon, Ceau°escu appeared on the balcony and attempted to speak, but people began jeering and throwing objects at him, forcing him back inside the building. At this point the crowd surged in through the main doors past unresisting police. Ceau°escu, his wife, and several others managed to escape by helicopter from the roof, just before the rioters could reach them. No one defended the regime anymore. The pilot did not follow Ceau°escu's orders. All former associates had joined the Reformists. They arrested the Ceau°escu's and kept them hidden. Soon after, rebels took control of radio and TV stations. The Ceau°escus were captured<sup>[22]</sup>. They were tried together and executed by a firing squad on 23 December.

Rupturists Three did not possess information on the arrest or who was in charge of power. They continued demonstrating. By midnight, the army reacted with an armed repression. The battle lasted throughout the night. The use of repression was not consistent as shooting occurred irregularly. The news encouraged their rage and helped create confusing impressions on power relations. Germany, the USA, Great Britain, Poland, Bulgaria, and the representatives at the round table discussions in East Berlin now protested against Ceaucescu. These statements could be heard on foreign radio stations. Rupturists Three thereby realised that not only the Western world, but also former Warsaw Pact members supported them. This would diminish the external threat. The Involutionists' versions were also broadcast on the radio, contributing to the growing diapproval of official versions.

The so-called "Terrorists" - soldiers belonging to Ceaucescu's former personal guard - destroyed several buildings in Bucharest but not the Central Committee Building. Brucan estimated the total number of these "terrorists" to be 4000 soldiers fighting the army. They had belonged to the Securitate school, special anti-terrorist units, the presidential guard, and the Bucharest secret police, according to Brucan. NSF members appeared on the Central Committee balcony several times during the night. The armed troops avoided any shots at this building or at the NSF members. Some "terrorists" were arrested after the incidents, but none of them were charged. No investigation was initiated on these matters in the aftermath. Instead, the NSF and the new leader of the security, Virgil Magureanu, stated that the

terrorists had disappeared after the uprisings (Ratesh 1991: 60).

The National Salvation Front was officially formed on December 22 in the midst of the demonstrations. They were forced by the crowd to accept the presence of a camera. Representatives from Rupturists Two wanted to join but were not allowed entrance. Roman read the declaration that had been written by Mazilu. Iliescu later appeared on television as NSF leader. He had been squeezed out of the Party in 1984 as a result of criticism. He now had a minor position as director of the State Publishing House and had kept popular sympathy. The Reformists had chosen a reasonably popular personality as leader, one using an image of independence.

The most important task at this stage was to gain control of the army and the Securitate, who were in ambivalent positions, according to Iliescu. He could use his connections with central leaders of these units in order to gain control (Ratesh 1991: 52). No one opposed Iliescu as leader: He earned legitimacy from his background. Rupturists Three had wanted open National Salvation Front discussions that would be available for observation by the whole country. They were repeatedly asked to form the programme in public, but instead it was done behind closed doors. Limited amounts of information had the effect of diminishing the popular revolutionary spirit. Sentiments of deprivation then started surfacing. Non-participants could follow the events all over the country via television and radio. In the districts, power was almost without exception transferred peacefully to popularly elected representatives. The NSF did not appoint these as candidates. Thus, this revolutionary phase took a different path in the villages and small cities. The NSF did not consolidate control yet. The former officials stepped down without resistance (Nelson 1992: 71).

In the evening of December 24, a small group of nomenclaturists from the Party, the army and other individuals who did not support the Involutionists anymore, decided to arrange a secret trial followed by the execution of the Ceau<sup>o</sup>escus. According to Brucan, this decision was taken by those who later constituted the ruling council of the NSF (Rady 1992: 116). The institutional arrangement of the trial followed a presidential decree from 1968, which prescribed a military tribunal (Rady 1992: 116). In this case, the relevant indictment was laid by the Directorate of the Military Prosecutor's Office. Secrecy surrounded the trial despite the promise on December 22 by NSF spokesmen of openness. On the 25th, it was instead announced that a secret military tribunal had sentenced them to death and executed them immediately. The acts were attempted to be justified by claiming that Ceaucescu loyalists in the Securitate were trying to save him from the trial, with the intention of reinstalling the old order. This fuelled suspicion among the Romanian population and foreign observers. An edited version of the trial was broadcast on the 26th. The trial bore judicial irregularities of rumours instead of facts. Insults were made from both sides. The Ceau<sup>o</sup>escus were offered the possibility of declaring themselves not guilty on grounds of insanity. That would have made execution illegal. They refused. At every accusation the dictator replied that he did not recognise the legitimacy of the court members and would only answer to the Grand National Assembly (Appendix)[\[23\]](#).

The revolutionary setting provided no procedures for judging who could be legitimate leaders of the country since the rules of the former regime were no longer applicable. Not even international law gives any prescriptions for legal leadership after the fall of a dictatorship. Candidates must try to gain legitimacy through argumentation. Popular support will secure an ethical foundation for their rule if they practise as an interim government that will lead a fair pre-election process. Old laws, as well as the ones inherited from a former democratic era, do not enjoy primacy (Smith 2000, Appendix). This was, however, an untouched topic in Rupturists Three's demands during the immediate chaos because of the popularity of these leaders. The Involutionists had repressed civil society and all attempts at opposition, which further strengthened the Reformists' popular position as exclusive relevant alternative. This seemingly chaotic situation separates Romania from the transition modes of round table discussions in other East European countries.

## **Further changes in rules**

Game Three was initiated by the Involutionists on December 21 and ended with the formation of the Popular Democratic Front on December 25, the forerunner of the National Salvation Front. It replaced the Involutionists with the Reformists in charge of power. Both players had experienced Game Two's non-coherence in the Securitate structures and could rationally regard the chance of a conspiracy operating. Games Two and Three can thus be understood as iterated games. Likewise, non-coherence shown in Game One contributed to this impression. Game Three is still analysed as a two-person game because the Involutionists and Rupturists Two are the groups that performed obvious acts that can be studied on the basis of reliable material. The conspiracy's role and extension are subjects of these actors' evaluations.

Rupturists Two had the same preferences as Rupturists One and merely continued the process. The same rationality discussion undertaken for Rupturists One applies to Rupturists Two as well. The difference lies in information. Rupturists Two had seen the outcome of Game Two and used changed information as a basis for their strategies. Rupturists Two did not have information on the PEC negotiations. They valued their available moves on the basis of information obtained from television and radio broadcasts, in addition to visible developments. Milea's fate was interpreted as proof of waning Involutionist support. Goman had been sent for a harder reaction. He also changed preferences. These events strengthened Rupturists Two's hopes. They did not change their understanding of the Reformists as a group with regard to preferences. Rupturists Two believed that elite support for a reformist-dominated soft-liner faction had increased. Thus they heightened the probability of realising their preferences.

The Involutionists' information had also changed. Non-coherence had been proven, the Openists' preferences, however, had not. The Reformists were waiting for a power vacuum in which they could take command. Their probabilities had increased now.

The game had incomplete information. No one knew the payoffs. Information was asymmetric because the Reformists would have better possibilities of understanding the conspiracy factions' preferences and strategies. The Reformists and the Involutionists also had more information than Rupturists Two on internal PEC events. Information was uncertain because nature would move after the Involutionists and Rupturists Two. This is in line with an interpretation of nature as deciding whether reformists, openists or involutionists were de facto in charge of power in this situation.

As discussed above, the initiation of a rupture was rational against the background of the Involutionists' preferences. Choosing continuity or reform would implicate removal from power because the Reformists were gaining such a strong position. Personal charisma and the attempt to give the impression of having control through a rupture did, however, fail. By consulting the PEC, the Involutionists had tried to test the preferences of its members. The PEC was not interested in punishing Milea and Postelnicu. Seeing Rupturists Two's fury, loyalty was, however, necessary. Rupture as strategy was used in the hope that sufficient strength would be available for achieving the first preference continuity. With this outcome, illoyal individuals could be forced out afterwards. Keeping Milea in office cannot be understood as an act of liberalisation, nor in the form of giving admissions to the PEC in order to secure support for their policies. The Involutionists put up a parallel military command structure simultaneously without informing the PEC. The intention was to give them the impression that a compromise had been reached after co-operation.

### **Increased credibility to society's representatives**

The Involutionists' main threat consisted of firing at the crowd in the event of disobedience, thus using a rupture in order to achieve continuity. The threat was relevant. Each individual member of Rupturists Two could freely choose if he wanted to obey the norms of shouting supportive slogans or not in the case of an arranged demonstration, or stay silent if there were no arrangement. They had an incentive to act contrarily in order to bring the regime down. A collective penalty for opposing the regime would

be firearms directed at Rupturists Two. This threat was not severe enough for some. This applied to the ones meeting up at the demonstration, not intending to oppose. It did not apply to the ones shouting hostile slogans and the ones taking part in the street riots. The latter would have done so, even if there had been no event arranged by the regime.


A loyal individual would not receive complete threats if the crowd acted contrarily to him. The threat was, however, complete with regard to the aggregate level. The exclusive available transition mode from a sultanistic regime is assassination by armed groups of civil society (Linz and Stepan 1996: 60). Rupturists Two knew the preference order of the Involutionists and put their hopes in the existence of reformists. This setting was regarded as an exclusive chance of democratisation. Game Two had shown society that the army would not necessarily support the Involutionists. This supported the impression of the threats as lacking severity. In Timisoara nonloyal Securitate and army units had proved that a lack of credibility outweighed the severity of the threat. Rupturists Two's impression of the credibility of the threats had also been weakened by the supportive messages from former Warsaw Pact countries and Gorbachev's speeches. External help may have been considered necessary or not for repression by separate members. For those regarding it necessary, these supportive messages diminished the Involutionists' threats. The threats were sufficiently clear. Experience had proven the Involutionists' habits and preferences.

The Involutionists' threats had lost relative effectiveness if compared with the situation in Game Two. They were perceived as less credible by Rupturists Two than by Rupturists One as a result of obvious non-coherence and the open support from former Warsaw Pact allies. The threats were also failing to justify the severity requirement because Rupturists Two rationally could regard the probabilities of reaching the goal of democratisation as higher.

Rupturists Two's threats were equivalent to Rupturists One's threats. They were also relevant, complete, and sufficiently severe. They might, as in Game Two, not have been considered complete. Lack of credibility illustrates the Involutionists' hope: This factor lies in the question of who could gain the necessary power. Rupturists Two's threat was more credible than Rupturists One's threat as proven by the manifest disloyalty of the Securitate and the army that occurred during Game Two. This provided an essential part of the information available in Game Three. Whether the threat was perceived as sufficiently credible or not on the basis of the Involutionists' choice is unclear as they had only one option, given their preferences. Total confrontation was the exclusive option now, in order to force their authority on those who might not act solitarily.

## **The tyrant versus the deprived**





**Figure 10: Game Three on extensive form**

Figure 10 shows Game Three on extensive form. Ordinal numbers are used in the “Openist regime” sub-game. No actor took this setting into account and the analysis is not dependent on interval numbers because the payoffs associated with these game rules were not considered. In the other sub-games, similarly, the previous games intervals of five, ten, and twenty points indicate attempted identification with the actors’ rankings of payoffs.

The probability that the left branch would occur is set to zero because Rupturists Two did not really take it into account. Ordinal numbers show rating of payoffs for the situation where it would have been considered. The middle branch is the situation where a reformist conspiracy would have sufficient power to remove the Involutionists, whereas the “Involutionist regime” in the right-hand sub-game shows the opposite case. Nature decided whether openists, reformists, or involutionists were in charge of power. The Involutionists played the right-hand side. Rupturists Two knew that both the right-hand sub-game and the middle branch could respond to realities. They took both possibilities into concern. They saw that, regardless of their choice, Rupturists Three would choose rupture. Hence the best option for the Involutionists was rupture. The left branch presents the second possible outcome. The players’ preferences were similar to those in the right branch. (RR) would give full confrontation. The Reformists would have sufficient support for resuming the emerging power vacuum. The result of the game would be continuity. The Reformists and their preferences and strategies were kept hidden until Game Four. The middle branch of the game tree presents the game according to Rupturists Two’s hopes. The outcome (RR) would in this case give democratisation. Rupturists Two believed that they had won this game and they also believed that it would be the final one in the transition process. The Involutionists also did not know which game was being played. The Reformists did not know that the result was (RR) in the left branch, but had more information available and better possibilities of predicting potential factions not having reformist preferences. They did, however, probably not know. A more exact interpretation cannot be given. (RR) would present the best option for Rupturists Two because their intention was to encourage a conspiracy that they hoped would consist of reformists. The chance of democratisation or at least limited reforms would be the lowest in the right-hand sub-game and the highest in the middle one. As the left branch presents true realities, it shows that further struggles for democratisation were needed. The tasks for Rupturists Two would have been easier if the Reformist Regime-game had been played. The outcome would have been a limited reform, implying



the possibilities of a pact with the conspirators.

Only the right hand game presented a satisfactory outcome for the Involutionists. As Ceau°escu saw that this game was not being played, he tried to flee. This shows that he had understood the realities. He had lost. The Reformists had secured control. Ceau°escu's only option was to escape.

The left-hand sub-game was not considered by the actors to respond to realities. Ordinal numbers can thus kept here. Interval numbers are inserted in the sub-games of Involutionist and Reformist regimes. An important difference from the second game in the Involutionists' payoffs was that only positive values were given in the Involutionist regime sub-game. This illustrates the fact that after two ruptures the chance of replacement of the Involutionists would be far smaller than what was the case in the second game. Rupturists Two, in both sub-games, preferred the Involutionists going for rupture. Full confrontation was more likely to encourage non-coherence. The following expected utilities for the Involutionists from choosing continuity or rupture demonstrate that choosing C would be irrational:

$$EU_{Inv}(C) = ((1-q)*(-50)) + (q*0) = -50 + 50q$$

$$EU_{Inv}(R) = ((1-q)*(-30)) + (q*20) = -30 + 30q + 20q = -30 + 50q$$

$$EU_{Inv}(C) > EU_{Inv}(R)$$

$$-50 + 50q > -30 + 50q$$

$$0q > 20$$

$0q > 20$  is an equation that cannot be solved. Such results indicate irrationality (Hovi 2000). Setting expected utility of continuity higher than expected utility of rupture would not be rational. Given the Involutionists' choice, the expected utilities for Rupturists Two associated with R and r were:

$$EURup\ 2(r) = ((1-q)45) + (q*15) = 45 - 45q + 15q = 45 - 30q$$

$$EURup\ 2(R) = ((1-q)50) + (q*20) = 50 - 50q + 20q = 50 - 30q$$

$$EURup\ 2(r) > EURup\ 2(R)$$

$$45 - 30q > 50 - 30q$$

$$0q > 5$$

As in the previous one, the result of this equation is error. Choosing reform would be an irrational choice by Rupturists Two. (Again interval numbers indicate the analyst's identification with the process. They are not exact but illustrate identification with the actors' situations).

The Involutionists had now obviously lost control over the process. Society had seen Rupturists Two's strength versus the Involutionists demonstrated. The Involutionists' rupture had not been consequent. They had lost authority over the power apparatus. Society concluded that the Reformists could now resume power in an emerging vacuum. Democratisation could now rationally be hoped for.

## Game Four: The NSF's internal power game

The Reformists formed the National Salvation Front on December 22 and invited dissidents to join, promising that it would function as an interim government only. This promise was not kept and most of the dissidents left during January and February. In the spring of 1990, the NSF used violent measures for defending their power and won the June election.

The Openists' no negotiation strategy was revealed by Iliescu announcing the synthesis of the army, the Securitate, and the Ministry of the Interior on December 27. Militaru was later removed from his position as chief of the armed forces after eight officers on February 12 had demanded his withdrawal.

The Initiative Group for the Democratisation of the Army (CADA) wanted an investigation of the army and the Securitate's roles in the revolution for publication. Additionally, they asked for an investigation of the re-activation of officers during and after the revolution, and the removal of all officers responsible for political indoctrination and party control within the army. The NSF interpreted these demands as direct threats to its leadership and nothing was done, except for an investigation of the military's role in the Timis county during the revolution. This investigation was not made public. Iliescu continued his politicisation of the army, supported by Militaru. Distrust in the NSF was fuelled as the public became aware of the fact that NSF member Mazilu had been a former Securitate officer.

## **The Openists defend privileges**

The self-appointed Executive Office had authority over the NSF. The leadership consisted almost exclusively of high-ranking actors from the former regime. Among them were General Guse, who had been Deputy Minister of Defence, army Chief of Staff General Militaru, the Commander of Romanian Special Units for Antiterrorist Warfare Ardeleanu, and the National Commander of the Patriotic Guards Parcalabescu. Apostoriu and Nicolcioru, the dictator's former Executive Secretaries, also took part in these discussions. Former nomenclaturists thus constituted the Front leadership. The Executive Office of the NSF was supposed to be accountable to the Council of the NSF. As the Council, however, was only seldom summoned, the Executive Office was virtually uncontrolled (Rady 1992: 128). General Militaru was appointed Minister of National Defence, Securitate Captain Mihai Lupoi Minister of Tourism, and Stanculescu Minister of National Economy, later to change to the post of National Defence Minister as Militaru had to leave his post. The order to use tear gas on the demonstrators in Bucharest was probably given by Mihai Chitac, who had then become Minister of Internal Affairs (Rady 1992: 129). Only Minister of Education Mihai Sora and Minister of Culture Andrei Plesu did not have a party background. Plesu was the only former dissident to receive a ministerial post. Thus, former army or Securitate officers and Party officials kept leadership control. Ad hoc committees of the NSF were now set up at the local level, replacing the locally elected organs. This applies to town halls, factories, institutions, and enterprises (Rady 1992: 138). They executed central organs' decisions.

Suspensions on the intentions of the NSF leadership had been growing from the first days of January. The number of members was increased in the midst of these criticisms from 39 to 145 during the NSF's first week. Dissidents were officially invited to join the Front. Cornea claims to have been enrolled without her consent (Cornea, Appendix). Along with Tökes, she was, however, delighted by the events that had taken place and they were both pleased to be included in what they were told was only going to be a provisional leadership. The dissidents Ana Blandina and Mircea Dinescu also accepted membership.

Iliescu had promised that the NSF would only exist temporarily as an interim government. The NSF programme drawn up by Brucan and Mazilu had promised political pluralism, democratic institutions, and the transfer of mass media to the "hands of the people". Later, Iliescu rejected these goals. In January, he described a democracy as "the possibility to achieve goals that were not accessible in the past". These possibilities were to be gained under socio-economic progress. He also made clear that if the democratic procedures were to be exploited for anarchic purposes, they should be withdrawn (Nelson 1992: 52). These statements enraged the disillusioned people and led to demonstrations on January 12 and 28.

On January 23 the Front announced that it would run for elections, thus betraying the promise of temporary existence only, Cornea left it in protest. She was the first former dissident to take this step, but others were to follow. Brucan had left after the January 12 demonstrations and Mazilu had been excluded.

The NSF tried to improve their image by widening its membership from 145 to 253 under the new name, Council for National Unity (PCNU). Still, the NSF faction accounted for more than 50 per cent. The National Salvation Front was formed as a party on February 6. With and without force, they installed their own people in the districts during the spring. This was to lead to further demonstrations by the end of January. The rural population had limited access to information. Not only was the distribution of newspapers in the districts limited: Some distributors were also harassed and had their papers burned (Nelson 1992: 75). The people were dependent upon the state distribution networks. Lack of information contributed to the strong support of the former communists in the rural areas. Iliescu had been presented as the only significant actor in the revolution, as a hero with great charisma. The NSF attacked the Bucharest headquarters of opposition parties on February 18 and 19, and miners from the Jiu valley attacked demonstrators after having been invited by the NSF. As well as being the cradle of the revolution, Transylvania also saw the first riots in the spring. On March 20, a group of Romanians attacked the Tirgu Mures office of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (DUHR). The Hungarians made numerous calls to the local police and armed forces without receiving any response. 15,000 Hungarians were gathered in the city square the next morning. Romanians were also present. They had received news saying that armed Romanians were coming to the city to avenge the events of the previous day. The police were alerted and supposed to stop the buses from arriving in the city. The police were instead often observed waving them through (Human Rights Watch 1991: 16). The Hungarians armed themselves and the result was a bloody battle. The state of emergency was declared after the clashes. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was not informed in advance, which is a violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 4.

Tökes was in the American Foreign Ministry, invited by President George Bush, as he received the news about Tirgu Mures. He interpreted the events as a true intimidation of Hungarians and criticised Iliescu openly for the way the NSF had handled the riots. He then saw what he called the "true intentions of Iliescu", meaning a communist restoration. Iliescu told him either to stay loyal to the NSF or leave as Tökes came back to Bucharest. He chose the latter option and started a new period of dissidence on his own. Tökes underlined the lack of proof of his suspicion that the NSF had provoked this ethnic battle. However, significant to this analysis, this particular event made him take the decision to leave it (Tökes, Appendix).

Cornea had joined the NSF because it provided the only alternative and had left the NSF before these riots. She spoke to Romanians in hospitals who had received anonymous phone calls telling them that the Hungarians were killing Romanian children in Tirgu Mures. These people had travelled there to save their children and relatives. The fact is that no Hungarian children had been killed at all. Cornea accused Brucan and Iliescu of having started their manipulations in February by using statements like "Hungary is waiting for the right moment". Hostilities had also been provoked beforehand in schools since the days when she was a child (Cornea, Appendix). The funnel thus shows latent conflicts that could relatively easily be activated. Like Tökes, she underlined the lack of evidence for her accusations. Nevertheless, she regarded it highly probable that Iliescu had provoked this event. Cornea interpreted Iliescu's rationale as attempts at having the population see him as the exclusive solution to the country's problems. The target of their dissatisfaction would need to be directed away from the NSF and its policies. Narti concluded that the nomenclature probably manipulated and provoked the population in a way that led to the ethnic battle in Tirgu Mures. They did not attempt to stop it, despite pleas for help from the democratic movement (Narti 1992: 12). Narti's report supports Tökes and Cornea's versions.

During the spring, Iliescu made several outbursts against demonstrators. Miners from the Jiu valley were alerted on numerous occasions and asked to come to Bucharest to save the government from what he called "anarchic groups", which were actually peaceful demonstrators wanting peaceful talks with the government. Among those demonstrations was one by the end of April and the first part of May, which at its height included about 40,000 participants. The threat became real as miners that had been

brought by buses from the Jiu valley on the 14 June crushed peaceful demonstrations in Bucharest's University Square. The Romanian government and Iliescu were responsible for the clashes. They had repeatedly threatened the demonstrators. Evidence shows that the government at least considered using extra legal force prior to the event (IHF 1994: 15). The police transported miners to Gypsy areas where a large number of them were beaten up. The Gypsies were additionally blamed for the events afterwards. Human Rights Watch reported that 70 - 80 per cent of those detained after the battle were Gypsies. Thirty-one Gypsies were tried under Decree 153, published in 1970, directed at "parasites of the socialist order". Seven of them were found guilty (IHF 1994: 21).

Further to the unjust charge itself, the procedure violated basic principles of due process. A parliamentary commission later investigated the events, but the report was never made public. Human Rights Watch managed to get a copy and concluded that it did not address the serious questions, including the extent to which the police and the army helped initiate the violence, and why local authorities did not respond immediately to calls for help (Human Rights Watch 1991: 19). Through interviews it became evident that the Gypsies had played only minor roles.

Hostilities between intellectuals and workers had been manifest as miners were used to repress the demonstrations. The Front also abused anti-foreigner sentiments, especially the anti-Western and anti-Hungarian ones. These conflicts had been provoked and kept alive during the Communist dictatorship.

## **Attempts at civil society formation**

Several opposition groups emerged in the spring, following the March 11 "Timisoara Proclamation" (Appendix). The essence of this document and the sentiment of those supporting were rooted in frustration with the NSF. The people were disillusioned by the changes as they saw employees administrating the country similarly to what had been the case during the former dictatorship. Article 7 of the paper stated:

*Timisoara initiated a revolution against the entire Communist regime and its entire nomenclature, and by no means in order to give an opportunity to a group of anti-Ceausescu dissidents within the Romanian Communist Party to gain power (Appendix).*

By "anti-Ceau°escu dissidents", reference is made to the Reformists and Openists. Intellectuals formed The Group for Social Dialogue. The Hungarian Democratic Union's programme laid weight upon the rights of the Hungarians to arrange their own educational system and of other group rights. With 7.2 per cent of the vote in the elections, they became the second largest party and manifest societal watersheds. They gradually realised the importance of having a strong alternative to the NSF. As a consequence, they formed an alliance with the historical parties, called the Anti-Totalitarian Front in August 1990. The second largest opposition group had been The Civic Alliance. Only minor differences existed between their programmes. The most visible division lay in the second one's domination by workers. The Civic Alliance joined the Anti-Totalitarian Front after its formation. The West supported the so-called "historical parties", namely the re-emerging National Liberal Party, the Romanian Social-Democratic Party, and the Christian Democratic National Peasant Party as alternatives to the nomenclature. Western attention was focused on the Romanian civil society later. NGOs have in the later years been dependent on support from American donors (Herciu 1999, Appendix). This was important for the development of a Romanian democracy. Support of societal movements paved the way for parties rooted in civil society.

According to Pasti, the historical parties had no significant policy. They emerged in the direction of top-bottom and had no popular base. Supporting them was therefore a failure, according to Pasti. A healthy democracy must be rooted in civil society, starting as popular movements. According to Pasti, parties should rather be the bases for a democracy, not a result of it (Pasti 1997: 177). This requirement

prevails when alternatives actually exist. Pasti's argument fails by the fact that society had no organisational background, an inheritance from the former regime. Alternatives to the NSF would in any case be preferable. The emergence of bottom-up political parties with solid organisational structures would necessarily take more time. With a Front dominated by the former nomenclature, support for alternatives was in itself essential. (Different organisations and forums emerging from societal movements did, in fact, experience better election results than the historical parties). The NSF had large financial benefits in the election campaign. The reserves of the defunct Communist Party were directly transferred to it. The NSF paid its functionaries about 7000 lei a month, whereas the other parties as units received only 40,000 lei altogether. The NSF also put up phantom parties with similar programmes to several of those emerging from below in order to confuse the electorate (Rady 1992: 167). Representatives of the National Peasant Party and the National Liberal Party were imprisoned, and their supporters were threatened and imprisoned. In the same month, there were demonstrations in the University Square in Bucharest. The "Timisoara Proclamation" was demanded to be put into effect. The opposition parties wanted postponement of the elections, lacking resources and time for organising. Iliescu responded by merely addressing the crowd as "hoodlums". The only demand of the proclamation that corresponded to the way reality was developing was that the first presidency after the elections lasted only two years. (George<sup>o</sup>cu 1991: 291). Iliescu exploited the uncertainty of the potential losers from a transition to a market economy for his election campaign, namely industrial workers, miners, and others working in unprofitable sectors. The NSF was almost universally supported by the former nomenclature. Young people opposed it, among them students, intellectuals, and skilled workers. These were the groups that thought they would be in a position to profit from a market economy. The celebrated dissidents were portrayed as having committed the same illegalities towards the people as the Securitate had (Nelson 1992: 28).

## **The elections**

The NSF decided the election law on March 14. The Senate would have 119 seats and the National Assembly was designated 396 seats, nine of which would be reserved for the representation of national minorities, independently of this election process. The elections for the National Assembly were based upon 41 multi-seat districts with magnitudes between 4 and 15, resulting from a proportional representation procedure. 39 representatives were to be reserved for Bucharest to both chambers. For the Senate, the magnitude varied between two and four. A Hare quota was used at the local level and the d'Hondt method at the national level for the lower house, using remainder votes from the first stage. There was no quota at this stage, thus it favoured small parties. Having gained no seats at the first stage, small parties naturally had a dis-proportionally large fraction at the second stage<sup>[24]</sup>. It was specified that the elections were meant for what the NSF called a "constituent assembly" more than a parliament. The exact power distribution between the two bodies was left open for future discussions. The powers of the President, like the duration of the Presidency, were not defined. The President would have the responsibility of choosing the Prime Minister with parliamentary approval. 13,000 polling stations had been set up and 500 international observers were present. Fraud was most common in remote areas that the observers failed to reach. The elections had largely followed the prescriptions of the election law, according to Rady (Rady 1992)<sup>[25]</sup>. These procedures gave 18 parties representation in the National Assembly. Eight parties achieved representation in the Senate. However, they were to be excluded from significant influence as the NSF won by a landslide. The Front got 92 out of the 119 seats in the Senate and 263 of the 296 in the Assembly of Deputies. With regard to the National Assembly, the NSF was supported by 66.3 per cent of the electorate, resulting in an average representation in the houses of 68.0 per cent. Number two in the elections was the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania, with 7.2 per cent of the total votes awarded with 7.5 per cent of the seats. Number three was the National Liberal Party, with 6.4 per cent of the share of votes, resulting in

a proportion of 7.5 per cent of the total seats.

In the elections for the Senate, 67.5 per cent voted for the NSF, 7.2 per cent for the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania and 7.1 per cent for the National Liberal Party. The result was a seat allocation of 77.3 per cent, 10.1 per cent, and 7.6 per cent, respectively. Total deviation from proportionality in the elections was 5.7 per cent.

The opposition movement lost its spirit after Iliescu's and the NSF's overwhelming victories. The electoral results gave no significant parliament pluralism. The NSF could continue its rule without parliamentary counterweights. If democratically minded, the NSF would have encouraged the opposition. They clearly did not. They were responsible for the lack of party development. The NSF clearly did not let the opposition parties build organisations without involvement after the elections: Headquarters were again attacked on June 18 and 19.

## **Actors' preferences and alternatives for action**

Rupturists Three had similar preferences as Rupturists One and Rupturists Two. They were societal representatives alike. They would have to try to imagine the true implications of the conspiracy intentions that, according to Tökes, were regarded to be commitment to democratisation. In the case where this group would be committed to negotiations, Rupturists Three would have made a rational choice by joining the NSF in order to give it a broad basis and support the transition. This situation is found in the left-hand sub-game. They would also have supported reform-minded openists because this outcome could lead to democratisation as well, necessitating a longer time span. In the case where Rupturists Three had understood that the NSF was ruled by non reform-minded openists, they would not have joined. They would not have supported undemocratic procedures and not consciously have been exploited in order to secure the Openists' privileges. A better option would have been from the start to stay in opposition. The dissidents, including Cornea and Tökes, enjoyed considerable popular support and could have functioned as a true alternative to the power base.


Openists are generally less committed to negotiations than reformists. This game's non reform-minded openists wanted liberalisation of the communist system but were not interested in sharing authority or privileges. As elaborated, Involutionists, who probably had realised that the pre-transition regime could not survive, joined this group in order to keep privileged positions. This gave this group the character of being non reform-minded. Thus they were separated from reform-minded openists who are likely to collaborate with reformists. Individuals who had supported the Involutionists before the transition but were not maximalists, are to be classified as Continuists. These now would rationally join the Openists because the former regime had fallen.

The Reformists' preferences were unchanged from the former games. They were interested in negotiations with the Openists and Rupturists Three that could lead to a democratisation process through which they could secure group privileges.

## **The Openists win**

Figure 11 shows Game Four on extensive form. The Openists might be more or less committed to democratisation, which is indicated by the sub-games "Reform-minded openists" and "Non reform-minded openists". Rupture for the Reformists and Rupturists Three would mean not joining the NSF in the sub-game with non negotiation-minded openists. Democratisation through negotiations would be unachievable here. In the sub-games of Reformist regime and negotiation-minded openists, democratisation would best be served by joining the NSF. Rupturists Three and Reformists going for reform meant negotiations in the NSF, applicable to all three actors. The Openists' choice of continuity would imply not going for negotiations, as opposed to reform. Distances of 20 are used to indicate considerable differences in payoffs compared to where 10 is used. This is an illustrative tool intended

to show the different importances of actors' choices.



**Figure 11: Game Four on extensive form. “Reformist Regime” indicates the case where the conspiracy has de facto power and will negotiate on the basis of reformists’ preferences. “Openist regime” is the case where Openists have de facto power**

The Openists initiated the game as they formed the NSF on December 25. It had asymmetrical information because only the Openists themselves knew the payoffs. Zero is taken as departure point in the payoffs to indicate status quo. Thus the Reformists and Rupturists Three’s payoffs are negative in the right-hand sub-game because no negotiation would be possible here, as contrasted to the other two sub-games. Openists would always gain positive payoffs. Thus Rupturists Three as well as the Romanian society believed that the left-hand sub-game was being played. The Reformists also believed that. Only the Openists knew the payoffs and the fact that the right-hand sub-game was being played. Information was also insufficient because the Reformists and Rupturists Three had to make moves without knowing the Openists’ choice. Rupturists Three could, however, observe the Reformists’ choice and Rupturists Three’s choices could be predicted by the other players. The Reformists and Rupturists Three joined the NSF and secured the Openists the necessary legitimation they needed. However, as they realised the Openists’ intentions, they realised that they had obtained sub-optimal results. By the time of the elections, all members of Rupturists Three had left the NSF, thus chosen Rupture. The Reformists observed the move by the Openists to establish the NSF as a party, and later they observed the provocation of ethnic clashes. Rupturists Three followed both the Openists’ and the Reformists’ moves. They also chose Rupture and left the NSF. The game tree refers to the end result. It predicts (C,R,R) in the right branch, which refers to the empirical outcome. The middle branch shows that (r,r,r) would have been the result if the openists had been reform-minded. The Reformists and Rupturists Three would have accepted limited reforms and stayed in the NSF, striving for a pact. The left branch predicts the outcome (r,r), a pact between the Reformists and Rupturists Three. The Openists are not involved in this sub-game.

Nature decided whether the conspiracy would be dominated by Reformists, reform-minded openists, or

non reform-minded openists. The sub-games “Reform-minded openists” and “Non reform-minded openists” do not reflect choices made by the Openists. On the contrary, it reflects the character of the Openists, which had to be calculated upon by the Reformists and Rupturists Three. The central topic was the fact that continuists who had supported the former Involutionists had now joined the Openists. It would thus be unclear whether this group would be reform-minded or not. Rupturists Three believed that Brucan, Iliescu, and Mazilu represented a faction that was interested in democratisation. The left-hand sub-game illustrates this situation. The Openists would be non-existent or the Reformists would gain control over the NSF. The interval numbers indicate the fact that the Reformists’ choices would be of greater importance for both actors than Rupturists Three’s choices.

The Reformists as a unit had promised a rupture and a fair transition to democracy before the Openists emerged as a faction that seized power over the NSF. Rupturists Three did not predict the Openists’ existence as a faction separated from the Reformists. The punishment for the Openists in leaving the agreement to negotiate had become too low and they could rationally break it, given their preferences. If Rupturists Three had understood the Openists’ preferences and power resources before these had gained control over the power apparatus, this punishment would have had a higher value. Rupturists Three could, in that case, have been able to pressure the Openists to follow democratic procedures. Reform-minded Openists would give better chances for democratisation than what would be the case with non reform-minded openists. Tökes initially believed that the conspiracy had pro-democracy preferences (Tökes, Appendix). Those members of Rupturists Three who did not support such an interpretation, like Cornea (Cornea, Appendix), believed in the sub-game involving reform-minded openists. In both cases, joining the Front would be rational, but with greater chances of success in the game tree’s middle branch. Only with non reform-minded openists in charge of power would joining the Front be irrational. In that case Rupture, performing independent opposition, would be the better option. International critics of the NSF would have emerged in the initial phase and the chances of a just and fair democratisation process would have been higher. Thus Rupturists Three’s payoffs followed the same ranking orders under “Reformist regime” and under “Reform-minded openists”. The Openists choosing reform would involve engaging in negotiations, whereas continuity would mean trying to center privileges in their own hands without negotiating.

The non reform-minded openists would choose between limited reform and rupture. Limited reform meant staying in the NSF and accepting only minor changes, whereas Rupture would mean leaving it and performing independent opposition. Similar combinations of Reformists’ and Rupturists Three’s choices were higher in the case where the Openists would be reform-minded. None of them would however stay in the NSF if the Openists were non reform-minded. Rupturists Three would only have chosen to leave the Front in the non reform-minded openists setting. Rupturists Three’s payoffs associated with similar combinations of their choices and those of the Reformists were higher in the setting with reform-minded openists.

Backwards induction put the Openists in the position to choose between limited reform and continuity. Limited reform was their optimal outcome, as they knew that both the Reformists and Rupturists Three would join in the first phase, thus securing the NSF necessary legitimacy. The crucial fact is that the Reformists and Rupturists Three believed that the “Reformist regime” sub-game was being played. Rupturists Three regarded the possibility of winning democratisation by joining forces with the nomenclaturists higher than what could be achieved separately. Both groups therefore joined the NSF. The Reformists intended reform through negotiations and Rupturists Three democratisation. Gradually, however, both understood the rules and left the Front.

The Openists would be better served by the cases where the Reformists and Rupturists Three would choose reform instead of Rupture. This would secure the Front legitimacy. Relative distance between their second and third preferences is thus higher than the ones between the first and the second and between the third and the fourth preferences in the left-hand sub-game. This applies not only in the case where they would perform a pro-negotiations image but also where they would not. Their



possibilities of securing privileges would be better by not going for negotiations.

The Reformists and Rupturists Three needed to calculate on the chances of having the three different settings. Tökes was convinced that the left-hand sub-game was being played. Cornea, on the other hand, had co-operated with Brucan but joined the NSF simply because no other alternative was available. This shows that the calculations differ. In order to have a common rational strategy analysed, the actors' subjective prior probability of having the left-hand sub-game is set to .8. Rupturists Three would have been irrational by joining the NSF if they had believed that non negotiation-minded openists had de facto power. Thus, their subjective evaluations of the prior probability for these rules is zero. Their subjective probability of having negotiation-minded openists was .2.

The Reformists may have had more information available than Rupturists Three. The question of whether this was the case, however, is unanswerable due to lack of information. For this reason, the subjective probabilities are decided to be the same as for the Reformists.

The following expected utilities document Rupturists Three's dominating strategy in choosing to join the NSF, given the situation that non negotiation-minded openists will not be actors in the game, meaning that the probability for having the right-hand sub-game is zero:

$$\text{EURup 3 (R)} = (0,8 * 10) + (0,2* 30) + (0* -40) = 14$$

$$\text{EURup 3 (r)} = (0,8* 20) + (0,2* 40) + (0* (-50)) = 24$$

Likewise, the Reformists also had a dominating strategy in staying in the NSF, working for a pact, given the incidence that non negotiation-minded openists would not occur as players:

$$\text{EURef (R)} = (0,8* 20) + (0,2* 10) + (0* (-10)) = 18$$

$$\text{EURef (r)} = (0,8* 40) + (0,2* 40) + (0* -40)) = 40$$

The Reformists and Rupturists Three later re-directed their behaviour and left the NSF. They got aware of the fact that non negotiation-minded openists decided the NSF's policies. They had secured the Openists with necessary support for them having continuity of privileges without negotiations.

As elaborated previously had could Tökes and Cornea have used their potential international backup immediately after the formation of the NSF and secured strong threat power for having the Openists removed from control over the NSF. They did nevertheless not take into account that communist privileges could be fought for by nomenclaturists using extraordinary measures. If Rupturists Three had taken this possibility into account, they would have had to calculate on probabilities for interactions with not only Reformists and negotiation-minded openists, but also with non negotiation-minded openists. In order to illustrate rational calculations in this situation, the probability for having the left-hand sub-game is set to q. The probability for the middle branch is x and the probability for the right branch is z. q will thus have the value of (1-x-z). Rupturists Three could now find expected utilities from Rupture and reform:

$$\text{EURup 3 (R)} = (1-x-z)10 + x*30 + z(-10) = 10 + 20x + 20z$$

$$\text{EURup 3 (r)} = (1-x-z)20 + x*40 + z(-20) = 20 + 20x - 40z$$

$$\text{EURup 3 (R)} > \text{EURup 3 (r)}$$

$$10 + 20x - 20z > 20 + 20x - 40z$$

$$z > .5$$

Given the payoffs in the game tree would the probabilities for having non negotiation-minded openists participating in the game have had to be higher than .5 for Rupturists Three to rationally reject any involvement with the Front. With the probability for presence of non negotiation-minded openists present lower than .5 would joining the NSF be rational.

## **The Openists: Unclear and incomplete threats**

The Openists wanted liberalisation of the totalitarian regime without negotiations with the Reformists or Rupturists Three. This threat was not made public before power had been secured. Rupturists Three could choose between joining the National Salvation Front or abstaining. Joining the Front would mean indirect support of undemocratic preferences, whereas abstaining would mean performing an independent opposition. The Reformists were in the position to stay in the Front or leave it. This threat was relevant. Some members of Rupturists Three were enrolled without consent. Nevertheless, they were free to withdraw immediately. The Reformists were also free to accept the Openists' agenda, to try influencing its course, or to leave. The threat was sufficiently severe: Continuity of these privileges and an unjust process towards democracy would mean considerable negative effects for the democratisation process, for which the dissidents had been leading a hard struggle. The fact that the Reformists left the Front shows that they also regarded the threat as sufficiently severe. The threat was not stated explicitly and did not occur to Rupturists Three or the Reformists as representing possible outcomes. Hence it cannot be interpreted as sufficiently clear. This is why the other actors misjudged optimal and sub-optimal payoffs. The Openists supported liberalisation through negotiations previously. Still, the Reformists knew that several former Involutionists had joined this group for pragmatic reasons. Importantly, the threats were also not complete. The Openists might have had the power to execute their preferences regardless of other actors. They controlled the Securitate and the army. They could also take advantage of societal watersheds in the 1990 spring. The other actors did not know if their actions would influence the threat of no negotiations being carried out or not. Not understanding the presence and impact of this threat formed the basis for their calculations on the expected utilities.

## **Rupturists Three: Rational behaviour under unclear rules?**

Rupturists Three could choose whether to join the NSF or not. The Reformists could choose whether to stay in the NSF or not. The effect of independent opposition would be society demonstrating against the practice of the Openists that would be pressured to change the course towards negotiations. The threat was relevant. The Openists could freely choose their preferences and strategy. The threat should also be considered sufficiently severe: The undemocratic acts performed in the spring prove a strong will behind the Openists' preferences. They would use strong measures. They did not adhere to the threat. The reason was lack of severity. Romania was now open to the outside world and news distribution had increased. The threat was also incomplete: Rupturists Three could perform their opposition as members of the NSF as well. The threat was considered credible and clear: The Openists could expect opposition from Rupturists Three by refusing to negotiate.

The threats were ineffective: The Openists would have executed their preferences anyway. Having Rupturists Three joining the Front and the Reformists staying would, however, decrease the effectiveness of Rupturists Three and the Reformists' threats, and ease the Openists' efforts of keeping privileges.

Elster's "thin" theory of rationality was satisfied by Rupturists Three and the Reformists' acts. The "thick" theory was violated on the requirement that acts shall result from reflected reasons. The "thick" requirements, however, are not prescribed for rational behaviour in this thesis' framework. Having information on Iliescu's background enabled the use of "reflexive monitoring" to predict that he could have non-democratic interests. With support from the "thin" theory the conclusion must instead be on rational behaviour that did not result in an optimal outcome because the rules of the game were fluid: Information was unclear. According to Tsebelis, the rational choice approach is less applicable under such circumstances. A contrasting conclusion can be drawn, stating that the rational choice approach is

effective for locating the reasons for under-optimal results. That has been achieved here. Opposition against the NSF from the start would have given better results. It could in fact have resulted in sufficient pressure for having negotiations on democratisation, thus giving optimal results. The international community would have listened to dissidents like Cornea and Tökes. International attention could have prevented the NSF from forming a political party, standing for elections, and using violence in order to repress civil society and other parties. The circumstances cannot be considered to have been chaotic with the implication of confusing Rupturists Three or the Reformists. They both had even better probabilities for performing protests without being punished by the Openists than the Reformists had in Game One. Brucan's international reputation, resulting from a diplomatic career, had made the Involutionists' threats ineffective. The Openists were in the same situation. US President Bush had invited Tökes. Protesting against the Openists would be sustained by threats of greater effectiveness than what was the case in the first game. Such threats would probably have been sufficiently severe for the Openists to change their course in accordance with the promises they had given.

## **A new French revolution?**

Figure 12 shows the Romanian transition games on extensive form. The vertical time scale indicates absolute time and the horizontal scale shows relative time durations between the initiation of the games. (The "Letter of Six" was written in the wake of the Brasov riots in November 1989. However, it had implications as initiation of a transition only from March 11, 1989, when it was broadcast). Ordinal numbers are used in this figure to show the actors' ranking of payoffs in a simplifying manner. In the game analyses, these numbers were replaced with interval numbers to indicate relative distances. This figure summarises the process. The figure's arrows show the transition's path.



Nevertheless, a rupture was intended in order to give moral support and they hoped that the sympathy of PEC-, Securitate-, and army officials would shift towards the Reformists. The fact was that the regime did not act resolutely. The Involutionists ordered rupture but this order was not carried out resolutely. Society saw that sympathy was shifting.

The Involutionists needed to use a rupture now in order to confront this illloyalty that would undermine the regime if not met with power. The Involutionists decided to arrange the supportive demonstration in Bucharest as a last means to demonstrate willingness and ability to use any measure. They did not succeed. Ceau°escu was removed from power and a leadership vacuum emerged.

Romanian society now put their trust in former Reformists' promise of a just transition. The dissidents and society were surprised as Iliescu and his faction used violence for securing privileges. The Romanian transition proved incomparable to the French revolution.

The Romanian transition has been interpreted as a coup d'etat and as a revolution. The fact is that elements of both were involved. Ramesh claimed that two conspiracy groups collaborated in order to have Ceau°escu removed from power: one within the military hierarchy led by Ionita and Militaru and one Securitate-based, led by Magureanu and Iliescu. Militaru has confirmed that he collaborated in a conspiracy with Maurer for years (Ramesh 1991: 91). According to Militaru, Gorbachev's liberalisation inspired them. Their goal would be to remove Ceau°escu from leadership, but not necessarily to replace the communist system. The plotters had planned to provoke an uprising in the 1990 summer. Society started the revolution independently of this plan.

Those who established the National Salvation Front in the revolution tried to give the impression of not having been a pre-institutionalised unit. The NSF was, however, accused of being so as the trial against the Ceau°escus was performed in secrecy, despite earlier promises of an open process. This was the first sign that made the Romanians suspect them of having undemocratic intentions. Brucan later stated that restoration forces in the Securitate might commit a coup d'etat. The trial had to be rushed, and power had to be secured before such incidents could occur. He claimed to have left the Front in February 1990, as a protest against Iliescu, who departed from his promises of dissolving the Front after the revolution. Iliescu, instead, transformed it into a political party and his personal power base (Nyholm and Ingemann 1999).

Radio Free Europe denied Brucan and Iliescu's stating that no such group as the National Salvation Front could possibly be formed under Ceau°escu's rule. RFE had received two letters in 1989 that were signed by the "Council for National Salvation", the first one on August 27 and the second one on November 8. The first one pleaded the 14th Party Congress not to re-elect Ceau°escu as Secretary General, whereas the second one attacked his policies for leading to human and economic disaster. RFE claimed to have experts who, with a high degree of certainty, concluded that the letter did not originate from within the Party hierarchy (Ramesh 1991: 89). Commodore Radu Nicolae had in 1985 mentioned this "council", of which he claimed to have been a member. Regardless of it having any connections to the NSF or not, the conclusion is that the letter indicated the likelihood of dissidence or a conspiracy.

Brucan clearly intended to present himself as a soft-liner in this statement, characterising Iliescu as a hard-liner not really interested in a fair transition process. However, Brucan could as well have had such preferences and withdrawn after having lost an internal power battle. His statements in the "Letter of Six" clearly demonstrated that he supported the communist system. One could contest this conclusion, by conceiving that it was an expression of a strategy. That conclusion must, however, be rejected as Brucan later defended the NSF as a "supra-ideological body above the old terms like socialism, Marxism, communism, Leninism, and capitalism" in the 1990 spring. There would be no need for other parties to exist (Nelson 1992: 23). Brucan denied that he had planned a coup d'etat in collaboration with Iliescu. He claimed to have been discussing the matters with Gorbachev, who had supported democratisation in Romania and accepted a transition in the form of negotiations.

No connections existed between the putschists and the masses during the revolution (Ramesh 1991:

117). The masses demanded Ceau°escu's retreat independently. Nomenclaturists executed him with support from the Securitate, and invited dissidents to join the National Salvation Front as an interim government. They accepted. After a few weeks, however, the NSF used violent methods in order to repress the opposition. They announced that they would stand for elections. The dissidents left the NSF that formed a political party and won in May 1990.

Pasti, political scientist and Iliescu's adviser before the 1990 elections, compared the events in Romania with the French revolution, finding broad societal similarities in the lack of an ideology, of leaders and of a programme (Pasti, Appendix). He understood a revolution as a change of institutions and rejected the importance of individuals occupying positions. Adopting his definition, one should term the events a revolution. Pasti pointed to changes in structures that would imply necessary and sufficient changes in the way leaders are elected. The Party organisation, the Party Executive Committee and the Parliament were changed in Romania. The administration was maintained. Pasti did not take the NSF's measures between the revolution and the first elections into consideration. The way the power was by violent means concentrated in the hands of the nomenclaturists, and the violent methods they used were, however, highly significant.

Preda is a political scientist who served as adviser for former President Constantinescu in his election campaign before the 1996 elections. He supported the interpretation of the events as a revolution. Preda referred to the riots in Timisoara and in Bucharest, which eventually led to the removal of Ceau°escu. Iliescu has proved not to be a convinced democrat. Preda referred to Iliescu stating that the ideas of socialism had been rejected by the communist regime. Iliescu saw himself as Ceau°escu's successor, intending to change to socialism like in the 1960s and 1970s, according to Preda (Preda, Appendix). Preda provided an actor-orientated approach as a contradiction to Pasti's institutional one. Both term the events a revolution. Preda's conclusion, however, implies fundamentally different viewpoints and conclusions.

George°cu supported Ratesh and Preda's conclusions on Iliescu and Brucan's preferences. He also concluded that Iliescu was interested in a reformed communism system, a looser form of the one-party system. George°cu referred to Iliescu's 21 December 1989 speech to students, calling political pluralism "an obsolete ideology of the 19th century". This statement is said to be equivalent to the NSF ideologue Brucan's statements as elaborated above (George°cu 1991).

Iliescu and Brucan's statements have been used for scrutinising their pro-democratic images. Formal democratic institutions are insufficient for stating that democratic procedures have been introduced. All formal rules are excluded from official legitimacy in a revolutionary situation. The constitution is non-enforceable and former procedures are no longer efficient. The only obligations placed upon the leaders are their promises and statements to the public that will give them more or less legitimacy. According to Smith, this is how an interim government must justify its existence (Smith, Appendix). Its legitimacy wanes if the positions are exploited for securing longer-lasting power. The nomenclaturists' preferences are further analysed in the analysis of Game Four.

## **Transition modes and democratisation**

The Funnel of Causality explained how the transition proceeded. This approach also contributed to the explanation of why it took place. The game theoretic analysis was embedded in the Funnel of Causality and proved adequate for the analysis of transition complexities. The funnel indicated imposition, revolution, or a combination of both as possible transition modes.

A transition was defined in Chapter two as an intention to form "some kind of democracy". The procedures of the 1990 elections themselves were largely free and fair. The new government gained authority to generate policies and the judiciary, the legislative, and the executive powers did not have to share authority with others. "Some form of democracy" had been established after manipulations and violence.

The economy had shown a declining trend over the last years before the revolution. More accurate conclusions cannot be given on Lipset's thesis. Linz and Stepan supported a more modest version, stating that economic development may influence legitimacy. The analysis has supported that hypothesis. Huntington postulated high degrees of popular frustration if necessary institutions are not present in the case where mobilisation is high. The NSF executed methods that indeed were unpopular, and that stoked up societal frustration. Their agenda, however, would have been executed far less problematically if society had not mobilised. Huntington's thesis is meant for the relation between society and democratic or pseudo democratic institutions, which were absent in the spring of 1990 in Romania, and thus less applicable. Thus the general conclusion from this discussion is that the modernisation paradigm provides limited explanatory power for the Romanian transition.

The main achievement has been an interpretation of the Romanian transition as a series of connected games supervised by the Openists. The Integrative Approach has examined how this planned process was both possible and likely in a former sultanist regime. Karl and Schmitter's analysis was insufficient for understanding the process: It did not show why or how relations exist between structure and action in transitions. Karl and Schmitter concluded that some transitions responded to their ideal types and some represented combinations. This analysis has elucidated important factors that explained the forces behind this particular case. It has also demonstrated Pasti's failed comparison with the French revolution. A fair and just transition should remove nomenclaturists, not only the structures. Karl and Schmitter found the survivability in leadership echelons of traditionally dominating classes to be likely after a pact, more so than after a revolution or an imposition. This analysis did not support their conclusion: The Romanian Openists were indeed able to preserve their privileges, despite this transition involving the ideal types of both revolution and imposition. They presented privileged groups of the former regime. Iliescu had experienced degradation. Still, he was part of the communist nomenclature and had been a close associate of Ceaușescu for years.

This approach analysed the transition as a process, which is achieved neither by Linz and Stepan nor by Lipset. Linz and Stepan pointed to institutional problems and actors' self-interest but did not show the implications of them. Lipset's analysis was based on economic independent variables exclusively, which are unreliable. An inclusion of several variables is necessary. That was attempted by Linz and Stepan.

Karl and Schmitter concluded that revolutions are more likely to end merely with a limited form of democracy than with impositions and pacts. They pointed to the absence of democracy-minded groups in a revolution. This corresponds to Colomer's conclusion that games involving maximalist groups will seldom give pacts (Colomer 1991: 126). This analysis showed that the democracy-minded Rupturists Three were directly involved in a seemingly interim government and what they hoped would function as a pact. This case bore strong ingredients of a revolution and the result of the transition must be characterised as a limited form of democracy. In this sense their hypothesis is supported. The pre-transitional regime was highly exclusive, and Rupturists Three did not possess effective threats in their interdependent accords with the Openists. The results support the first hypothesis of this analysis.

The second hypothesis postulated that weak liberal traditions would give transition actors not maximising democratic preferences. The analysis provides a mixed picture: The Openists were not interested in negotiations. Their violent means of securing privileges responded to a confrontational political culture and a lack of liberal traditions. The rupturists in Timisoara, in Bucharest, and in the NSF would have accepted reforms as an alternative to continuity of the Involutionists' rule. Game Four showed that their representatives would have participated in a pact. This result does not support the hypothesis.

The third hypothesis postulated that structure decides transition mode and self-interest. The analysis has shown that imposition or revolution would be likely transition modes in Romania. A combination of both responds to realities, and this hypothesis is supported. With regard to self-interest, Ceaușescu advanced under the Stalinist structure and an absence of liberal traditions. His self-interest also led to

the particular transition mode. The sultanistic leadership directly decided economic development and institutional characteristics. The absence of a civil society, necessary for a pact, resulted from his leadership. As examined above, less evidence has been found of a correlation between structure and the opposition groups' preferences. Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu's severely repressive measures contributed to the strong focus on both nomenclaturists and dissidents as leaders that would receive attention in the transition. This aspect supports the hypothesis.

Colomer predicted that games between groups of distant blocks, including maximalists, would give single, threat-vulnerable results. That means that, whatever the result of the game, at least one of the actors would have strong incentives to have it changed. The Involutionists could not defend their positions properly against Rupturists One in Game Two. Continuity was the result of the game and society had strong incentives to have it changed. Hence Rupturists Two rioted in Game Three. The Reformists lost the battle with the Openists and the result was the Reformists being directly or indirectly forced out of the NSF. This result contradicts Colomer's prediction that interactions between reformists and openists are likely to proceed without conflict because the groups' preferences are close. Colomer stated that a single, strongly stable equilibrium would be the result. The Openists were, however, examined as either reform-minded or non reform-minded in this thesis. As the last sub-type corresponds to this group's characteristics, the solution could be they are more closely associated with continuists. Games between continuists and openists would according to Colomer give single, strongly stable equilibria. This conclusion, nevertheless, is not supported by this analysis.

The interactions in Game Four were analysed as games between rupturists and openists because the Reformists lost. Colomer predicted Pareto under-optimal results in such cases. At least one of the actors would have incentives to have the result changed. Such proceedings could end with pacts. This analysis demonstrated a Pareto under-optimal outcome that did not give a pact because Rupturists Three's threats were ineffective.

It is documented that Colomer's theory could also not predict the proceedings and outcomes of the Romanian transition. The strict dependency of outcomes on transition groups does not hold absolutely. The patterns nevertheless prove high probabilities. A considerable degree of variance is subject of unpredictability simply because it results from actors' choices.

As elaborated, the 1990 spring witnessed provoked clashes between ethnic groups. These did not result in conflicts that could threaten the state. Cornea gave information on the systematic indoctrination of Romanians against Hungarians in schools since the time of her childhood. She suspected the nomenclaturists of having attempted to create Yugoslavia-like relations between ethnic groups. The nomenclaturists intended to appear as leaders that could save the country and gain support from all groups (Cornea, Appendix). This study has shown that the Openists exploited this latent conflict. Ethnic hostilities, however, cannot be regarded to have had the same conflict potential as in Yugoslavia. A transition involving ethnic battles to that extent was unlikely.

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[20] The poets, Mircea Dinescu, Dan Desliu, Ana Blandina, Dan Petrescu, Gabriel Andreescu, Radu Filipescu, and Aurel Dragos Munteanu, wrote critical texts, independently of this group.

[21] The other regimes were undergoing transitions, and Gorbachev had stated that East Central European states' internal affairs would not be intervened with. An intervention by Western powers was also unlikely. Western military intervention always comes after diplomacy.

[22] Ceausescu's son Nicu was captured soon after his parents. So were also Nicolae's sister Zoia and stepbrother Valentin.

[23] On 20 September 1990, Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu's brother received a prison sentence of 15 years and Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu's son, Nicu, was sentenced to 20 years on September 21, both for instigating to aggravated murder. Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu's sons, Zoe and Valentin, were kept in preventive detention until August 1990 but not charged).

[24] All citizens not convicted for criminal acts were allowed to vote. Thereby, even members of Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu's family were included.

[25] In an election report from the Timis province, Aarebrot observed large numbers of deviations as resulting from the inexperience of those in charge. Some of the more serious deviations were not compatible with a free election, but these had been the exceptions and not the rule (Aarebrot 1990-1991: 15).

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# APPENDIX

## ABOUT THE INFORMANTS

Silviu Brucan Brucan is a former ambassador and chief editor of the Party paper Scinteia. He also worked as a Professor of Marxism at the University of Bucharest. Brucan wrote the critical “Letter of Six”, co-signed by former high ranking nomenclaturists. He left the National Salvation Front in January 1990 and now works at Pro TV in Bucharest.

### **Doina Cornea**

Doina Cornea supported the striking miners in Brasov in 1987. She made important contributions to spreading news on human rights abused by writing letters to Radio Free Europe that were broadcast all over Romania. She also protested against Ceau°escu’s so-called “modernisation plan”. Cornea was a member of the National Salvation Front in its initial phase and left it in January 1990.

### **Amalia Herciu**

Herciu is a project co-ordinator at Asociatia Pro Democratia, an important non-governmental organisation in Bucharest that works for cross-cultural understanding and democratic values.

Vladimir Pasti

Pasti is a political scientist and was Iliescu’s adviser before the 1990 elections. He now works as a researcher at the National Institute for Opinion and Market Studies in Bucharest.

### **Christian Preda**

Preda is a political scientist and was Constantinescu’s adviser before the 1996 elections. He now works as a Professor of political science at the Faculty of Political and Administration Sciences, University of Bucharest.

### **Petre Roman**

Roman worked as a political science professor at the University of Bucharest before the revolution. He was Prime Minister from the revolution to the 1990 elections and again in the 1990-1992 period. He belonged to the Iliescu-faction in the transition and was criticised for measures taken in the spring.

### **Laszlo Tökes**

Tökes was a priest in the Reformed Church of Timisoara and protested against the repression of minority rights and of religious freedom. He also objected to Ceau°escu’s so-called “modernisation plan”. Tökes started the Romanian revolution. He left the National Salvation Front after the ethnic battle in Tirgu Mures on March 20, 1990. He now works as a bishop in the Reformed Church of Oradea.

### **Eivind Smith**

Eivind Smith is a Professor of Public Law at the University of Oslo.

## INTERVIEW WITH DOINA CORNEA (Romanian language)

by Øyvind E. Lervik.

March 23, 2000

Translator: Tilda Bazqa.

Location: Ms. Corneas home

Str. Alba Iulia nr. 16

3400 CLUJ-NAPOCA

ROMANIA

No interview scheme had been prepared in advance. I had explained the translator which questions were of interest and asked her to lead the interview.

Translator: Deci este si pentru lucrare lui de licență această teză va fi inclusă în această lucrare despre Europa în particular. Deci lucrarea lui va fi publicată în cadrul aceastei cărți . Ieri am avut un interviu cu domnul Tökes Laszlo

care vă transmite salutare, iar săptămîna viitoare va avea un interviu cu domnul Ion Iliescu . Aa, i sîntrecem la întrebări. So we'll get to the questions now. Cînd ați început să aveți această împotrivire în ceea ce privește regimul comunist?

Cornea: Păi a venit treptat și traduceți ? Ca să știți ce să mă întrebe. A venit treptat. N-a putut spune o dată fixă, pot să spun niste evenimente.

T: It came gradually. It didn't start at a certain moment in time.

C: Si spuneti-I că la noi comunismul a avut două perioade , probabil și în celelalte țări , cea stalinistă după un fel de eliberarea, cum să zic, de frică, de teroarea din anii stalinisti. Adică două perioade. Traduceți-i.

T: There were two different periods in communism. The first one was the Stalinist period and there was a second one which was against...

C: Era mai multă libertate în perioada a doua.

T: There was more freedom in the second part than in the Stalinist part.

C: La noi a început cu Ceaușescu perioada a doua.

T. And thus the second period started with Ceaușescu .

C:Sistemul communist a fost îngrozitor în România în prima perioadă.

T. The system was awful in the first period before the Ceaușescu period..

C: Eu cred că numai în Uniunea Sovietică a mai fost așa de cumplit comunismul.

T: She thinks that only in the Soviet Union was there such a terror and such an awful kind of legislation.

C: A fost decimată elita intelectuală, religioasă, mă rog, toată universitățile, în închisoare, au murit, cu domiciliu obligatoriu, deci tot ce a fost gândire în România a fost suprimat.

T: All the intelligentsia , I mean teachers, the clergy, everyone who has...

C: Armata, tot, tot, tot...

T: People from the army, everyone was killed or deported or closed in their houses, in house arrest.

C: Frica a marcat toată populația.

T: Fear marked the entire population.

C: Dar după ce a venit Ceaușescu, prin '68, cu Cehoslovacia, atunci a fost un respiro, un moment de mai mare libertate, care a fost bun dar a fost și rău într-un fel.

T: So when Ceaușescu came in 1968...

C: NU atunci a venit, dar...

T: In that period, there was a respite, everyone was freer and everyone had the time to feel the freedom, there was in some part good and some part bad.

C: Din cauza atitudinii lui de emancipare față de erori și cînd au avut loc evenimentele din Cehoslovacia.

T: Because of his emancipation concerning the events in Czechoslovakia.

C: A fost bine c

Am avut un fel de speranță, că vine primăvara și în România.

T: There was the hope that there will be much more freedom in Romania, too.

C: Dar a fost rău pentru că ne-am creat iluzii în privința lui Ceaușescu.

T: It was bad because illusions were formed about Ceaușescu.

C: Dar pentru a fi foarte dreaptă părerea mea este că s-ar fi putut, intelectualitatea românească ar fi putut să facă mai mult în anii '70, ca manifestarea de opoziție, ar fi putut să facă ceea ce s-a făcut în Polonia, în Cehoslovacia, în Ungaria, și nimeni nu făcea nimic.

T: The intelligentsia could have formed alliance against him, could have done the same thing that happened in Czechoslovakia, in Poland, in Hungary, but nobody protested, nobody was against.

C: Așa că eu spun că suntem de vină, suntem de vină, pe Ceaușescu în parte noi l-am creat.

T: So she says that in part we are guilty, the Romanian people, guilty because in some way....

C: Intellectually în primul rând, nu poporul...

T: Not the people in general, but the intellectuals have actually created Ceaușescu . There was no resistance.

Lervik: But I have read in books that security was so present, everywhere, how can she say that she is guilty when the repression was so harsh?

T: Spune că el a citit că securitatea era prezentă peste tot, că nu se putea misca nimic, atunci de ce v-ați simți d-voastră vinovată că n-ați putut să faceți nimic din moment ce nu era posibilitatea?

C: Eu am pariat, tot ce am făcut a fost ca un pariu cu mine însămi să-mi dovedesc că nu e justificat să așa și n-am murit , vedeți, sunt întreagă. Dacă fiecare făcea așa sau cit de puțin, puterea lui Ceaușescu nu ar fi crescut , nu s-ar fi întins așa.

T: She says that she is a living example of the fact that somebody could be against him, staying in one's place and not doing anything was not a solution.

C: Și spuneti-I că eu sunt o dovadă .

T: She is a living proof that somebody could raise against Ceaușescu.

C: Și să dau exemple din societatea românească: în 1977 s-au răsculat muncitorii din Valea Jiului, minierii, 33.000 de muncitori.

T: In 1977, 33.000 miners made a kind of revolt, they rose against him.

C: E adevărat că noi am aflat aici în țară la o lună

T: We found about this only one month afterwards.

C: Și asta prin Europa Liberă.

T: And this through Radio Free Europe.

C: Dar nimeni dintre cei în libertate, nici eu, nu am luat atitudine căci știam că Ceaușescu a început represiunea. S-a dus acolo, a promis că nu va fi nimeni pedepsit, să intre la lucru și pe urmă i-a sancționat pe sefi, conducătorii

minerilor au fost împrățiați în toată țara , noi nu știm ce s-a întâmplat, unii poate au fost arestați, alții...D-zeu știe ce s-a întâmplat. A băgat armată, securitate mai ales în mine și securisști afară, bineînțeles, să supravegheze și să urmărească. Dar nu era, întreb, totuși rolul intelectualilor să se solidarizeze , să spună ceva, nici eu nu am spus nimic, asta e.

T: Then Ceaușescu started the repressions against the miners and out of the mines everybody was spied on, the leaders of the miners were spread all over Romania so they couldn't get in touch with the people any more. But the intellectuals should have had the role to raise against the government in the same moment that the miners did. But this didn't happen. Nobody rose against Ceaușescu at that time.

C: Dar spuneți la persoana I plural căci și eu fac parte, eu nu vrea să culpabilizez pe alții și eu să zic că sînt grozavă . E adevărat că nici nu știam să luptăm, nu știam atunci la început, nu știam.

T: At first we didn't know how to fight.

C: Nu știam , noi am fost o generație care nu am trăit stalinismul și nici contact nu am avut, adică am pierdut legătura cu cei care au rezistat în anii '45, '46, '47, pînă prin anii '60, prin munte. Spuneți-I asta. Și voi vorbi și de această rezistență. Spuneți-i de ce nu știam . am pierdut legătura cu acei oameni care au știut să lupte.

T: So they didn't know how to fight because...

C: E vorba de două generații

T: There were two generations . The one that lived the Stalin era and this one in which Doinea Cornea is included . There is a period which lost contact with the generation that lived under Stalin, which knew how to fight.

C: E generația compromisurilor, a mea.

T: She says that her generation is the generation of compromises.

C: Și eu imi începeam la universitate cursurile, nu știu după ce am început eu să lupt și am învățat le spuneam studenților: Să nu credeți în noi! Suntem ăștia și ăștia și ăștia ! D- voastră trebuie să fiți altfel de oameni! Cu asta imi începeam ora de curs.

T: Asta cînd?

C: Asta prin anii '80, '70, la sfîrșit pentru că în '83 am fost dată afară .

T: She was a lecturer at the university and she always started her lectures saying ?Don't be like our generation!/? Să lupte, vă refereați?

C: Intotdeauna se poate face ceva, un minimum, dar acel minimum care pare ca nu are rost, dar are rost. În primul rînd mă autoeduc, scap de frică, e chestie de educație, am să vorbesc sidespre asta un pic, și îi faci pe ceilalți, îi antrenezi într-un fel de acțiune, de solidaritate.

T: So everyone has to do something, has to do a little bit to achieve something or to help someone to do something because only in this way

C: Asa, și acum să reiau firul . Deci a fost Vaalea Jiului, pe urmă a fost un muncitor, Paraschiv.

T: There was a worker, Paraschiv.

C: Nu mai știu cum îl Chema pe celălalt, care a făcut un sindicat liber tot pe vremea aceea, '79 cred, a întemeiat un sindicat liber la ca au aderat, au început să adere muncitorii.El spune, că eu l-am cunoscut, spune că avea vreo 2000 de membrii. Vaslie, Vasile Paraschiv.

T: Vasile Paraschiv created a free trade union that had around 2000 members from all over the country, at least from

the Western zone, Timisoara.

C: Paraschiv a fost arestat, a fost drogat de securitate, a fost abandonat într-o pădure, când s-a trezit nu mai stia.

T: He was dropped in a forest.

L: When was this?

T: Around '79.

C: L-a vizitat un ziarist francez, i-am uitat numele, care a fost batut din cauza lui Paraschiv, a fost scandal atuncea.

T: There there was a French journalist who visited this person...

C: Poulet.

T: He was called Poulet and he was beaten up because he and spoken to Paraschiv.

C: Dar noi atunci am aflat imediat că Radioul Europa Liberă functiona și eu ascultam Radio Europa Liberă, nimeni nu s-a solidarizat cu acest muncitor, care ar fi meritat toate mințile din țară să declare și să protejeze, să fie pentru un sindicat liber.

T: Even though everyone had found out through Radio Free Europe, nobody expressed any solidarity with this man. He was left alone, nobody had the courage to raise against.

L: All heard this, all the country?

T: Europa Liberă se auzea în toată țara.

L: It was heard on the news.

C: Eu însămi, prin anii '80 știu că este executat, ea a înființat sindicatul în '79, în '80 era la pământ Paraschiv. Totuși, Europa Liberă, când i-a dat numărul de telefon acasă au am luat telefonul și am încercat să-l telefonez, să-l spun că sunt alături de el, i-am trimis o felicitare de Anul Nou, deci nici semn de prietenie și solidaritate nu cred că a mai primit și din alte părți, dar a fost absolut insuficient, trebuia să fac o declarație în mare public, n-am făcut-o.

T: She had taken the phone number, it was given on the radio and she had tried to contact this person. She sent him greetings, tried to keep in touch for a while, but she didn't raise with him, she should have made a public declaration, but she didn't do it.

C: Deci telegrame i-am trimis, telefon n-am putut, adică răspuns o voce, o voce de femeie, era securitatea sigur, sigur pe-acolo și a zis că nu-l cunoaște pe Paraschiv, dar numărul de telefon ni s-a dat. Pe urmă a venit Brasovul, 1987, muncitorii din Brașov.

T: In 1987 the workers from Brasov raised against the regime.

C: Așa cum ei au fost solidari, alți muncitori din jur, din Zărnești, deci a fost o solidaritate dar pur muncitorească.

T: Some other workers from other towns around Brasov, they were only workers, not intellectuals, no clergy was involved in this movement, again there was only a workers' movement.

C: Înainte de Brasov, prin '80, au fost voci răzlețecare făceau ceea ce făceam și eu, deci trimiteam texte de protest la Europa Liberă. Au fost Dorin Tudoran, scriitori, Paul Goma a fost primul care a ridicat vocea.

T: Paul Goma was one of the first people who rose against the regime, then Dorin Tudoran.

C: Eupă Paul Goma, mai târziu, Brătianu. Acesta a murit de cancer chiar pe vremea lui Ceaușescu, a scris vreo șapte

texte foarte frumoase în care spunea să rezistăm și să luptăm. După aceea Calciu Dumitreasa. Eu nu am așa o grozavă admirabilă, cât a fost în țară, dar pe urmă s-a degradat totul în jurul lui, dar trebuie menționat Calciu Dumitreasa, și pe urmă, bine, a mai fost Căleschi și cu Iancu, cu trecerea în Turcia și asta ca i-ai apucat și d-voastră, Gabriel Andreescu, Radu Filipescu care e grozav și ca care a pus în cutiile postale niste bilețele în care chema la a ieși pe stradă, la protest colectiv. Dar nimeni, am mai fost Ana Blandiana cu cele câteva poezii ale ei, ? Arpaș? ai au mai fost trei patru frumoase, deci nimeni, Dan Desliu, să nu uit, Scrisoarea celor șapte comunisti dar nimeni nu s-a solidarizat cu ei, în afară de mine, public. Deja eu am învățat lecția pe vremea aceea eu deja am învățat lecția. Acum să-i traducem.

T: She said a few names of the ones who individually protested against Ceaușescu.

C: Dar spuneți-I că nici măcar ei între ei, nu au făcut declarații de solidaritate cu ceilalți, în afară de mine.

T: None, except Mrs Cornea declared the solidarity with the rest of them. The rest of who were protesting.. They were individuals and they didn't ...

C: În fiecare text, eu nu mai puteam călători, în fiecare text din ultimii trei ani, aproape pe toți îi numeam, crezând că va sfârși și o reciprocitate. Nimeni nu a fost solidar cu mine, în afară de Dan Desliu și Dan Petrescu care în ultimul an, în textele lor m-au menționat. semnificativ, nu pentru că eu as fi frustrată dar să citim exact ce s-a întâmplat cu noi..

T: During the last three years when she had sent messages to this radio station, the radio was the main weapon against communism. She mentioned the names of those who were protesting. She thought that in this way she would get answer from them.

C: Și cu comunisti cei șapte am fost solidară, cu Brucan de exemplu și am să spun de ce când am să revin la Brașov. Cu toți, pentru că era o luptă comună împotriva regimului Ceaușescu. \*i noi nu puteam spera mai mult pe vremea aceea decât un comunism cu față umană, așa cum doreau și ceilalți, să umanizăm puțin comunismul.

T: The main aim wasn't to change communism into something else, but to make communism more human.

C: Dan Desliu și Dan Petrescu trebuie menționați.

T: Dan Desliu and Dan Petrescu were the only ones who mentioned her in their articles to Radio Free Europe.

C: Acum revin la Brașov. A fost răscoala din Brașov, au fost numai muncitori solidari, în afară de Silviu Brucan, s-a declarat solidar cu ei, nu știu dacă ți-ai dat seama sau nu, trebuie să spun adevărul, nu-mi place nici mie, dar asta e adevărul și realitatea și eu apreciez pentru acest gest nu pentru că l-a înfundat pe Maniu în închisoare, dar omul se mai schimbă, trebuie să fim toleranți, să avem o oarecare toleranță și fiul meu și cu mine am pus manifeste, o dată aici pe poartă, în afară și am scris ?Sunt solidară, adică eu, Doina Cornea cu muncitorii din Brașov.? Dimineața am pus la șapte, seara am aflat prin Europa Liberă, dimineața am pus o foaie ministerială pe care am scris cu tus violet ?Sunt solidară?. Lumea trecea, se uita, cred că multi socoteau că e bine și le plăcea dar seara am aflat de la un muncitor brașovean care oprișe mașina pe aici, nici nu știu dacă era securist, habar nu am puțin îmi pasă, dar el mi-a spus că în Brașov e jale, că au fost arestați muncitori, că sunt bătuti și că e prăpăd acolo. Noi am aflat abia în 17 ce se întâmplase în 15 și atunci mi-am zis: eu, care tot timpul invit la solidaritate, la luptă comună, nu se poate să nu fac un gest mai amplu decât o hârtie pusă pe ușa. Traduceți-I până aici.

T: The only one who declared solidarity with the movement of the workers in Brașov was Mr Brucan. The day that Mrs Cornea found out about this movement of the workers in Brașov, she had put a sign out on the front door saying: 'I am solidarity with the workers' strike'. It was an invitation for a strike to everybody. She placed manifests with her son in all the courtyards of the factories.

C: Iar a doua zi dimineața, la 7.30, în 19 noiembrie a bătut cineva la ușă, era un milițian, trei civili și o femeie care era tot civil și nu aveau mandat de arestare și de percheziție, că e ora prea devreme, dacă vrem să așteptăm până la 8 și atunci mergem după mandat. De la 7 până la 11.30 a fost răscolit pod, pivniță, cămară și aici tot. în afară de militanți, cei patru au lucrat, vă dați seama ce amanunț mi-au căutat toată casa.

T: Four people worked, only the policeman stayed, they moved everything, they searched everything in the house.

C: Si vă spun, nici atîta nu a rămas deplasat. Nu stiu cum au făcut , sunt de un profesionalism...

T. Nu au mutat absolut nimic ?

C :Au mutat, dar au pus la loc.

T : So they put everything into the right place.

C: Mi-a scris unchiul meu din Londra, mă rog, o scrisoare cu ani de zile în urmă în care mă întreba, el a lucrat la BBC si a fost seful departamentului, Victor Cormnea îl chema, seful departamentului românesc al BBC-ului, dinainte de război, stabilit la Londra în perioada războiului, pînă la sfîrsitul anilor 70. mi-a scris o scrisoare în care mă întreba, ce zic eu, am mai putea face noi aicea o miscare de rezistență că arme si ce trebuie ne vor trimite.

T: She got a letter from her uncle who was a director at the BBC and asked her in that letter: Do you want a movement here because they'll send the weapons?'

C: Eu scrisoarea am ascuns-o în scriin. Cînd am venit din arestul securității acasă, m-am uitat la scriin, am căutat scrisoarea, are decupat din scrisoare numia partea acea.

T: From the whole letter, when Mrs Cornea came back from the arrest of the security, the letter was there but only that part was missing , the question was cut out of the letter.

C: Cît de amănunțit au făcut percheziția... După Brasovm-au dus lde aicea să dau o mică declaratie si pe fiul meu la fel si ne-am întors am scris mica declarapie cinci săptămîni.

T: She was taken to give a small declaration And the declaration lasted five weeks.

C: Si acolo am fi rămas dacă Occidentul nu ar fi făcut presiuni, eu eram deja cunoscută, si printul mostenitor Charles si parlamentul belgian si Mitterand si d-na Mitterand, au fost niste forțe extraordinare, o solidaritate nemaipomenită, atuncea am primit, adică după aceea, premiul Rafto. Era o protecție a mea. Si Belgia mi-a acordat titlul de Doctor Honoris Causa, Universitatea din Bruxelles.

T: The University of Brussels had given her the title of Doctor Honoris Causa.

C:Spuneți-I că erau măsuri de protecție.

T: These were measures of protection because during that period when she was in danger these external forces made pressures on the Romanian government to let her go because she would have stayed longer if this wouldn't have happened.

C: Acum două lucruri, trag niste concluzii. Că mi e mi se tot spunea: ?A, i-a fost usor, a fost protejată.? Asa gîndesc foarte muti oameni. Replica mea este: am fost protejată pentru că am dat dovadă întîi că fac ceva, că dacă nu dai această dovadă, cine să te protejeze? Pe vecina mea, pe vecinul meu de acolo îi protejează cineva? Nu, pentru că nu îi stiu...

T: So she says that some people said that it was very easy for her because she was protected but how to get this protection, some other persons across the street wouldn't have got this protection because first the outside powers had seen what she could do, whether they had given her the support she needed.

C: Mare lucru nu am făcut, dar totusi an de an trimiteam cîte trei , patru scrisori la Europa Liberă, de protest, asta totusi este ceva.

T: She says that she doesn't think that she had done much because she sent three or four letters every year to Radio Free Europe and that's all she had done.

C: Am luat poziție în problemele bisericii greco-catolice.

T: She had taken position in favour of the Greek- Orthodox Church.

C: Am avut un protest împotriva dărîmării satelor și a bisericilor.

T: She raised her voice against the project that was to demolish villages and churches.

C: În timp ce Patriarchul spunea că nu s-a demolat nici o biserică.

T: During the period in which the Patriarch was saying that nothing was demolished.

C: Fiind în învățămînt am emisun program, adică o reformă, am cerut o reformă a învățămîntului.

T: She asked for the reform of the whole system of education.

C: Care nu convenea comunistilor.

T: Which was not on the taste of the communists.

C: Am cerut reforme în societate, adică reformarea institutiilor, le-am luat pe rînd.

T: She asked for the reformation of all the institutions.

C: Am arătat distrugerea morală, că este pierderea noastră cea mai mare.

T: She showed the moral destruction .

C: Distrugerea morală am arătat-o în toate textele, începînd din 1982 și pînă

Acuma, altceva nu am făcut decît să atrag atenția și intelectualilor și la populație și a conducerii cît de mult rău fac poporului roman prin această distrugere morală, prin frică, prin aceea dublă gîndire pe care ne-o impuneau.

T: the moral destruction was one of the most important features of her letteres.

C: Și chiar am mers pînă acolo încît I-am cerut lui Ceaușescu într-un text pe care-l consider c el mai important, scrisoarea din 23 august, fie renunțați de a mai fi în fruntea țării, ca și conducătorul acestei țări, fie introduceți reforme. Asta a fost în '88.

T: In '88 she had written this article to the radio in which she asked Ceaușescu either to resign or to introduce reforms.

C: Deci nu am renunțat. În '87am fost arestată, fiul meu arestat, fiul meu dat afară din seervici căci cu asta mă santajau.

T: She was blackmailed through her son, who was put in prison, then he lost his job so they used her son against her .

C: și asta datorez în primul rînd fiului meu care a zis mereu: ?Mamă, nu te uita la mine, n-are importanță , fă mai departe ce crezi că trebuie să faci.?

T: She owed very much to her son because he always said : 'Don't look at me, do what you have to do.'

C: Și în al doilea rînd, a doua concluzie este că într-o societate, dacă oamenii stau așa și nu fac nimic și ei se sîrăcesc în interior și frica îi face mai mici, mai firavi și mai anemici ca spirit și dacă în fiecare zi încearcă să facă mici gesturi , că și eu am început a o a, tot mici erau gesturile, ajungi tu să te formezi, fiecare aact mărunt are și o valoare spirituală, are o semnificație, te formează. Eu rîd și spun că pe mine securitatea m-a format de fapt. E



important să facem gestul mărunț în toate domeniile zilnic, acum nu mai luptăm împotriva lui Ceaușescu, deci nu mai e gestul mărunț care să-ți dezvolte curajul acesta de cetățean. Acum e altfel de curaj.

T : The second conclusion was that staying without doing anything would destroy persons who would become less and less people and doing little things against the regime, against this whole situation, not doing anything. This whole situation, not doing anything extraordinary, but little things could give us the power and the force to continue. But now there is a new form of courage that is needed.

C: Formează subiectul, dar formează pe urmă și pe ceilalți.

T: It forms the subject, and then has the force to form the others.

C: Acum de ce gesturi mărunte de altă natură pe care românii nu vor să le facă.

T : Now, during this period the people have to make different little gestures, but they don't want to.

C: Dacă românii ar fi tăcut când ar fi trebuit să tacă, acum vorbesc prea mult când ar trebui uneori să tacă.

T: If people talked too much when they were supposed to listen...

C: ăi intelectualii, eu am ce am cu intelectualii....

T: Now they talk too much when they should shut up sometimes and this has to do with intellectuals, not only with common people.

C: De pildă, pot să dau un exemplu, d-l Octavian Paler cred că vorbeste acum prea mult cind ar trebui să tacă sau să se ocupe de altceva, pentru că face rău.

T: There is this man, Octavian Paler, who she says should shut up because he does harm to the people.

C: Acum nu e cazul să zic, eu care am dreptul să spun acest lucru, eu care am luptat împotriva lui Gheorghiu Dej, nu, împotriva lui Ceaușescu, da, împotriva lui Iliescu, da, și acum nu lupt împotriva lui Constantinescu ci îl susțin cu toate forțele mele pentru că este singurul șef de stat, singurul președinte de republică de care nu îmi este rusine, eu înșeleg că face mici greseli, dar ceea ce a făcut este esențial, politica externă a României, mediator aicea, că praf și pulbere se alegea de coaliție și de guvern de mai multe ori, noi nu apreciem că a pus capăt la atâtea conflicte și că a adus un fel de pace socială.

T: During this period she didn't fight against Gheorghiu Dej, she fought against Ceaușescu, she fought against Iliescu, but now she supports Constantinescu because on the external level he did a good job, and besides this there is an internal peace.

C: A mediat conflicte, a luat atitudine.

T: He took a stand, he mediated conflicts.

C: Trebuie să fim solidari cu ceea ce este mai bun la ora ctuală, nu este perfect nicăieri în lume.

T: We have to be solitary with the things that are better because there is no political perfection, so we have to go with the best.

C: Trebuie să susții ce e mai bun, su să te întorci, știi că a fost foarte rău, eu nu mai cred în vorbe, eu cred în ce vād că s-a făcut.

T: Words are not something she believes anymore, but only facts.

L: Can you ask her when and how she was invited to join the National. Salvation Front and when she met and how she worked together with Iliescu and when and why she and the others decided to split from the Front?

T: Mă roagă să vă întreb când și cum ați fost invitată să deveniți membră FSN?

C: N-am fost invitată niciodată.

T: She has never been invited to become a member.

C: Am fost nominalizată fără să fiu consultată.

T: She was enrolled in the party without her consent.

C: Ghiceste de ce. Eram opozanta cea mai cunoscută în Occident și aveau tot interesul să mă aibă drept firmă, ca la magazin, reclamă.

T: She was the most well-known person who protested against the regime, the communist regime, they were very excited about having her in the party so that they could show that she sustained this new wave.

L: For the legitimacy. But how did she, why did she join them if she in advance would expect that Iliescu would be not democratic.

T: Până la urmă ați acceptat.

C: Până la urmă nu am avut ce face, eram manipulată cu teroristii.

T: She was very manipulated with the terrorists.

C: Și după ce am cunoscut echipa de comunisti, pe Brucan, pe Iliescu, pe Mazilu, m-am dus la București în 26 decembrie și l-am cunoscut.

T: After that she met the ex-communists Iliescu, Brucan and Mazilu and other people...

C: De ei am fost manipulată, m-au făcut să cred că există teroristi care pot să răstoarne mica ordine existentă care nu exista și să introducă un regim de teroare aici.

T: She was told that there were terrorists who could kill the people and who could install again a terrorist regime.

C: De de alta parte l-am acceptat și pentru că nu era nimeni să preia.

T: On the other side, she accepted because there was no one else who could take this place.

C: Nu era nimeni altcineva și ei ne-au mintit.

T: They lied to her.

C: În prima proclamare.

T: In the first proclamation.

C: În care vorbeau de pluralism politic, de libertatea presei, au și respectat asta, de libertatea de mișcare, au respectat, dar pluralismul nu voiau să-l respecte, mi-am dat seama că câteva zile când Iliescu propunea pluralismul în cadrul FSN-ului. Era altă promisiune proprietatea privată, văd că și acum lupta.

T: There was another promise, the private property that is still fought over after ten years.

C: Și separarea puterilor. În mare principiile erau principiile unei societăți democratice.

T: The principles were basically the principles of a democratic society.

C: Încă au mai promis că nu vor participa la alegeri ci vor organiza alegeri libere, dar nu vor participa ca formațiune politică.

T: They promised to organise free elections but not to take part in the elections.

C: Individual probabil, dar nu ca formațiune.

As a party, they wouldn't go together in the election, but finally they went into the election together, not individually.

C: Când am văzut că din toate acestea numai libertatea presei și libertatea de mișcare...

T: When from the first proclamation she had seen only the freedom of movement respected...

C: Și vedeam că se opun pluralismului politic.

T: They were against political pluralism.

C: În primele variante acceptau mici întreprinderi și limitat numărul de muncitori, asta a fost în primele săptămâni, întreprinderi cu trei muncitori, maximum trei.

T: They had this theory of having little private factories supposed to have three workers.

C: Pe urmă au trecut la nouă.

T : Then they raised the figure to nine.

C: Eu întrebam ce se întâmplă cu întreprinderile de stat.

T : The state factories had about thousands of workers. Only one factory had thirty thousand workers, so from nine to thirty thousand there is quite a difference.

C: Au rebotezat instituțiile.

T: They renamed the institutions.

C: Dar nu au schimbat nimic în modul de funcționare comunist. Iar când au declarat că devin formațiune politică eligibilă.

T: When they declared that they would become an eligible party...

C: Care vor candida la primele alegeri din 20 mai.

T: ... who would candidate on the first elections on the 20th of May.

C: Asta a fost în 23 ianuarie, '90.

T: This was on the 23rd of January, 1990.

C: Atunci am părăsit, am zis că totul este minciună și nu am vrut să sustin o putere comunistă sau neo-cripto-comunistă.

T: She didn't want to sustain again a neo-communist party.

C: Dar totuși și presiunile, căci partidele totuși s-au format, eu denunțam în Occident.

T: So the new parties were already constituted and she continued to tell in the western countries about the facts that

were happening here.

C: Si spuneam ce democratie vroia Iliescu.

T: And she was telling what kind of democracy Iliescu wanted.

C: Chiar la Bergen am denunțat prima dată, am fost invitată la Berben de Egil Rafto si acolo pentru prima dată am arătat cum se structurează aici noua putere, adică că e tot o putere neo-comunistă, gorbacioviană, că sînt cu Moscova.

T: In February 1990 she went to Bergen and there for the first time she publicly denounced what was happening here, that there was no democracy and that what was here was just a new face of communism.

C: Si tactica mea a fost preluată, cred că am avut o oarecare influență. Eu am spus a'ă: partidele care abia s-au reformat după atîția ani, după 40 de ani de comunism cînd au fost suprimate, încă sînt foarte slabe, că nu poti organiza un partid nici în 5 ani, trebuie în cel puțin 5 ani ca să prindă forță un paartid si erau persecutate de Iliescu, mereu li se puneau bete în roate. Țsta era demersul meu, cum partidele sunt în curs de formare, sunt foarte slabe si li se pun o multime de piedici. Vă rog să exercitați niste presiuni asupra guvernului si conducerii României ca să democratizeze, să adopte principiile democratice existente în Europa.

T: She asked the western countries to put pressure on the Romanian government.

C: Partidele democratice sunt slabe.

T: The Romanian parties were week

C: Si nu exista opoziție.

T: There wasn't practically an opposition. There were only small parties that were two months old and they required more than 5 years to become a real, strong party, not two or three months and she asked the western countries to put pressure upon what happened in Romania, to put in practice a democratic policy.

C: Si nu acorda ajutoare politice si economice guvernului.

T: She asked not to be given political and economic aid.

C: Inainte ca guvernul sa dovedească că adoptă regulile democratice europene.

T: Not before Romania would accept the European democratic principles.

C: Inainte să dovedească si pe urmă...

T: And only after having proven the fact that they can accept these democratic principles, only after that they should be given the aid.

C: De aceea m-au urît foarte tare.

T : That's why the was hated.

C: Si toate yiarele comuniste au scris: ?Doinea Cornea vrea să înfometez poporul român.? Mă urau.

T: Everyone hated her becausee thay said that Mrs Doinea Cornea wanted to starve the country.

L: You talk about the media.

T: The media, the press manipulated by Iliescu.

C: Chiar amenințări cu moartea. Era sotul meu plecat în Franța și eu eram singură acasă și zice: ?Să te pregătești la 12 noaptea, ți-a sunat ceasul.? Și eu spuneam ce să mai așteptăm, veniți acum, să terminăm odată.

T: She was threatened on the phone, she was called, there were said ugly, dirty words. She said: 'Ok, if you want to kill me, come, the door is open and finish with this.

C: Spuneti-I că era organizat, erau aceleasi voci.

T: There were the same voices over the phone.

C: Inainte de alegerile din '96 a fost descoperit un grup la Bucuresti care dădeau telefoane încercând să manipuleze lumea să-l voteze pe Iliescu.

L: Who did these things?

C: Au fost descoperiți de ziaristi, nu știu în ce sală.

T : Aparțineau FSN-ului ?

C : Sigur că da.

T: They belonged to the NSF.

C: Nu-I mai zicea așa. I se zicea Partidul Democrației Sociale.

T: It was called the Party of Social Democracy, PDSR.

C: Probabil și d-l Coposu, și el primea oî el a aflat. ătia în perioada astăa că acele telefoane veneau.

T: Those phone calls were coming from certain ....

C: El a aflat de la altcineva care l-a spus că uite, acolo, e organizată campania de calomnii.

T: He found out that there was this campaign of calumnies.

C: Și o mică paranteză pentru dumenavoastră, să știți ce fel de om e Iliescu.

T: Dacă puteți să ne spuneți și despre d-l Tökes câte ceva.

C: Eu ce să vă spun despre d-l Tökes dacă ati vorbit cu d-l Tökes?

Eu nu am vorbit cu d-l Tökes.

T: He protested against the oppression of the Hungarians and the Hungarian religious Reformed Church.

T: Spune că aveai părți diferite. Tökes era împotriva opresiunii maghiarilor, eram împotriva faptului că în general cultele maghiare nu erau acceptate.

C: Când? Pe vremea lui Iliescu?

T : NU, pe vremea lui Ceaușescu. Și asta l-a determinat să apară revoluția. Deci ai avut alte părți.

L: For Tökes, the most important thing for him was religious freedom and that Hungarians be left alone in this area and in the end he couldn't stand this anymore and that's what made him protest against the decision. He started the whole movement.

T: Dînsul spune că a vorbit cu d-l Tökes și că acesta a spus că practice el a început această revoluție în numele

Bisericii Protestante, vroia ca pe o pornire a protestanților în general de a nu se supune iar el a fost factorul care a declansat revoluția în Timisoara, dar el avea ca scop altceva decât d-voastră.

C: Deci el avea acest scop?

T: El vroia libertatea religiei și libertatea ungurilor.

C: Și eu ce vroiam? Eu vroiam dărmarea comunismului.

T: She wanted to demolish communism.

C: Care aducea libertăți democratice tuturor

T: Which would have brought democratic liberties to everyone.

C: Să luăm perioada Ceusescu, că este o diferență și pentru români și pentru unguri, adică un punct de vedere. Eu as zice că bisericile maghiare, atât cea reformată cât și cea catolică nu au suferit proteste chiar așa de mari pe vremea lui Ceaușescu. Am zis proteste, persecuții au fost recunoscute. Eu sînt româncă și Greco-catolică. Biserica mea ca româncă a fost suprimată, persecutată și nerecunoscută deși a avut merite istorice. Poate ăi azi am scrie cu litere chirilice dacă nu ar fi fost aceasta biserică.

T: Mrs Cornea says that the Hungarian Churches, Protestant or Catholic were not as suppressed as the Greek-Catholic church she is a member.

C: Pe vremea lui Ceaușescu, înainte au fost cea catolică în primul rînd, au avut pe Aron, arestat, episcop.

T: During the Ceausecu period they weren't persecuted as much as the Greek-Catholic Church was..

C: Sapte episcopi au murit .

T : Seven bishops died.

C: Și ceilalți în închisoare dar nici unul n-a trecut la altă religie, deci a fost rezistență, în total am avut în închisori 12 episcopi, o serie dintre care au murit vreo patru, și a doua serie au mai murit trei. ăi n-au cedat.

T : There were two series of bishops into prisons and in the first series four died and in the second three died, but they didn't give up their religion.

C: Și pînă la sfîrșit, pînă la revoluție, biserica noastră a fost suprimată, nerecunoscută, n-aveam drept de existență.

T: The Greek-Catholic Church didn't exist till the revolution.

C: Uitați pe cine au omorît, e monseniorul Ghica, nepotul domnitorului Moldovei, care a trecut la romano-catolici, a făcut teologia la Roma, cînd avea 82 de ani a fost luat de pe stradă în București, uite ce om și a murit în închisoare, uite ce oameni au omorît.

T: This was the nephew of a former leader of the country, Ghica, this a noble family and he turned to Roman-Catholicism and when he was 82 years old he was taken from the street and he died in prison.

C: L infirmerie a murit, deci a avea ceva sau a răcit, sau pneumonie, nimeni nu stie, este un sfînt.

T: He is a saint.

C: Deși Papa Ioan Paul al II-lea acum vrea să-l sanctifice.

T: The Pope wants now to sanctify him

C: A spus acum, el a fost la Bucuresti. Astea ar trebui fiecare sa citească. Asta este despre el. Eu am tradus în românește două volume din gândirea lui, din reflecțiile lui.

T: Ați fost profesoară de franceză.

C : Da,da. Se scriu în Franța studii despre el. El mai venea în țară, a făcut primul spital gratuit în România, în 1906, prima ambulanță, spitalul acesta era unde a fost Institutul Parhon, că Parhon a pus mâna pe ce a ctitorit Vladimir Ghica și l-a lăsat să stea în subsol și după ce Parhon a căzut, securitatea a pus mâna pe el, deci într-un fel i-a luat ce a avut. A îngrijit leproșii, și a dat piele ca grefă în primul război mondial, a fost chiar un sfânt. A vindecat bolnavi , așa prin pus de mâini și rugăciune.

T: He healed people with his hands.

C: Să terminăm cu Tökes, că maghiarii au fost într-un fel persecutați pe vremea lui Ceaușescu este adevărat și în ce sens se facea această persecuție. Studenții maghiari erau repartizați prin Moldova, prin doborogea, deci erau dezrădăcinați.

T: During Ceusescu's time the Hungarians were persecuted, they were sent to Moldova, to the South of the country, they were taken from their roots.

C: Este o formă de persecuție.

T: It is a form of persecution to be taken from your origin, from the people you lived with.

C: După Revoluție într-un fel lis-audat niste drepturi, aveamu instituții, alte institutii decât cele de stat, ba și atunci aveau tipografii, totuși și mai erau reviste maghiare. Iliescu le-a dat mai multe ore la televiziune, pe urmă le-a retras, le-a înjumătățit, dreptul să se organizeze UDMR.

T: After the Revolution they were given more freedom, they even had the right to make their party UDMR, that' the Democratic Union of Hungarians from Romania.

C: Iliescu a permis niște formații naționaliste și era misiunea lor să întărească populațiile.

T: There were formed special parties.

C: Si Romania Mare.

T: Great Romania, PUNR, these parties were meant to trouble the people and to raise them against the Hungarians.

C: Nucleul lor era securitatea, fosta securitate: în optica mea, poate că interpretarea mea..., eu nu sint analist politic, dar tot așa am și eu și Cioaran zice, mai bine n-am avea opinii.

T: She said we'd better had no opinion.

C: Să ne punem în situația de rugăciune.

T : We first have to have a predisposition for prayer.

C: Eu cred că aici strategia KGB care era în legătură, după părerea mea, cu o parte a securității și a armatei care erau pro Moscova, bineînteles de aceea a fost propulsat Iliescu, de forțele astea și Iliescu era trup și suflet pentru Moscova. Această parte a securității să zicem condusă, teleghidată de KGB, aicea vroiau să facă un fel de Iugoslavie, de conflict interethnic, asta a început în '90, în ianuarie. Deja nu ne-am dat seama ce se întâmplă dar faptul că au ieșit în stradă atunci scolile cu conflictul, cu maghiarii, dau afară pe români din scoli, românii care protestau , totul a ieșit pe stradă. Ceea ce era suspect pentru mine a fost că acest fenomen, în ziua aceea, noroc că n-am căzut capcană, m-am dus, am adunat scolile și am vrut să văd cu ochii mei ce e, ea mi-a spus că românii vor să plece, înseamnă generală, d-na Stoica de aici de la Cluj și mi-a spus că românii vor să plece și nu-I problema străzii. Zic și eu sint de părere că școala, învățământul nu-I problema străzii, nu pe stradă se rezolv

. Zice semnăși hîrtia aicea c  s nteșbi de accord, eu eram  n Cconsiliu prin ianuarie'90. nu semnez nimic p n  nu v d despre ce-I vorba. I-am adunat pe oameni si pe unguri. Vai, ce a fost acolo. S-au spart toate  n capul meu . Avea o tactic , tocmai s  menșpin  zona aceasta de influenș  a Moscovei.

T: The KGB had a tactics to have a hold of this part of Europe so we would become like Yugoslavia where a civil war started because of such interethnic problems.

C: Dar poate c  cauza e si mai veche, a fost poalte Malta, poate c  totu i a existat o  ntlelgere la Malta.

T: Maybe it was started long before at the meeting at Malta.

C: S-ar putea. Bine, Malta a c zut  n clipa  n care Gorbaciov a c zut si Reagan, nimeni nu e obligat s  se g ndeasc  la Malta.

T: Nobody has to think about Malta anymore as long as Gorbahev and Reagan are no more in power positions.

C: S-a  ncercat  n ianuarie un conflict cu scolile, la cluj si nu mai  tiu  n ce alte localit ti,  n aceeași zi si la aceeași or , nu se poate s  fie o coincidenș .

T: In the same day, in some of the main cities where there were both Hungarian and Romanian people in large numbers, all the Hungarians wanted to throw all the Romanian students out of the Hungarian schools, so it was not a coincidence that it all happened at the same time in all those places.

C: Si m   ntreb de ce era nevoie de conflict ca s -l accept m pe Iliescu ca salvator sau s  fim sub influenș  ruseasc .

T: Why make a conflict between Hungarians and Romanians to be under the influence of the Russians because this way Iliescu would come as a saviour.

C: Iliescu ne scapa de unguri.

T : That Iliescu would save us from the Hungarians.

C: D nsul poate nu stie c  rom nii au fost traumatiz și aici  n Transilvania.

T: The Romanians had suffered during centuries in this part of Transilvania, especially by the Hungarians.

C: Persecușbiile din Transilvania de nord , '40, '44, s-au purtat nu cu m nusi dar a a era Europa atuncea. Personal am fot b tut   n scoli maghiare c  eu am tr it  n Transilvania

T: She was beaten up in a Hungarian school.

L: By pupils?

T: De elevi?, Alti elevi v-au b tut ?

C: Nu, colegii ne  nșelegeam, copii nu s nt r i. Directorul scolii.

T: Not the children, the headmaster. She had to go to a Hungarian school because there were no Romanian schools. She was beaten up by the headmaster.

C: Noi st team  n judeșul Mures,  n Reghin, nu eveau p rinșii bani si eera singurul liceu rom nesc din Transilvania de Nord unde erau dou  Scoli normale la Gherla si la Oradea si gata, scoli primare la sate.

T: There was only one high-school, at Reghin and her parents didn't have money so she finished her school in Reghin.



C: Si două școli normale de învățători la Gherla, câte două, de fete și de băieți, așa paralele.

T: There were two schools that prepared teachers, Romanian teachers.

C: Era aici la Cluj o școală de menaj, unde învățai să faci de mâncare.

T: There was a school here in Cluj where you were taught how to cook.

C: Si școli primare la, parăunde învățau să scrie 'i să citească, eu deja trecusem de asta.

T: And there were primary school in the villages.

C: Atîta era tot.

T: That was all.

C: Si eu am fost trecută brutal, fără voia mea, într-o școală de altă limbă, limbă pe care o vedeam ca limbă ostilă, din cauza profesorilor.

T: She considered the language hostile because of the teachers and because she was taken there against her will.

C: Dar asta m-a ajutat...

T: This helped her...

C: În atitudinile mele anterioare pentru că eu am trăit această dramă de trece din limba maternă într-o limbă pe care nu o dorești, nu-și poate nimeni închipui pentru un copil ce dramă e, de aceea eu suspin cu toată convingerea că acum maghiarii trebuie să aibă școli în limbă ca să nu trăiască aceeași dramă pentru că rezultatul care e: eu l-am urât pe maghiari, mai ales după ce am fost bătută, l-am urât din tot sufletul meu de copil și asta vrem să facem, să ne urească 2 milioane de oameni. Nu se poate. Atunci Europa are altfel, era o Europă a urii.

T: During that period Europe was a Europe of hate, Mrs Cornea said that she supports Hungarians having their own schools in the country, in spite of the fact that she hated the language because she had been beaten up, you know, and she doesn't want the Hungarian children from Romania to live the same nightmare that she had because she had to learn a language that she didn't want to learn and this happened to the Hungarian children here, they would learn Romanian language as a hostile language.

C: Limba maternă e ca un înveliș protector, e ceva ce te protejează, orice cuvânt îl spui are o rezonanță afectivă pe când într-o limbă străină este o rupătură să intri în ea a'a brutal.

T: The mother tongue is a protective shell and being taken to another language is a very big trauma.

C: Așa că trebuie să ne schimbăm și mentalitatea, trăim într-o altă Europă și am susținut această cauză a maghiarilor, în privința școlilor și a universităților. Universitatea încă nu s-a realizat, școlile funcționează, cred că au mai multă încredere de când e d-l Constantinescu.

Acum am pierdut firul puțin. A fost Tîrgu Mureș, în '90, în 15 martie. Nici acum nu sînt lamurită. Au am impresia că au fost manipulați 'i românii și maghiarii.

T : Both the Hungarians and the Romanians had been manipulated.

C: Era necesar un conflict aici.

T: A conflict was necessary here.

C: Din aceleași motive.

T: From the same reasons.

C: Foarte multi analisti romani spun că sã se reînfiinþe securitatea, deci SRI-ul a fost reinfiinþat, eu cred cã cauza e mult mai amplã decît înfiinþarea securitãþii. E acelasi lucru, adicã mentinerea Romaniei în sfera de influenþã ruseascã, în ultimã instanþã prin Iliescu, care era omul lor.

T: Some of the political analysts say that this crush between the parts was made thorough the security, now SRI, that's the Romanian Service of Information.

C: Asta spun majoritatea, dar eu cred cã semnificãþia e mult maimare.

T: The semnification is even greater than what is thouht to be.

C: Si de ce, pentru cã în toiul conflictului ambele pãrþi cereau sã vinã Iliescu.

T : Because right in the middle of the conflict both sides demanded that Iliescu should come there.

C: Cele douã tabere erau desprþite de un cordon subþire de polipisti.

T:The two sides were separated only by a few policemen.

C: Iliescu nu venea.

T : Iliescu wasn't coming.

C: Si conflictul a izbucnit, nu mai vreau sa spun ce a fost înainte, eu stiu amãnunte cã am fost acolo, la faþa locului dupã evenimente si mi s-a povestit de un medic, nu intru în detalii, dar conflictul a izbucnit în momentul în care au apãrut autobuze cu pãrani romani de la 60 de km adusi din douã sate, Hodac si Ivãneºti.

T: The conflict burst open when some buses full with Romanian peasants were brought from a distance of 60 km.

C: Din douã sate pur romãnesti.

T:From two 100% Romanian villages.

C: Si sate de munte. Þãranidin aceste sate în perioada '40, '44...

T: From this region, in the 1940-1944...

C: Veneau la Reghin, la târg, orasul în care stãteam, sã vîndã lapte, smîntînã, ouã.

T:...were coming to the market to sel eggs, milk.

C: Imbrãcaþi, fiind la munte, cu portul traditional.

T: Dressed in the national costume.

C: Si jandarmii maghiari îi bãteau, erau recunoscþi cã aveau aceste haine si le tãiau cãmaºa.

T: The Hungarian policemen were beating them up and were cutting their shirts.

C: Eu am pus întrebarea: de ce la Tîrgu Mures nu s-au dus oameni din satele vecine.

T : Why people from villages very near to the town didn't come, only those from 60 km away.

C: Pentru cã acesti oameni, memoria colectivã a pãstrat pe de o parte acestã traumã, nu, sã fi bãtut.

T: Because these people have suffered from the Hungarian oppression during that period.

C: Si eu am vorbit la spital cu un rănit, m-a adus cineva la spital, aveam cunoscut pe profesorul Pancu, n-are importanță, chirurg la chirurgie.

T: She went to the hospital and talked to one of the injured.

C: Si l-am întrebat: Bine, de ce ați venit? Cum ați venit ? Si mi-a răspuns: ni s-a spus că ungurii omoară românii la Târgu Mureș. Si noi aveam copii acolo.

T: And she asked them why did they had come and he answered that they had been told that the Hungarians had been killing Romanians in Târgu Mures. And they had two kids in the city.

C: Dar cine v-a spus?

T: But who told you?

C: Au primit un telefon. Nu stia. L-am întrebat de fapt cine, nu știa . Dar când ați primit ? Zice: dimineața, în ziua în care s-au întâmplat . dar cum ați ajuns la Târgu Mures? Cum ați ajuns așa de repede?

T :How come you arrived so fast here?

C: Zice: ni s-au dat autobuze . vă dați seama că era pus la cale și zic : Au fost omorâți copii, v-au omorât copii, v-au omorât copiii ungurii ? nu.

T: Were your kids killed by the Hungarians? No, she said.

C: Am întrebat: ce ați făcut, cum v-ați dus acolo? Ați avut arme, ceva ? Zice: ne-am dus bâte ciomege și cuțite.

T: She asked what weapons did you have?

C: Si am întrebat: dar ungurii au stat cu mâinile goale? Zice : nu, ei au dat în noi cu foc, aveau sticle incendiare . Omul avea arsuri.

T: The Hungarians fought them with fire, Molotov cocktails. He was all burnt because of the fire.

C: Și alți răniți mi-au explicat . Ungurii aveau niste prastii. Dar faptul că băranul ăsta a fost pentru mine foarte lămuritor. L-am întrebat pe urmă : v-au omorât copiii ? Nu.

Si aici la Cluj au fost forme de persecuții, ce a făcut funar și alții, sunt foarte periculoase provocările. Nu se poate spune că nu aveau drepturi ungurii, vorbes de perioada asta a lui Iliescu, nu se poate spune.

T : During Iliescu's time we can't say that they didn't have rights.

C: Nu aveau universitate, Iliescu s-a exprimat împotriva, dar totuși aveau drepturi. Dar ce efect poate avea o calomnie asupra unei minorități care mereu e provocată, majoritatea ținută mereu în stres că ungurii o să ne fac

Rău, că ungurii vor Ardealul, asta crează ură și poate și reacții necioplite. Mie mi s-a dat în cap cu o greblă, pe stradă, în '97, de un muncitor.

T: In '97 she was hit on the head by a worker.

C: Populația românească este mereu stârnită: ei vor Ardealul, ei sînt cei răi. Asta chiar la nivel înalt, Iliescu s-a pronunțat vorbind despre pericolul maghiar.

T: Iliescu himself talked about the Hungarian danger.

C: Brucan a spus odată, Ungaria stă la colț și pîndeste.

T: Brucan said once that Hungary is waiting behind the corner for the right moment.

C: Adrian Năstase, vicepresedintele PDSR-ului, asta tot înainte de alegeri, ca să voteze cu Iliescu. Domnul Coposu vrea să rupă țara în două.

T: Adrian Năstasee, the vice-president of Iliescu's party said that Mr Coposu wanted to tear Romania to pieces.

C: Și despre mine se striga pe stradă: unguroaico, trădătoare. Numai că eu nu eram în politică. Și Năstase la fel, a declarat ceva deformat, și asta s-a întîmplat de multe ori că se exagerau declarațiile d-lui Tökes.

T : Sometimes they were exaggerating Mr Tökes' declarations.

C: Eu nu știu de declara uneori, poate că declara ceva ce românilor nu le-ar fi convenit, dar câteodată a arătat textul pe care l-a rostit și ceea ce s-a spus despre el. Acum eu am vorbit de dublă manipulare și am impresia că și Revoluția declansată la Timisoara a fost și ea puțin prinsă... Trebuia să izbucnească și la noi ceva. Am această impresie, n-am dovezi. Sigur că d-l Tökes a avut cu episcopul refomat un conflict, dar în jurul bisericii erau câteva zeci de maghiari , pe urmă au venit români securiști. Eu nu știu ce a fost acolo, dar poate că a fost ajutată această mișcare. Și ce am văzut aici la Cluj, pentru mine este această bănuială

Că noi toți , și eu am ieșit în 21 dar a venit un grup compact care scanda numele, care striga: ?Jos Ceaușescu!?, atât de mult îl detestau oamenii, s-au saturat de regimul lui. Din păcate am uitat totul, am uitat de stat la coadă, de frig, de lipsă de lumină, au uitat, acum plîng după Ceaușescu.

T : Now they are crying after Ceaușescu. But Mrs Cornea thinks that not only Mr Tökes did the job, but they were pushed from behind.

L: By whom?

T: Întrebă de cine au fost împinși.

C : De securitate. Probabil că nici nu stia. Eu am zis că el a avut un conflict cu episcopul.

T: Mr Tökes had a conflict with his bishop, but maybe Mr Tökes didn't even know about these things but all the same time the movement was also started by the security.

C: S-au adunat acolo români din solidaritate, dar cine știe, și eu recunosc că nu știu cine a condus grupul pînă la mine, acolo erau și studenți de-ai mei, și cunoscuți de bună credință. Fiul meu a fost reprimat într-o fabrică, asta-I altă poveste, două săptămîni înainte de Revoluție, a fost repede băgat într-un serviciu și el a încercat după ce a auzit de Timisoara în fiecare zi să spună muncitorilor: ?Hai, trebuie să ne solidarizăm!? Era practic ocupată întreprinderea de securiști și muncitorii cînd îl auzeau întorceau capul , ca într-o bună zi, cineva în stația de autobuz a început să strige. Atît le-a trebuit muncitorilor care ieșeau din schimb, toți au început să cînte ?Desteaptă-te române!? și au pornit spre centrul orașului. Și eu la fel, a trebuit doar să aud ?Jos Ceaușescu!? și am sărit în picioarele goale, am fost deja la poartă la poartă și am zis: ?Așteptați-mă să vin și eu cu voi? Asta a fost în 21, în 22 decembrie a fost revoluția deturnată deja .

T: On the 21st of December a lot of people came to Mrs Cornea and the first time that she heard them she went barefooted outside and told them to wait for her. Mrs Cornea's son was rehired at the factory two weeks before the revolution began. But these events occurred on the 21st, on the 22nd the revolution was hijacked.

## **INTERVIEW WITH DOINA CORNEA (English translation)**

by Øyvind E. Lervik.

March 23, 2000

Translator: Tilda Bazqa.

Location: Ms. Corneas home

Str. Alba Iulia nr. 16

3400 CLUJ-NAPOCA

ROMANIA

No interview scheme had been prepared in advance. I had explained the translator which questions were of interest and asked her to lead the interview.

Translator: Let's get to the questions. When did you start having this rejection against the communist regime?

Cornea: Well, it came gradually. Do you translate for him so that he knows which questions to raise? It came gradually. I can't name a precise date, I can name some events.

T: It came gradually. It didn't start at an exact moment in time.

C: And tell him that in our country communism had two periods. It was the same thing in the other countries, the Stalinist period and the post – Stalinist one, which came after a sort of release of the fear from the terror of the Stalinist years. There were two periods. Translate for him.

T: There were two separate communist periods. The first one was the Stalinist period and there was a second one which meant less fear.

C: There was more freedom in the second period.

T: There was more freedom in the second part than in the Stalinist part.

C: In our country, the second period started with Ceau°escu.

T: And thus the second period started with Ceau°escu.

C: The communist system was awful in the first period in Romania.

T: The system was awful in the first period.

C: I think that only in the Soviet Union was communism worse.

T: She thinks that only in the Soviet Union there was such a terror and such an awful kind of legislation.

C: The intellectual society was decimated, the religious society, well, everything. The professors died in prison,

they were forced to stay inside their houses. All that represented thinking in Romania was suppressed.

T: All the intellectuals, I mean teachers, the clergy, everyone who had..

C: Army, everything, everything..

T: People from the army, everyone was killed or deported or closed inside their houses. They had to stay inside their houses, they didn't have the chance to go to the..

C: But, when Ceau°escu came, around '68 with Czechoslovakia, there was a period of respite, a period of more freedom which was good in a way, but in another way it was bad.

T: So, when Ceau°escu came in 1968..

C: Because of his attitude of emancipation concerning the heroes as the Czechoslovak events took part it was good, because we hoped that spring was to come to the country of Romania too.

T: In that period there was a respite. Everyone was freer and everyone had time to feel the freedom. It was in some ways good and in some ways bad.

C: But it was because we created illusions about Ceau°escu. But to be fair, my opinion is that the Romanian intellectuals could have done much more in the '70s concerning the movement of opposition. They could have done something like what happened in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, in Hungary, but nobody did anything.

T: The intellectuals could have formed alliances against him, could have done the same things that was done in Czechoslovakia, that happened in Hungary, but nobody protested, nobody was against..

C: So I say that we are guilty. We are guilty because in some way we created Ceau°escu.

T: So she says that in part we are guilty, the Romanian people is guilty because in some way..

C: The intellectuals, not the people..

T: Not the people in generality, but the intellectuals have actually created Ceau°escu. There was no resistance.

Lervik: But I have read in books that the security was so present everywhere. How can she say that she is guilty when the repression was so harsh?

T: He asks how you can judge the intellectuals to be guilty when the repression was so harsh..

C: I made a bet. Everything I did was like a bet with myself to prove that staying like this cannot be justified and I didn't die. You can see that I am alive. If everybody had done so, Ceau°escu's power wouldn't have grown, wouldn't have extended in this way.

T: She says that she is a living example of the fact that one could be against him. She made a bet with herself. She wanted to prove that she could do something against him. Staying in one place and not doing anything was not a solution.

C: And tell him that I'm a proof.

T: She is a living proof of the fact that it was possible to raise against Ceau°escu.

C: I can give examples from the Romanian society: In 1977, 33.000 miners from the Jiu valley raised against Ceau°escu.

T: In 1977, 33.000 miners made a kind of revolution, they were against him.

C: It's true that we found out in the country only one month after the event.

T: We found out about this only one month afterwards.

C: And through the Radio Free Europe.

T: And this through the Radio Free Europe.

C: But nobody who was free, neither did I, took attitude because we knew that Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu had begun the repression. He went there, he promised that nobody would be punished. They were told to continue their work and then he punished the bosses, the miners' leaders were spread all over the country. We don't know what happened. Some of them might have been arrested, others... God knows what happened. He brought the army, the security especially inside mines and outside, of course, to spy and watch. But I wonder, the intellectuals had to solidarise, to say something. No one did, neither did I.

T: Then Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu started the repressions against the miners, the security was brought into the mines and also stationed outside the mines to spy. The leaders of the miners were spread all over the country so that they could not get in touch with the miners anymore. But the intellectuals had the role to raise against the government in the same moment as the miners did it. But this didn't happen. Nobody rose against Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu at that time.

C: But translate in first person singular because I belong to the intellectuals. I don't want to blame the others so that he will say that I'm the great one. It's true that we didn't know how to fight at first. We didn't know.

T: At first we didn't know how to fight.

C: We didn't know. We represented a generation which didn't live in the Stalinist period and we didn't have contact with it. We lost contact with those who resisted in '45, '46, '47 'till the '60's in the mountains. Tell him this. I'll talk about this resistance. Tell him why we didn't know. We lost contact with those men who knew how to fight.

T: So they didn't know how to fight because..

C: There are two generations

T: There were two generations: The one that lived in the Stalinist era and this one in which Doina Cornea is included. The last one lost contact with the Stalinist generation, the ones who knew how to fight.

C: My generation is the generation of compromises.

T: She says that her generation is the generation of compromises.

C: And I started my courses at the university. I had the feeling that the students didn't believe in us! "You must be different people!" I started my course like this.

T: When was that?

C: This happened in the '80's, by the end of the '70's because in '83 I was fired.

T: She was a teacher at the university. She always started her lessons by saying: "Don't be like us! Don't be like our generation!"

C. You can always do something which seems to be useless but which is important. First I educated myself, I got rid of the fear, it's about education. I'll talk about this too, and you also gather the people in a sort of action, of solidarity.

T: So everyone has got to do something, has got to do a little bit to help someone to do something. This is the only way to connect links between groups of the population.

C: And now I continue. It was the Jiu valley, then a worker, Paraschiv.

T: There was a worker, Paraschiv.

C: I don't know the names of the others who created a free union during that time. I think it was in '79 that he started a free union that the workers joined. I used to know him. He says he had around 2000 members. Vasile, Vasile Paraschiv.

T: Vasile Paraschiv started a syndicate that had around 2000 members from all over the country.

C: Paraschiv was arrested, he was drugged by the security, he was abandoned in a forest, when he woke up he didn't know what had happened.

T: He was left in a forest.

L: When was that?

T: Around '79.

C: A French reporter visited him, I forgot his name. It was a scandal by that time.

T: There was a French reporter who visited this person..

C: Poulet.

T: His name was Poulet and he was beaten up because he had spoken to the Paraschiv.

C: But we found out immediately that the Radio Free Europe was functioning, and I was listening to the Radio Free Europe. Nobody solidarised with this worker. Everybody should have protested, should have fought for a free union.

T: Even though everyone had found out through the Radio Free Europe, nobody solidarised with this man. He was left alone. Nobody had the courage to raise against..

L: Did all of the population learn about this, all over the country?

T: Was it possible for people in all parts of the country to receive these broadcasts?

C: It could be heard on the news. It was accessible for everyone. I know that he was executed in the '80's. He founded the union in '77 and in the '80's he was dead. The Radio Free Europe spread his private telephone number. I took the phone and I tried to call him. I sent him a New Year's Eve card, little signs of friendship and solidarity. I don't think that he got it from somewhere else. It was not enough. I should have made a public declaration, but I didn't.

T: She had taken the phone number, it was spread by the radio and she contacted this person. She sent him greetings but she didn't raise with him. She did not make a public declaration, the thing that she should have done.

C. So I sent him telegrams, I couldn't phone him. A voice answered, a woman's voice. It was the security and she said she didn't know Paraschiv but they gave us the phone number. Then there was Brasov, 1987, the workers from Brasov.

T: In 1987, the workers from Brasov raised against the regime.

C: They acted solitarily, other workers from around Brasov, from Zarnesti, so there was solidarity but purely a workers' solidarity.

T: Some other workers from other towns around Brasov, they were only workers, no intellectuals, no clergy were



involved in this movement. Again, there was only a workers' movement.

C: Before the Brasov events, around 1980, there were some voices that did what I was doing, they were sending texts of protests at the Radio Free Europe. They were Doriu Tudorau, writers and Paul Goma, who was the first one to raise his voice.

T: After Paul Gonea, later, Bratianu, who died from cancer during the Ceau°escu period, wrote seven very beautiful texts in which he was urging us to resist and to fight. After that Caleiu Dumitreasa, I'm not such a fan of him in what concerns the period when he was in the country, but later. I don't know why everything degraded around him but he's worth mentioning. Then there were Caleschi Iaucu and these whom you know: Gabriel Andreescu, Radu Filipescu who is great and who put in the letterboxes some notes in which he was urging the people to come out on the streets to protest. But nobody solidarised with them, maybe Ana Blandiana with her few poems "Arpagic". There were three or four more but nobody solidarised. I learned the lesson at that time. Now translate for him.

T: She mentions a few of the ones who individually protested against Ceau°escu.

C: But tell him that they didn't make declarations of solidarity, not even between themselves, except for me.

T: None, except for Ms. Cornea, declared solidarity with the rest of them, the rest of the ones who were protesting. They were individuals and they didn't.

C: I couldn't travel anymore so in every text during the last three years I mentioned almost everybody, hoping that this way I might get solidarity. Nobody was solidarising with me, except Dan Petrescu who in the last year mentioned me in his texts. It is important not only because I would have been frustrated but to know exactly what happened to us.

T: During the last three years she sent messages to this radio. The radio was their most important weapon against communism. She mentioned the names of those who were protesting. She was thinking that in this way she would get an answer from them.

C: I was acting solitarily with the seven communists too, with Brucan, for example, and I'll tell why I got back to Brasov. I solidarised with everybody because it was a common fight against Ceau°escu's regime. We had to give up our hopes of a communism with a human face.

T: The main goal wasn't to change communism into something else but to make communism more humane.

C: Desline must be mentioned and Dan Petrescu also.

T: Dan Desline and Dan Petrescu were the ones who mentioned her in their articles to the Radio Free Europe.

C: Now I got back to Brasov. There was this revolt in Brasov, consisting only of workers. Only Silviu Brucan declared solidarity. I don't know if you remember or not, we must tell the truth. I don't like it either, but this is the truth and I appreciated him for his gesture not because he put Maniu but man changes, we have to be tolerant, we must have some tolerance. My son and I put manifestations on the gate and wrote: "In solidarity with the workers of Brasov" with our names under. In the evening I heard about the revolt on the Radio Free Europe and in the morning I put up a paper outside and I wrote "Solidarity". People were passing, looking at the paper, I think many of them were saying that it was a good thing and that they liked it. In the evening I found out from a worker from Brasov who had stopped the car in that area, I don't know if he was even a securist, I have no idea, I don't care but he told me that in Brasov everything was awful, the workers had been arrested, that they were beaten up and that there was a disaster going on there. We found out only at 17 in the afternoon what had happened by 15 and then I told myself that it was time to do more than a simple gesture by putting up a paper on the door. Translate for him.

T: The only one who had declared solidarity with the workers of Brasov was Mr. Brucan. The day that Ms. Cornea found out about this movement by the Brasov workers, she put out a sign on the front door: "I am solitary with the workers striking." It was an invitation to strike aimed at anyone. She placed the manifest with hers and her sons in all the courtyards of the factories.

C: In the morning, at 7.30 on the 19th of November somebody knocked at the door. These were a policeman and three civilians. They didn't have a warrant, they said it was too early, we must wait until 8 and then go to take the warrant. From 7 until 11.30 they searched in the attic, cellar, everywhere. They searched in all parts of my house.

T: A policeman and three civilians searched through her house.

C: And I tell you that they didn't move anything, I don't know how they did it. They were professionals! My uncle in London had written a letter to me some years before in which he was asking , he worked for the BBC, he was the chief of the Romanian department, his name was Victor Cornea, he settled for London before the war and lived there until the end of the '70's. He wrote me a letter in which he was asking for my opinion, if we could start a movement. They would send me weapons.

T: She got a letter from her uncle who was the boss at the Romanian department of the BBC in London. He asked her if she was interested in starting a movement because he could provide weapons.

C: It was already well – known that prince Charles, the parliament of Belgium. Mr. Mitterand and his wife, these were some extraordinary forces, showing such great solidarity. I received after that the Rafto prize. It represented my protection. The University of Brussels gave me the title of Doctor Honoris Causa.

T: The University of Brussel had given her the title of Doctor Honoris Causa.

C: Tell him that they were measures of protection.

T: They were measures of protection because during that period when she was in danger, these external forces put pressure upon the Romanian government to let her go. If this had not happened, she would have been staying longer in prison.

C: To conclude, we had such a protection because they kept saying: "Ah, it was easy for her because she was protected." Many people think this way. My answer is: "I was protected because I proved first that I was doing something. If you wouldn't have had this proof, who would have protected you? Is my neighbour protected? No, because they don't know him."

T: She says that some people said that it was very easy for her because she was protected . But how did she get it? Other persons wouldn't have got this protection because the external forces didn't know them. They hadn't done anything to deserve protection.

C: I didn't do much. I only sent three or four letters every year to the Radio Free Europe.

T: She says that she doesn't see her own efforts as that great. She only sent three or four letters every year to Radio Free Europe. That's all she had done.

C: I took part in the problems of the Greek – Catholic Church.

T: She had taken part in the problems of the Greek – Catholic Church.

C: I protested against the demolishment of the villages and of the churches.

T: She defended the people against the demolishment of the villages and the churches.

L: Did she have any contact with Mr. Tökes in this period?

T: He would like to know if you had any contact with Mr. Tökes in this period.

C. No, I knew his name but I did not co - operate with him.

T: No, she..

C: I protested against the demolishment of the churches while the patriarch was saying that no churches had been demolished.

T: She protested against the demolishment of the churches while the patriarch was claiming that no churches had been demolished.

C: I made a program, I mean a reform. I asked for a reform of the education.

T: She asked for a reform of the whole educational system.

C: Which did not suit the interests of the communists.

T: Which would not have suited the interests of the communists.

C: I asked for the reform of all the institutes.

T: She asked for the reform of all the institutes.

C: I showed the moral destruction because this is our greatest loss.

T: She showed the moral destruction.

C: I showed the moral destruction in all of my texts, beginning with '82. All I did was to draw the attention of the intellectuals, the people and the leaders towards the fact that they harm the Romanian people through this moral destruction. Through fear, through this double thinking that they were imposing upon us.

T: To show the moral destruction was one of the most important features of her letters.

C: And I even asked Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu in the text that I consider the most important, in the letter from the 23rd of August, either to give up being the leader of the country, or to introduce a reform. This was in '88.

T: In '88, she had written this article to the radio in which she asked Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu either to give up his power or to introduce a reform.

C: So I didn't give up. In '87 I was arrested. My son was arrested, my son was fired, they blackmailed us.

T: She was blackmailed through her son, her son was put into prison, then he lost his job. They used her son against her.

C: And I owe this to my son because he always said: "Mother, don't look at me, it doesn't matter, do whatever you think you must do".

T: She owed very much to her son because her son always said: "Don't look at me, do what you have to do."

C: The second conclusion is that in a society, if the people stay not doing anything, their soul will be poor, the fear makes them less and less people, and if they try to do little gestures every day, because I started also with little gestures, they form their personality. Every little act has a spiritual value. I laugh and I say that the security formed me. It is important to do the little gesture every day, we don't have to fight any more against Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu. It is the little gesture that develops the courage. Now it's another kind of courage.

T: The second conclusion is that not doing anything destroys the soul of a person and makes him less and less a person. Performing small acts against the regime, against the whole situation not something extraordinarily but little things gave them the power and the force to continue.

C: It forms the subject and the others.

T: It forms the subject and then has the force to form the others.

C: Earlier, the Romanians kept their mouths shut when they were supposed to talk. Now they talk too much where they'd better shut up. And the intellectuals, my problem is the intellectuals.

T: In the first period, the people didn't perform small gestures when they were supposed to do so. Now they talk too much even when they are supposed to listen. This has to do with the intellectuals, not only with the common people.

C: For example Octavian Paler now talks too much when he should shut up and do something else because he's doing no good.

T: There is a man, Octavian Paler, who she says should shut up because he is doing harm to the people.

C: I didn't fight against Gheorghiu – Dej. I fought against Ceau°escu, against Iliescu. Now I didn't fight against Constantinescu but I sustain with all my forces because he is the only leader of the country whom I'm not ashamed of. I understand that he makes little mistakes but what he has done is essential. He is a mediator. We don't appreciate enough that he has put an end to many conflicts and that he brought a kind of social peace.

T: During the first period, she didn't fight against Gheorghe Gheorghiu – Dej. She fought against Ceau°escu, she fought against Iliescu and now she sustains Constantinescu because he is a mediator and brought some kind of social peace.

C: He mediated conflicts. He took attitude.

T: he took attitude in these conflicts .

C: He's got to manifest solidarity with what is the best. Nothing is perfect. We've all got to solidarise with the better things because there is no perfection.

T: We can't look for perfection because there is none. We've got to sustain the best alternative.

L: Can you please ask her when she was invited to join the National Salvation Front and when she met and how she worked together with Mr. Iliescu and when and why she and the others decided to split from the Front?

T: He would like to know when and how you were invited to become a NSF member..

C: I was never invited.

T: She was never invited to become a member.

C: I was enrolled without being consulted.

T: She was enrolled in the party without her consent.

C: Guess why. I was the most well – known person who had protested against the regime and they were interested in having me a member. I was like a firm sign.

T: She was the most well – known of the persons that had protested against the regime. The communists were very excited about having her in the party so that they could show that she sustained this new wave.

L: For the legitimacy. But how did she, why did she join them if she in advance would expect that Iliescu would not act democratically?

T: You finally accepted.

C: I had no choice. I was manipulated with the terrorists.

T: She was very manipulated with the terrorists.

C: And after I had met the communist team: Brucan, Iliescu, Masilu, I went to Bucharest on the 26th of December.

T: After she had met the ex – communists, Iliescu and Mazilu and other people.

C: They manipulated me, they made me believe that there were terrorists who would change the order which didn't exist in fact and introduce a terrorist regime.

T: She was told that there were terrorists who would change the order, kill the people and install again a terrorist regime.

C: On the other hand I accepted because there was no one else who could take the place.

T: On the other side she accepted because there was no one else who could take this place.

C: There was no one else and they lied to me.

T: They lied to her.

C: In the first proclamation..

T: In the first proclamation..

C: in which I was speaking about political pluralism, about freedom of the press, they respected this, about freedom of movement, they respected this but they didn't want to respect the pluralism. I realised it after several days where Iliescu proposed the pluralism within the NSF. There was another promise, the private property. They are still fighting against this.

T: There was another promise, private property, a question that has not been solved yet.

C: And the separation of the powers, basically these principles were the principles of a democratic society.

T: The principles were basically the ones of a democratic society.

C: They promised to organise free elections in which they would not participate as a party.

T: They promised to organise elections and not to participate.

C: They would participate individually but not as a party. From all this they respected only the freedom of the press and the freedom of movement.

T: Finally, they participated in the elections as a party and not individually. From the first proclamation she saw only the freedom of the press and the freedom of movement not being violated.

C: They were against political pluralism.

T: They were against political pluralism.

C: At first they accepted small factories with a limited number of workers. This was during the first weeks, factories with three or four workers.

T: They performed this theory of having small factories supposed to have like only three workers.

C: Then they raised the number to nine.

T: Then they raised the number to nine.

C: I asked them what they were intending to do about the state factories. They wanted to rename the institutions.

But they changed nothing in the way of functioning, it was still the communist way of functioning. Then they declared that they would become an eligible party..

T: For the transformation they merely wanted to rename the institutions.

C: that would candidate in the first elections on the 20th of May. This was on the 23rd of January, 1990.

T: Then they declared that they would stand for elections on the 20th of May as a party. This was on the 23rd of January.

C: Then I left the party. I said that all was a lie and I didn't want to sustain a communist power or a neo – communist party.

T: Then she left the party. She didn't want to sustain a neo – communist party.

C: I continued telling the western countries what was happening here.

T: She continued telling the western countries what was happening here.

C: And I was saying which type of democracy Iliescu was going for.

T: She was saying which kind of democracy Iliescu was going for.

C: In Bergen I announced for the first time what was happening here, on the 8th of February 1990. I had been invited to Bergen by Egil Rafto and I showed here for the first time the structure of the new power, that was a neo – communist power, that they are with Moscow.

T: In February 1990 she went to Bergen and this was the first time that she publicly announced what was happening here, that there was no democracy and that what was here was just a new type of communism.

C: My tactics were copied, I think I had a certain influence. I said: "The parties that were formed after many years, after 40 years of communism, were suppressed, are still weak. It's not even sufficient with five years if you want to organise a party. You need at least five years to form a party". Iliescu tried to break the new parties. I asked the western governments to put pressure upon the Romanian government and try to have them adopting democratic principles that exist in the western countries.

T: She asked the western countries to put pressure upon the Romanian..

C: The democratic principles are wear.

T: The Romanian parties were weak.

C: There was no opposition.

T: There wasn't practically any opposition. There were only small parties that were about two months old and they required more than five years to become a real, strong party, more than two or three months and so she asked the western countries to put pressure upon what happened in Romania to apply a democratic policy.

C: I proposed that Romania should receive political and financial help only after proving that the country adopts the European democratic rules.

T: She asked not to be given any political or financial help before Romania would be able to follow democratic rules.

C: That's why they hated me.

T: That's why they hated her.

C: And all the communist newspapers wrote "Doina Cornea wants to have the Romanian people starving": They hated me.

T: Everyone hated her and said that she wanted to have the population starving.

L: Which media are you referring to?

T: Which media are you referring to?

C: The media, the press manipulated by Iliescu.

T: The part of the press that was manipulated by Iliescu.

C: They even threatened me with death. My husband was in France and I was alone at home and a voice on the telephone told me: "Prepare yourself at midnight, you're finished". And I said that there was no point in waiting, that they should come and finish me at once.

T: She was threatened on the phone, she was called up, ugly, dirty words were pronounced. She said: "OK. If you want to kill me, then come. The door is open."

C: Tell him that his was organised.

T: These were organised threats.

C: Before the elections in '96, a group was discovered that used to make phone calls and curse the candidates. They tried to manipulate the people to voting for Iliescu.

T: A group had tried to manipulate people to voting for Iliescu.

L: Who did these things?

T: Who were they?

C: The journalists discovered them. I don't know where.

T: Did they belong to the NSF?

C: Of course.

T: They belonged to the NSF..

C: They didn't call it the NSF. It was called PDSR, the Romanian Social Democratic Party.

T: which was called the PDSR.

C: Mr. Coposu probably found out this as well, he used to receive phone calls. He found out from somebody else that there was this campaign of calumnies.

T: Mr. Coposu found out that there was this campaign of calumnies.

C: I told you this so that you know what type of man Iliescu is.

T: Now you know what type of man Iliescu is.

T: Can you please tell us about Mr. Tökes?

C: What can I tell you about Mr. Tökes if you have already spoken to him?

T: I asked her to tell us about Mr. Tökes and she asked what we wanted to know from her about him after having spoken to him ourselves.

L: He protested against the oppression of the Hungarians and the Hungarian reformed church.

T: He tells that you had different targets. Tökes was against the oppression of the Hungarians. He was against the fact that Catholicism and the Hungarian religious groups were not accepted.

C: Where? During the Iliescu period?

T: No, during the Ceau°escu period. This was what made him involve in the revolution. So you had different targets.

L: He protested against the oppression of the Hungarians and the Hungarian reformed church.

T: He said that he had spoken to Mr. Tökes who practically started the revolution.

C: So what did he have in mind?

L: For Tökes, the most important thing was religious freedom and that the Hungarians be left alone in this area. In the end he couldn't stand it anymore and that's what made him start protesting against these politics. He started the whole movement.

T: He wanted freedom of religion and of the Hungarians.

C: And what did I want? I wanted the demolishment of communism, which brought democratic freedom to all of us.

T: She wanted the demolishment of communism that should bring democratic freedom to all of us. Democratic freedom to everyone.

C: Let's talk about Ceau°escu's period. I say that the Hungarian churches, both the protestant church and the catholic one did not suffer such harsh oppressions. I am Romanian and Greek catholic. My church was suppressed, persecuted and not recognised although it had historical merits. Perhaps we would have been writing Cyrillic letters if it hadn't been for this church.

tams. Cornea says that the Hungarian churches, both the Protestant and the Catholic ones were not as suppressed as..

C: During Ceau°escu's period the Catholic church had a bishop, Aran, who was arrested. Seven archbishops died. And the others died in prison but none of them changed his religion. They represented a model of resistance. There were twelve bishops. In the first period four of them died and in the second three more died. Still they didn't give up. Until the end, until the revolution, our church was suppressed, not recognised. We didn't have the right to exist.

T: Ms. Cornea says that the Hungarian churches, both the Protestant and the Catholic churches, were not more suppressed than the Greek – Catholic Church. Seven archbishops died. There were two series of archbishops. In the first one four archbishops died in prison and in the second one three died. Still the fight wasn't given up.

C. Look at who was killed: Mister Ghica, the nephew of the the ruler of Moldavia, who turned to Roman – Catholicism. When he was 82 years old, he was put in prison where he died. Look at which kind of men they killed.

T: Monsigneur Ghica was the nephew of the leader of the country. He comes from a noble family. He turned to Roman – Catholicism. As he was 82 years old he was taken to prison

C: He died in the sickroom. He was sick or he had a cold, pneumonia, nobody knows, he is a saint.

T: He is a saint.



C: The Pope wants to sanctify him.

T: The Pope wants to sanctify..

C: These things should be known. I translated to Romanian two volumes of his thinking and reflections.

T: You were a teacher, you taught French.

C: Yes, yes. In France there are written books about him. He used to visit the country. His hospital from 1906 was built where the Parhon Institute used to be. He took care of the lepers. He donated skin in the First World War, he was a saint. He cured sick people using the touch of his hands and the prayer.

T: He healed people by using his hands.

C: Let's finish with Tökes. It's true that the Hungarians were in a way persecuted during the Ceau°escu period. The Hungarian students were sent to the faculties in Moldova, to Dobrudja, they were taken away from their roots.

T: During the Ceau°escu era, the Hungarians were persecuted. The Hungarian students were sent to Moldavia, to the south of the country. They were taken away from their roots.

C: This is a form of persecution.

T: It is a form of persecution when you are taken away from your origin, from the people that you lived together with.

C: They attained some rights after the revolution, they had institutions. During the Ceau°escu era only the state institutions existed. They had printings and magazines. Iliescu gave them TV programmes, then withdrew them and also gave them the right to form the UDMR.

T: After the revolution, they were given more freedom, they even got the right to form the UDMR Party.

T: They were given more freedom after the revolution. They even got the right to form their own party, the UDMR, which means the Union of Democratic Hungarians.

C: Iliescu permitted the formation of some nationalist parties. This was based on strategic thoughts. He wanted to raise the people against the Hungarians.

T. Special parties were formed

C: Big Romania, PUNR.

T: Big Romania, PUNR. These parties were meant to torment the people and raise them against the Hungarians.

C: Their nucleus was the security. I think this is a KGB strategy which was in connection with a part of the security and of the army which were pro Moscow. That's why Iliescu sustained. This part of the security led by the KGB wanted to make a kind of Yugoslavia here, an interethnic conflict. This started in February '90. We didn't realise then what was happening. The pupils went out on the street, kicked out by the Hungarians. I didn't realise then what was going on. I understood it later. In every city with a mixed population. A Romanian woman manipulated me. I was lucky. I didn't believe her. I went to those schools to see what was happening. That woman told me that the Romanians wanted to go to the general inspector for education in Cluj. Ms. Stoic came in the morning to the Council and told me that the Romanians wanted to leave and this could not be solved on the street. I told her that I agreed that the problem could not be solved on the street. She told me to sign a paper stating that I agreed. I was in the council in January '90. I didn't sign anything. I gathered the people. The KGB used these tactics to maintain this zone of influence of Moscow.

T: The KGB used tactics to maintain a hold on this part of Europe so that we would become another Yugoslavia where inter - ethnic problems was to result in a civil war.

C: Maybe this started long before Malta, maybe it the result of an agreement at Malta.

T: It may have started long before, at a meeting at Malta.

C: This is possible. Malta was at the same time as Gorbachev and Reagan fell.

They tried to start a conflict in January in the schools, in Cluj – Napoca and I don't know in which towns.

T: On the same day, in the some of the main cities where there are mixed populations of Hungarians and Romanians in large quantities, all the Hungarians wanted to throw all the Romanians out of school. It's impossible that this could happen in so many different cities on the same day without somebody manipulating it.

C: Iliescu was supposed to save us from the Hungarians.

T: Iliescu was supposed to save us from the Hungarians.

C: Maybe he doesn't know that the Romanians were persecuted here in Transylvania. There were centuries of suffering.

T: The Romanians had suffered during centuries in this part of Transylvania, especially because of the Hungarians.

C: There were persecutions in North Transylvania in '40, '44. I Myself was beaten up in the Hungarian schools. I lived in Transylvania.

T: She was beaten up in Hungarian schools.

L. By pupils?

T: By pupils?

C: No, we got along. The children are not so bad. It was the headmaster. We lived in the district of Mures. My parents didn't have money to send me to the Romanian high school in Cluj, which was the only one of it's kind in North Transylvania. There were two schools that prepared teachers in Gherla and Oradea and primary schools in the villages.

T: Not the children. The headmaster. She had to go to a Hungarian school because there were no Romanian schools. She was beaten up by the headmaster.

C: There was a school in Cluj in which you could learn how to cook.

T: There was only one high – school, here in Cluj, a Romanian high – school. But her parents didn't have money to send her to Cluj.

C: There were primary schools in the villages where the children were taught how to write and read. I already knew how to write and read. That was all. And I was brutally sent to a school, without my consent, in which the language seemed hostile to me because of the teachers.

T: She considered the language hostile because of the teachers. She was brought there by force.

C: But this helped me..

T: This helped her..

C: later because I lived in this drama where I had to speak a language that I didn't like, nobody can imagine which drama that is for a child. That's why I sustain that the Hungarians must have schools in their maternal language. I hated the Hungarians, especially after I was beaten up. I hated them with all of my heart. And that's what we want to do. We want to have two million Hungarians hating us. This is not possible. During that period Europe was a

Europe of hate.

T: During this period Europe was a Europe of hate. Ms. Cornea says that she sustains Hungarians having their own schools in the country in spite of the fact that she hated the Hungarians when she was a child and she hated the language because she was beaten up. She doesn't want to have the Hungarian children from Romania experiencing the same nightmare that she had to go through in learning a language that she didn't want to learn. The Hungarian children here have to learn Romanian as a hostile language.

C: The maternal language is like a protective shell. It is something that protects your every word. Every word you say has an affective resonance. When you utter words in a foreign language things change.

T: The mother tongue is a protective shell. Having to use another language is a big brake.

C: So we have to change our mentality. We live in another kind of Europe and I sustained the Hungarians' rights regarding the schools and the universities. The university has not been founded yet, the schools are functioning. I don't think they will have more trust as long as Mr. Constantinescu is the president. Let's get back. I was in Tirgu Mures on the 15th of March, 1990. I'm not cleared up. I have the impression that both the Hungarians and the Romanians were manipulated.

T: Bot the Hungarians and the Romanians were manipulated.

C: A conflict was necessary here..

T: A conflict was necessary here..

C: due to the same reasons.

T: due to the same reasons.

C: Many analysts said that the security should be founded again and the Sri was founded. I think the problem is of a different character. The solution is not merely the founding of the security. This institution is of the same character as the Securitate: It was supposed to keep Romania under Russian influence through Iliescu, who was their man.

T: Some of the analysts said that the clash was arranged by the security, now the SRI, that is the Romanian Service of Information.

C: The significance of this event is of greater importance than the majority says..

T: The significance of this event is much more important than what is thought to be the fact..

C: because in the middle of the conflict both parts wanted Iliescu to come.

T: because during this clash both parts were asking for Iliescu.

C: The two parts were separated only by a few policemen.

T: The two parts were separated only by a few policemen.

C: Iliescu wasn't coming.

T: Iliescu wasn't coming.

C: And the conflict bursted on. I don't want to say what was before. I know details because I was there after the events and a doctor told me the details. The conflict bursted out in the moment when some buses full of Romanian peasants appeared, peasants brought from 60 km far from the villages Hobac and Ivanesti.

T: The conflict bursted out in the moment when some buses full of Romanian peasants brought from 60 km far..

C: From two 100 per cent Romanian villages.

T: From two 100 per cent Romanian villages.

C: There were mountain villages. During the period 1940 – 1944 the peasants from these villages were coming to Raghine, the town where I was living, to sell milk, sour cream, eggs.

T: From this region, in 1940 – 1944...

C: They were dressed in the national costume.

T: they were coming to the market to sell eggs and milk, dressed in the national costume.

C: The Hungarian policemen were beating them up because they were recognised through their national costumes.

T: The Hungarian policemen were beating them up.

C: I raised the question: "Why didn't the people from the villages near Tirgu Mures come?"

T: Why did the people from the villages near the town come, why only these people from 60 km away?

C: Because these people had kept the drama in the back of their minds.

T: Because these people suffered from the Hungarian oppression in that period.

C: And I spoke to a patient at the hospital. (I knew a professor there):

T: She went to the hospital and talked to one of the patients.

C: And I asked him: "Why did you come? How did you come?" And he told me: "We were told that the Hungarians were killing the Romanians in Tirgu Mures and we have children there".

T: The arriving villagers had children there. Their children were going to school in Tirgu Mures.

L: But who told you?

T: "Who told you?"

C: He had got a phone call. He didn't know who had called. I asked him when he had received the phone call. "In the morning", he said. "The same day as the conflict". I asked him how he had got to Tirgu Mures and how he had arrived that soon.

T: She asked him how he managed to arrive in Tirgu Mures so soon.

C: He said: "We were given buses". I asked him if the Hungarians had killed his children and he said no.

T: She asked him if the Hungarians had killed his children and he had said no.

C: I asked: "What did you do? How did you get there? Did you have weapons?" He answered: "We went there with sticks and knives".

T: She asked him which weapons they had brought and he answered sticks and knives.

C: And I asked him: "What weapons did the Hungarians have?" He said: "No weapons. They fought with fire, with Molotov cocktails". The man had been burnt.

T: The Hungarians had fought them with fire, Molotov cocktails. He had been burnt by the fire.

C: Other patients explained to me that the Hungarians had some slings. There are persecutions here in Cluj, too, what Funar did and the others, was very dangerous. We cannot say that the Hungarians had no rights. I'm talking about this period, Iliescu's period.

T: In what concerns Iliescu's period, we can't say that they didn't have any rights.

C: They didn't have a university. Iliescu didn't agree with this but they did have rights. The event had effect on the minority that is always provoked and the majority is stressed up because "the Hungarians want Ardeal". This creates hate and maybe rude reactions. In '97 I was hit in my head with a rake by a worker.

T: In '97 she was hit in the head by a worker.

C: The Romanian population has always been provoked by the fear that the Hungarians might take Ardeal, that they are the bad ones. This happens even at high levels. Iliescu was talking about the Hungarian threat.

T: Iliescu himself talked about the Hungarian threat.

C: Brucan himself said one day that Hungary is sitting at the corner and is peaking.

T: Brucan himself said one day that Hungary is peaking at the corner, that means that Hungary is waiting for the right moment.

C: Somebody shouted at me on the street: "Hungarian! Traitor!" But I was not involved in politics. Sometimes Mr. Tökes' declarations were exaggerated. I don't know all the declarations he made. Sometimes he made statements with which the Hungarians did not agree. I spoke about a double manipulation. Something had to start in our country, too. I have one impression, but no evidence. Mr. Tökes had a conflict with the bishop going on but around the church there were many Hungarians. Then the Romanian securists came. I don't know what happened there but maybe this movement was helped. And what I saw here in Cluj, I have a suspicion. I went out in the street on the 21st and a group came that was shouting: "We don't want Ceaușescu!" The people hated him so strongly. They had had enough of his regime. Unfortunately they forgot everything, they forgot the cold, the shortage of light, now they cry for Ceaușescu.

T: Now they're crying for Ceaușescu, but Ms. Cornea thinks that not only Mr. Tökes did the job. They were pushed from behind.

L: By whom?

T: He asked who pushed them.

C: The security. Probably he didn't even know. I told that he had a conflict with the bishop.

T: Mr. Tökes had a conflict with the archbishop. But maybe Mr. Tökes didn't even know about these things but at the same time the movement was also started by the security.

C: The Romanians manifested solidarity and gathered there. I don't know the leader of the group that came to me. There were some of my students, some people that I knew. My son was hired again in a factory. But that is another story. Two weeks before the revolution, he was quickly hired and after he had heard the news from Timisoara he tried to tell the workers every day: "Come on! We've got to manifest solidarity!" The factory was full of securists and when the workers heard him they turned their heads. One day, somebody started shouting at the bus station and then all the workers who were coming out of the factory started singing: "Wake up Romanians!" They started moving towards the centre of the town. This happened to me as well as heard "Ceaușescu!" in the street. I went quickly downstairs, bare-footed in December and I said: "Wait for me, I'm coming too!" This happened on the 21st, on the 22nd the revolution was already embedded.

T: On the 21st of December a lot of people came to Ms. Cornea. As soon as she heard the shouts, she went barefooted outside and said: "Wait for me! I'm coming too!" On the 22nd the revolution was already embedded.

## INTERVIEW WITH AMALIA HERCIU

by Øyvind E. Lervik.

November 28, 1999.

Location: The Asociatia Pro Democratia office

Bd. Pache Protopopescu 29, ap. 3.

Sector 2, 72300 BUCHAREST

ROMANIA

Questions had been prepared that were given to Amalia Herciu by the start of the interview session.

Questions:

1. Would you call the 1989 events in Romania a revolution or a coup d'etat?
2. Can you explain the anti – Hungarian sentiments of the Romanians?
3. Would you caricaturise Romania as a consolidated democracy?
4. How would you view the roles of dissidents and the opposition, if there was one?
5. Do you think Iliescu's motivations were democratic consolidation or securing power for himself, exploiting the emerging power vacuum?
6. How would you connect the democratic institutions in Romania to former democratic experiences?
7. How does your organisation finance the activities.

The interview

Lervik: Would you call the 1989 events in Romania a revolution or a coup d'etat?

Herci: It would be safe to call it a coup d'état. Immediately after the revolution, the general feeling among the population was a positive one. The events were perceived as something like the French revolution. Now there is a great suspicion connected to the way the leaders gained power.

L: How did Ceaucescu manage developing his extremely strong control over all parts of society, compared to other countries in Eastern Europe?

H: First of all, the propaganda was present every day and in every sector. For instance, there were films for children and novels presenting the Securitate as "the good guy", fighting all evil. All history teaching in schools was directed at legitimising the role of the regime.

Ceaucescu in addition exploited the traditional strong role of communitarian values in this country, which is a culture evolved out of the orthodox faith, also of relevance in Bulgaria, Russia and Greece. The communitarian and nationalistic attitudes were connected by the regime to state socialism. In criticising the armed intervention in Hungary in 1956, he not only gained international credibility, but confirmed his officially performed allegiance to the nation state. The result was stronger support for himself and his regime. The formula exploited is the connection between church and state in orthodoxy. Nobody condemns the church. The left side of politics is now the isolationist one, while the internationalists vote right. They are more pro – NATO and pro – EU. The rural population tends to be more conservative, by which I mean nationalistic and undemocratically minded. This part of the population has lower notions of democracy. One reason for that is the relatively modest distribution of newspapers.

L: So you would explain these attitudes using solely religion?

H: It's also got to do with traditions and history. We had to fight the Habsburg monarchy, then came the world wars and after that the Russians. Part of the attitude is also manifested and distributed in certain departments at the university, like the biology and history departments. The latter discipline is divided into one traditionalist and one revisionist camp. The professors of political science, on the other hand, were re-educated in the west after 1989 and influenced by western ideas, which they bring further.

L: Can you explain the anti – Hungarian sentiments of the Romanians?

H: The conflict is partly based on economic cleavages. There were large groupings of Germans and Hungarians in Transylvania, leading an economically better life than the rest of the population. This attitude has also got to do with isolationism. The Romanians like to make the decisions themselves, and they don't want other groups to interfere with their problems. Therefore, the rights of the Hungarians are frequently violated.

L: Would you caricaturise Romania as a consolidated democracy?

H: Institutionally, it is a democratically consolidated regime, but that does not include the population. Well, there are of course institutional matters that I would consider unfavourable for our democracy. The parliament consists of the House Of Deputies and the Senate, functioning very much like the British system. The Senate consists to a high degree of old people, defending procedures of the old authoritarian regime. Their conservative attitudes also slow down the reform process.

L: How would you view the roles of dissidents and the opposition, if there was one?

H: There were dissidents like Tökes and Cornea, but there existed no movement. The army eventually sided with the reformers, which first and foremost was represented by Iliescu. They took advantage of the situation to enter power positions, after bringing the Ceaucescus to trial.

L: Do you think Iliescus motivations were democratic consolidation or securing power for himself, exploiting the emerging power vacuum?

H: I don't think his intentions were a democratically consolidated regime. Pressure from abroad forced him to change his course. He exploits the conservative attitudes of the rural, uneducated population, which do not imply healthy politics.

L: How would you connect the democratic institutions in Romania to former democratic experiences?

H: There exists no connection. The Romanian institutions are imported from the west.

L: How does your organisation finance the activities.

L: It's impossible to find support in Romania. We are dependent on American donors in financing the promotion of democracy. The Americans often have their own ideas and restrictions on how the money should be used, even if we consider ourselves as knowing better what is needed and which work should be done.

## **INTERVIEW WITH VLADIMIR PASTI**

by Øyvind E. Lervik

November 23, 1999.

Location: National Institute for Opinion and Marketing Studies

Calea Victoriei 141, Et. 2

BUCHAREST

ROMANIA

### **Questions**

1. How would you describe the involved groups and alliances in the revolution (Ceaurescu, the Securitate, the opposition movement and others?)

2. Following given definitions, would you characterize the 1989 events as a revolution or a coup d'etat?

3. How would you value the following factors as contributing to the overthrow of the regime?

- the mass uprisings;
- the opposition movement(s);
- external factors
- economic development and distribution.

4. To which extent did the people know what was going on in other countries?

5. Keeping the post – 1989 development in mind, would you understand the intentions of Iliescu and the National Salvation Front before and after 1989 as being:

- a) democratic consolidation and economic development;
- b) limited reform, securing power for themselves;
- c) other?

7. To which degrees are the characteristics of the sultanistic regime still alive, concerning mentality and administrative procedures, at the central and local levels? Do the authorities act according to the law? How great is the problem of corruption?

8. Which roles do foreign relations play for the democratisation, economic development and development of civil society in Romania, for example the IMF, the European Union and NATO?

9. Which role did the pre – democratic institutions play for the creation of the new democratic institutions?



## The Interview

Lervik: How would you describe the involved groups and alliances in the revolution? I'm referring to Ceaucescu, the Securitate, the opposition movement and others.

Pasti: Well Ceau°escu, how can I describe Ceau°escu? One meter and fifty centimetres... (laughter). What do you really want to know about him?

L: Well, first of all I assume that he had full control over the Securitate..

P: No, he did not. No leader in any country of the world has full control over the secret services or intelligence services in any country of the world or anytime in history because a chief of state is a politician and the the intelligence service is a bureaucracy following its own rules and its own chiefs, their own interests and so on as much as they think is compulsory or in their interest. They do what they are asked to do, but are targeted to act according to their own interests. The secret services have the advantage of working undercover. They can afford not to tell entirely or everything they are doing. So Ceaucescu did not have full control over the Securitate.

L: OK. But at which time point do you think he lost control of the Securitate?

P: The question is when the intelligence services decided not to obey Ceaucescu anymore.

L: Yes. When was that?

P: I don't know exactly. It's difficult to say exactly when, but it was probably some time after 1985 when they were well informed on what was happening in the world outside, in Eastern Europe and in Moscow. They had connections to similar institutions in other countries, and were able to change messages and sometimes they could co – operate with for example the CIA or the British Intelligence Services, French intelligence, so they knew very well what was going on.

L: Would you say that the opposition movement controlled the Securitate at any time point?

P: No, they lived their own life.

L: And how would you describe the role of the Securitate in the revolutionary days?

P: They disappeared.

L: They disappeared?

P: Yes. They couldn't formally intervene. But what they could do and what they did was not to defend it

L: But why didn't they try to take the power?

P: First of all, they are not politicians. They tried to take power. General Vlad was one of the people who were leading the events, one of the leaders of the revolution. Later he was arrested. They tried to be there in the middle of the events. For some time they were in the middle of the events. But other forces rejected them and started offensives against them. The main actor that was acting against the Securitate and the political institutions was the army.

L: The army?

P: Yes, because there was competition with the secret services.

L: And what was the role of the army? Were they supporting the revolutionaries, Ceaucescu or the reform movement?

P: When a regime is under pressure, the army will be asked to defend the regime everywhere. It's easy for the army to do that because usually, the head of state is the chief of the army. The army is supposed to obey. Ceaucescu ordered the army to intervene in Timisoara, and then he ordered the army to defend the government in Bucharest. And at the beginning, they obeyed, and then they didn't.

L: They obeyed in Timisoara?

P: They obeyed in Timisoara, but not all the time in Bucharest. They had intervened on the 16th of December. On the 20th, they had already stopped intervening and started discussing with the popular leaders of the population. Timisoara and Bucharest were already under the authority of the leaders of the population.

L: Were these leaders identical with the National Salvation Front?

P: No, there was no National Salvation Front on the 20th. The National Salvation Front appeared only on the 22nd.

L: Yes, but who were the leaders of the revolution?

P: In Timisoara? Those people that were in front of everybody.

L: So it's not completely clear who the leaders were?

P: There are mainly two ways of making a revolution. One is to have an underground organisation that is doing popular revolting. If it's not possible to start a popular revolting, they will start organising a guerrilla army fighting against the regime. Such revolutions took place in South America and in Eastern Asia, in Cambodia, for example. The leaders had an ideology, a program and an army. But in the French revolution, things happened different: There were no political parties, no leaders, but the population gathered on the streets and started fighting against the soldiers and then they destroyed the Bastille. The population took the power and then the leaders emerged. What happened in Romania is more similar to what happened in France. There were no political movements, no people organised, no ideology, no program and no leaders. There was no one to tell the people on the street what to do. No slogans, no one to tell them why they were even there. But gradually some people appeared, shouting louder than others. These people were considered to be leaders. They trained the people to obey to their orders in two ways: They initiated slogans which everybody obeyed and they asked the population either to stand still or to move on the street. The ones standing in front and shouting louder were focused on by the television cameras broadcasting all over the country. That were the people that appeared on television. They were regarded by everybody as leaders. And these people organised themselves as a National Salvation Front Committee. That's how it developed on the 22nd. So of course nothing, all this could not have happened if the Securitate had done what it was supposed to do. They did not shoot. On the 22nd they did nothing. That means that somebody at the top of the organisation gave them the orders not to do anything.

P: Well, the second question. Following given definitions.. What definitions?

L: One definition of a revolution could be that it should involve a change of leaders and a redistribution of social goods and a coup d'etat...

P: I would rather say that a revolution is something that changes the political system. It is a change of the political system, while a coup d'etat only changes the political leaders, but maintains the political system. So following this definition, what would you call the things that happened in 1989?

L: A coup d'etat.

P: Why?

L: Because Ceaucescu was removed, but the secondary leaders under him stayed in power.

P: But we just said that a revolution means the change of a political system.

L: Yes, but to have a change of the political system you'd have to remove all the people involved in the former

regime.

P: Then the English revolution in 1688 was no revolution because they only replaced the king with a prefect and kept most of the members of the parliament and most of the aristocracy. Can you give me an example of a revolution?

L: Yes..

P: The leaders are not important in a revolution, but the political system is important. So if you change the institutions, then you have a revolution. If you only change the political leaders, then you have a coup d'état. There was a coup d'état in Indonesia, because Habibie changed the ministers, but not the political system. But there was a revolution in Russia in 1917 because all the institutions of the former regime, first of all of the monarchy, were replaced. You have a revolution in Britain in the 17th century, because the monarchy was developed, and the other political institutions were replaced. You had a revolution in Romania, in Bucharest in '89, because all the political institutions of the communist regime, the communist party, the executive committee, the parliament were replaced. Party, party executive committee and parliament. Only the administration was maintained. But all the political institutions were replaced.

L: But the National Salvation front has been accused of not being particularly democratic.

P: I don't know if they were democrats or not, but the problem now is to differentiate between a revolution and a coup d'état. And the difference is what happens to the institutions.

L: But if you have a change of the institutions but keep the same leaders?

P: If you change the political system, you change the way the leaders are elected and nominated and so on.

L: OK.

P: You have to differentiate between what a journalist or an American movie says and scientific definitions. A journalist will only write what he sees, a writer also. You can test a definition. Now, how would you value the following factors as contributing to the overthrow of the regime? The mass uprisings 95 %, the opposition movement 2%, external factors 3%. Economic development and distribution were the main causes of the mass uprisings. So its something like that.

Very much. The people of the cities knew very much about what was happening in Eastern Europe, in the Soviet Union. The radio did a lot to help. There were also other ways of transmitting information, for example via visitors and newspapers coming more or less legal to the country. So to a large extent they knew what was going on in other countries. They knew the events, but the significance of them was perhaps not very clear to everybody. But what was clear to everybody was that the communist, the former communist regime, changes and transformations were taking place in other countries, and that these changes also should come to Romania.

L: Do you think there would have been a revolution without the opposition movement?

P: There was not an opposition movement. The army deserted in fact and they did not defend the building anymore. He had ordered a helicopter to land. And he went to one of his houses. There he tried to organise something. He decided to go to a military unit not too far from Bucharest. The pilot of the helicopter had deserted. Then his bodyguard took him by car. The problem was that the army started to obey the new authorities. He was arrested not by the opposition. There were dissidents, individuals but there was no opposition movement in Romania. They were not united and not organised. Doina Cornea was one of the most important dissidents. People like her distributed messages and ideas. She was protected against the secret police. In this way you had some organising and some backing of them, but you can't call that an opposition movement.

These are very well possible together. No supposing you want to consolidate the democracy in Romania, you'll need power for that, and you'll need to secure the power for yourself in order to do that.

L: But which do you think were the real intentions of the actors? Democracy or limited reform?

P: I don't know, ask him. I don't think that intentions are important. What is important is what you've got, what he

was doing. Popular movements, competent leaders, political parties, elections, modern constitutions, democratic laws and so on is what you need. Acting in order to improve peoples' lives, the country. There was a lot of pressure for introducing modern procedures. He acted in order to promote political parties and the elections. One can make assumptions on the intentions, but one can not know, and I don't think that it's important.

A sultanistic regime is what?

L: A sultanistic regime is a communist regime with..

P: A communist regime is not a sultanistic regime. There is a big difference between a sultanistic regime where the will of the sultan is the law and a communist regime that has clear laws. Of course, the leaders act according to the law, formally. They have the power to change the law when they do not like it. For example if I am the leader of the government in Romania and I think that there were too many cars on the streets, and I decided that only cars with equal numbers were allowed to drive on Saturdays and Sundays. Such a law existed.

L: When was that?

P: During Ceaușescu. You can give any law you want to. So the political authorities normally act according to the law. It is only the administrative system that can violate the law. That's how corruption appears. But authorities they always respect the law.

L: But now, how is this situation now, in the latest years, after '89 and how has it developed after the revolution?

P: The parliament in January one year ago decided a law saying that any company is allowed to offer a free meal to its workers. The ministers of parliament did not want to respect that law, so they issued another law that allowed them to suspend this law, suspending the implementation of the former one. So they acted according to the law, but issued another law to avoid the law.

How great is the problem of corruption? How can I estimate that?

L: Well, there might exist estimates or theories on the field.

P: I can not imagine how we could raise that question to anyone.

L: I have seen estimates from other countries on the percentage of the economy being black.

P: Corruption is one thing, black economy is another one. There is an estimate that the black economy in Romania is perhaps 40% of the GNP. But corruption I can't tell you how many percent of the GNP is connected to corruption.

How would you describe the development of civil society in Romania? Christina can tell you that for sure. The concrete form of democratisation in Romania was mainly due to the European Union and the European Unions judgements, because Romania was and is intending to join the European Union, so the Romanian democratic institutions should fit the democratic institutions of the European Union. The democratisation process was monitored by the European Union and the European Council. The IMF is not interested in democracy. Neither is NATO. I don't mean in a formal way, but the NATO programs are related to the organisation of the army, the budget, it's resources and which weapons they are using, in which language they are communicating and questions like that, technology. The economic development was monitored by the IMF and the World Bank, and as you know the GNP of Romania between 1989 and 1999 decreased with perhaps 20% or 25%, with the significant contribution of these two institutions.

L: The European Union follows the signals from the IMF. You need economic development in order for organisations to develop. The attitudes of the IMF, the World Bank and the EU will be important.

P: The acts and the programs of the European Union are not dependent on the judgements of the IMF. The IMF is not interested in economic development. Their programs are normally oriented to macroeconomic stabilisation and to the way the government is organising it's own revenues. Budget deficits, trade balance and the way Romania relates to other economies is their problem. If the IMF says that the government is bad, they will be reluctant to give it money.

What role did the pre – democratic institutions play for the creation of the new democratic institutions? I don't

know. I don't understand very well..

L: What did the Ceau°escu – era institutions have to say for the new structures of the roles of the president and the parliament, if any?

P: There were political, administrative, economic and social institutions, also culture and so on. The political institutions of the former communist regime disappeared on the 22nd of December. Even the communist party disappeared. And the new governors had problems with how to handle the properties of the communist party, because it was a rich party. So the political institutions of the former regime had no role in shaping the new institutions. Its an entirely different story with the economy. The economic structures are another question, because they are inherited from the former economic regime, and they are not yet completely changed. The administrative institutions were maintained, and mainly, we have the same institutions now as we had before, with some unimportant changes. Some ministries disappeared and others appeared. Some social institutions changed and some are changing now. Part of the social institutions is being reshaped as market activity, and not as state activity. Some disappeared. Some of the culture situations disappeared. Some culture is reshaped as market activity. Statistics on economic development before '89 you can't find. The communist regime also published annual statistic reports. But of course they were manipulated.

L: Yes of course, but are there made estimates.

P: Statistics on economy under Ceau°escu? Its impossible to re - compute the figures.

L: But historians do make estimates on former societies..

P: Yes, but you cant find any official data. For after '89 you can make copies but we can't give you. Statistics on civil society development you can find on, there is an organisation doing research on development of civil society. I apologise, but I have to leave you.

L: Thank you for your help.

P: My pleasure. If you need any more help don't hesitate.

L: Thank you.

P: You're welcome.

## **INTERVIEW WITH CHRISTIAN PREDA**

by Øyvind E. Lervik

November 29, 1999.

Location: Faculty of Political and Administration Sciences

6-8 Povernei Str., cod. 71124, sector 1

BUCHAREST

ROMANIA

### **Questions**

1. Would you call the 1989 events in Romania a revolution or a coup d'etat?

2. How would you value the following factors as contributing to the overthrow of the regime:

- the mass uprisings;
- the opposition movement(s);
- external factors;
- economic development and distribution.

3. Do you think the Romanian population in advance expected an intervention from the Soviet or Romanian forces

in case of an uprising?

4. Keeping the post – 1989 development in mind, would you understand the intentions of Iliescu and the National Salvation Front before and after 1989 as being:

- a) democratic consolidation and economic development;
- b) limited reform, securing power for themselves;
- c) other?

5. Which role did the historical parties play in the transition and consolidation process?

6. How would you describe the democratic mentality of the Romanian population? Is there any important connection between this mentality and the orthodox faith?

7. Which role do foreign relations play for the democratisation, economic development and development of a civil society in Romania, for example the IMF, the European Union and NATO?

8. Which role did the pre – democratic institutions and the transition procedures play for the creation of new democratic institutions?

The interview

Lervik: Would you call the 1989 events in Romania a revolution or a coup d'état?

Preda: It was a revolution in the sense that it was a popular protestation, even though it was sustained by a coup d'état, by preparation. The main actors from December '89 say that it was prepared to change the regime. It was not possible to make a coup d'état. I saw a protestation, a general movement in the street here in Bucharest and not in other places in Romania. In my point of view it was a popular protestation in the streets of Bucharest and Timisoara, and not a coup d'état. The actors, including Brucan and Iliescu, say now that it was not possible to make a coup d'état, and that it could only be described as a popular protestation.

Mass uprisings.. I think that mass uprisings and economic development are the main factors in December '89.

L: But the external events like the perestroika in the Soviet Union and the opening of the Hungarian border?

P: The population in Timisoara and in Bucharest knew in December 1989 that something was going on in Germany and other countries, but the information was not generally distributed. There was a minority in the bigger cities like Bucharest, Timisoara and Iasi that understood what was going on, but the majority of the population only had a vague idea about the implications of these happenings for Romania. It was only information accessible in the great cities in Bucharest, in Timisoara, in Iasi. It was not generally known at this moment.

L: But Radio Free Europe and Voice Of America....

P: Yes, but the majority of the population was not listening to these programs, so I would not say that they had any significant importance. Only a small minority knew about the external events. It was not a generally organising unit. It was the communist power...ah! My English! It was not very well – known information among the population in Romania.

L: Do you think that the Romanian population feared a...

P: Yes it was a fear only in December when the people supposed that Iliescu would tell the Soviet Union army to intervene in Romania, but this was not a factor relevant at the beginning of the movement. Personally, I couldn't imagine the possibility of a Soviet Union army intervention or of a crackdown from the Romanian army. It was not a decisive factor in the revolts, only a fear created by the ambiguity of the position of Iliescu and the other main actors.

L: Keeping the post – 1989 development in mind, would you understand the intentions of Iliescu and the National Salvation Front before and after 1989 as being democratic consolidation and economic development?

P: Limited reform, that's clear. Iliescu said in December '89, the first thing he said was that the general ideas of socialism was denied by the experience of the communist regime. He did not say we must introduce a multi – party system or the market. The first thing he said was that the communist regime had denied the great ideas of socialism.

L: So you think that he would prefer securing power for himself instead of introducing democracy in Romania?

P: Yes! In fact he seems to have been convinced of being the successor of Ceaucescu. He had in his mind that the only thing wrong with the old regime was it's leader, and he considered himself as being a better leader. He thought that the Romanian population wanted to replace Ceau'escu by him and he sustained this thesis. He said that he was the successor.

The historic parties... It's very difficult to say anything about the historical parties because the renaissance after '89 was a great surprise for us. In fact it was a very amateuristic organisation, re - invasion of these historic parties. Only after '94 I think have these parties organised themselves in a sufficient way for a democratic system.

L: I read a book written by Mr. Vladimir Pasti, the historical parties were the ones wanting to secure the power for themselves, they wanted to lead the country instead of working for a democratic future for Romania. He writes that Iliescu was the right man to lead the reforms towards a democratic...

P: Yes, but he was Iliescu's adviser, and he thinks in the same patterns as Iliescu. Iliescu is a form of communist reformator. He wanted in fact a socialism like the variant of the 1960's or 1970's. He's not a convinced democratic leader. The Romanian communist party was not reformed. In fact Iliescu would have preferred to main tain the structures of the former regime, not to reform the communist party. The reform of the communist party has not been sufficient. It was a transformation of persons. It was not a profound, serious reform. Continuity is the right word to describe the relation between the former communist party and the new, so – called social democratic party. Iliescu would prefer not to reform the party. The party has not been transformed into a social democratic party, like for example in the Czech Republic or in Poland.

The political mentality of the Romanian population is one of not participating. The level of participation is low. The influx of the orthodox faith is very important in this field. We can see no the fact that about 28% of the Romanians population thinks that we need only a single party and they deny a multy – party system. But it's difficult to say something very strong about the reasons for this authoritarian attitude. We do not have much research on the field. That is my perception but not a scientific conclusion. My personal opinion is that the orthodox belief plays a strong role, but this is not a scientific statement.

L: So what is needed to change this attitude towards one in favour of multipartism?

P: We had in '96 a democratic change. The reunification of the liberal movement.. Initially it was five or six or.. . No we have only one political party of the liberals. This movement was initially split into five or six political parties. The experience of the change of power after 1996 is very important because the new government consists of different parties forming a coalition. This experience of a large co – operation is very important. This change of power and co-operation between the liberals, the Christian democrats and the social democrats is of importance for the evolution of a democratic mentality.

L: Which role do foreign relations play for the democratisation, economic development and development of a civil society in Romania, for example the IMF, the European Union and NATO?

P: Its very difficult to say something here. Making an exact judgement is problematic. But one problem is that the Romanians are very focused upon internal politics, and it's difficult to convince them, for president Constantinescu, that decisions made outside of the country are important, for example the ones made by the EU, the World Bank and the IMF. The general attitude is that we must decide ourselves on our own matters.

L: If the IMF doesn't like the policies made by the Romanian government, it will influence the economic prosperity. To change the mentality of the people you need organisations and they need money.

P: The IMF was important. A strong conviction of the Romanians is that we must decide here in Romania. This is one of the remnants of the communist mentality. It's difficult for us to convince the population that support from the European Union and later a membership is of major importance for Romania. There are some remnants of the communist mentality that are very present here, in this country.

L: So which is the best strategy for improving this?

P: We need a link between Romania and the European Union. European governments must sustain the democratic government of Romania. We are now a democratic state, the democratic institutions have been established, but the market economy is not functioning. During the ten years after '89 we experienced political progress, but the economy did not follow. It must be supported. It is a difficult situation with political progress without economic progress. Therefore relations between Romania and the European Union and the unions support programs are very important for the economic development.

L: And when do you think Romania will be a EU member?

P: I think that the Helsinki summit gave an important decision for Romania. In ten years Romania can be able to participate in the process. I think that ten years is the most optimistic view. Without economic progress in 2000 and 2001 there is a serious risk of destroying the political progress. It is a very delicate situation. We need support. After '89, the European Union and the IMF told us that political development would be the condition for economic development. But this has not been the case for Romania. I think that the IMF and other international organisations must recognise that we have had political progress but no economic progress. The EU and the IMF must support economic development in Romania. There should be no reason for denying us this, to blame the country for having undemocratic governments. We are now in a delicate situation: If we won't have support for economic development in the coming years, it might destroy our political advances.

L: Pasti writes that a central problem is the lack of control by the government over the bureaucracy. They act independently. How would you comment that?

P: I have a lot to say about these things but my English is bad..

L: Well, you may explain it in French and I can have someone translating it for me.

P: That's perfect.

L: Just give me a short explanation in English first and you can do it French afterwards.

P: Yes, yes! Romania does not have the experience of a modern bureaucracy and a modern administration. The communist administration was very large and important in the social and economic fields. President Iliescu and also president Constantinescu had problems, they did not get the support from the administration. The Romanian parliament is voting on a law regulating the relations between the public administration and the public functionaries, ten years after. People's wishes are not represented. The issuing of this law is important in securing that the interests of the population are being taken care of.

L: How is the power – sharing between the government and the president?

P: The administration is the strongest. The government and the presidency are two elements who try to act, in fact destroy the influx of the administration. They have not many solutions. I would like to say something in French because..

## **INTERVIEW WITH LASZLO TÖKES**

by Øyvind E. Lervik

April 27, 2000.

Location: The Reformed Church of Oradea

Str. Calvin Nr. 1



## Questions

1. You started the Timisoaran uprisings in 1989 after being told that you were going to be removed to a smaller church county. Please explain your preferences. What was more important for your decision to protest:
  - this removal
  - the general way the country was being led?
2. Did you the people joining you in Timisoara wish for a "socialism with a human face", meaning merely the replacement of Ceau°escu or democratic elections? This question might seem obvious. However, there existed large segments in the GDR at the time that favoured communism, only wishing for a softer line than the one performed by the Honecker leadership.
3. How were you involved in the proceedings of the coupmakers from the arrestation of Ceau°escu until the end of the trial? Can you please give a description of the involved actors in this short period that for an extern seems quite chaotic?
4. To which extent do you think the Banat population was informed on the liberalising events taking place in Hungary and the GDR, given the border location and the existence of different ethnic groups.
5. The Hungarian foreign minister in 1989, Mr. Gyula Hors, has stated that the Hungarian government "helped opposition movements in Romania" (Der Spiegel 2/9-1991). Did you base your activities on foreign support of this or other kinds?
6. Conspiracy theories propose the existence of coup – planning groups (Ratesh, N. (1991): "Romania – The Entangled Revolution". The Washington Papers. New York). One is supposed to have existed within the military units, led by Ionita and Militaru and the other one within the Securitate, led by Magureanu. Ratesh states that no connections existed between the nomenclature putschists and the people. Did you or the protesters joining you in Timisoara know about any such activities? If yes, did you communicate with them or receive any support from them?
7. After the revolution, you joined the National Salvation Front along with other dissidents, among them Mrs. Doina Cornea. As I have understood, both of you decided to split from this group due to dissatisfaction with the NSF performing the trial against Ceau°escu behind closed doors and the decision by Iliescu and the NSF to stand for elections. Can you please confirm the acts that you considered illegitimate and how they led you to leaving the Front?
8. Can you describe the different factions within the NSF in the 1990 spring and their wished – upon measures concerning the way the democratic transition was to develop? Who were on your side and who favoured Iliescu and his group? How did Iliescu win?
9. How would you describe the role of the army and Securitate in the transition? Who controlled these units in the transition?
10. Which characteristics from the Romanian short and intensive transition were important for the democratisation, as compared to the Hungarian and east German transitions, characterised by more experienced and well organised opposition groups?

## The interview

Lervik: I'm interested in an overview of the different actors involved in the transition, concerning the period between the uprisings in Timisoara and the trial of Ceau°escu, and after that the spring of 1990 until the elections. How were the relations between dissidents like you and Mrs. Doina Cornea, the Party nomenclature and the army and the Securitate in these games taking place after you had started the protests in Timisoara? That's the first main

question. The second one is why you decided to break with the National Salvation Front and Iliescu. Please describe the constellation of actors involved in the power struggles and their goal preferences in the process. Finding reliable information on this topic is difficult in second – hand literature and there is not so much written on it.

Tökes: I made my struggle on my own. Before December 1989, I had no relations with Romanian dissidents like Mrs. Doina Cornea or others. My struggle was a very specific one on church level. Specifically, I opposed in the first case the oppression of the church, the oppression of the freedom of worship, the deprivation of the church and of church rights generally. This struggle went on in two directions: First, I was an opposer of my own bishop, who was an opportunistic, pro – Communist one. On the other hand I opposed the state church policy which was very much combined with the inner – church policies of the bishop. These were the two directions of my dissidence in the church. In this struggle I had to face the Securitate itself and the state office for religious affairs, the so – called Department of Cult. Step by step, gradually, through this inner opposition in the church, in the reformed church, on church issues, religious freedom issues, I had to face more and more in direct ways the Communist Party, the Securitate, the office for Religious Affairs, different persons representing this offices, the state power. This opposition at the end of this preceding period concluded into a plain opposition against the Communist state, against Ceau°escu, the Securitate. A very important which made this evolution was the demolition of the villages. This was such a very concrete issue, which put me into concrete and direct conflict with, the state, with the Communist Party, with Ceau°escu and with the Securitate. In March '89, secretly I recorded an interview to two Canadian reporters with the help and intervention of my brother who at that time was living in Canada. They visited me, and secretly I gave an interview to Michel Claire and Jean LeRuan. In a very adventurous way they took my interview across the border. But even the Canadian TV was so frightened by the information that they did not want to make it public. This is why some months later this tape was taken off by a Hungarian TV reporter Cludina Olovios, a dissident Hungarian TV reporter, and she succeeded in making public my interview in the Hungarian TV. The Hungarian TV spread the information all over the Carpathian basin my story and my protests against the demolition of some seven thousand villages. You probably know about it, this plan. This is the motive which threw me into concrete and direct conflict with the state and this was the main issue that made my case a somehow universal one in the Communist state. This issue and all my struggle for my Hungarian reformed church is at the same time a minority issue because we are a minority in a double way, both as protestants and as ethnic Hungarians. All my manifestations, my opposition took quite a different shape, that of minority activism. It is an important concern that the issue did not remain in the frameworks of a minority or a church activist one, but enlarged into a general Romanian anti – communist dimension. That is why all the people in Timisoara supported me and gathered around my church.

Before December 1989, if I had relations with dissidents, it was only with Hungarians. Of course I knew about Doina Cornea and she knew about me. We made declarations about each other but we were not direct contact. My family in Cluj, I was born in Cluj, got into direct contact with Doina Cornea but I did not know her. I knew Hungarian dissidents as Andras Shutu, the writer who was blinded on one eye in March 1990 in Turga Mures in the bloodshed. One of the most well – known Hungarian writers, Andras Shutu and another poet György Giesa, who later became one of the prominent Hungarian Democratic Alliance leaders. And of course, I had many friends in the clergy and amongst my community, who were against Ceau°escu and the national communist oppression. They supported me or we knew about each other.

I got into contact with Iliescu at the end of December 1989 when I was invited to the assembly of the National Salvation Front. There I got into contact with Doina Cornea, Andrei Plesu, with Iliescu and many other personalities, on the one hand members of the former nomenclature, on the other Romanian dissidents. All the time since I became a minister of my church, that is 1975, then I started my church career, all the time I had to suffer the presence of the Securitate, which put a special attention upon the Hungarians on the one hand and upon the clergy on the other. We were their priorities: the ethnic minorities and the church minorities. That's a separate chapter of my life. The oppression of an intellectual from Romania. You know, anyone worthy for attention had to suffer the intervention and the everyday presence.

L: Discussions have occurred on whether there existed "softliners" within the Ceau°escu regime. Did you know any such persons or movements?

T: What do you mean by "softliners"?

L: I mean persons within the Party leadership who wanted to liberalise Romania and perhaps replace Ceau°escu with another person. I have read theories based upon speculations on such groups within the Securitate and the Party that wanted a milder form of communism.

T: Yes, there was a movement of reform communists all over Eastern Europe. In Hungary, "Communism with a human face" was installed after the revolution of 1956. There were general trends of liberalisation. We can say that in the time of Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu, after 1968, there was a period of liberalisation, after the Czechoslovakian revolution. From '68 to the beginning of the 1970's, there was such an atmosphere of liberalism in the time of Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu. Even for Hungarian people, it was a very positive period, but only for a very short time. After that began the period of Chinese – like Communist dictatorship. There were all the time rumours about the replacement of Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu. I remember that some years before the '89 changes, I heard about the name of Iliescu mentioned as one possible heritor of the regime, but these were only rumours, and I was not sure if these rumours were not started by the Securitate itself, so it was difficult to guess what kind of information it was. I myself did not involve in any kind of such groups and was not part of any group that had such goals of replacing Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu or the change of the regime. And I think that if one is to be objective and modest, one cannot say, nobody in Romania can say that they were struggling for the fall of Communist regime like in Moscow. The image of Communism was so well built up and the sense of the Communist power was so customised with the people that no one could imagine, not even in December, that the whole regime could be changed. On the other hand, I have to say that I myself, my friends and some dissidents, tried to make the Communist regime as comfortable as can be made, as supportable as possible. I myself fought in all my adult life against the oppression of the Hungarian community. We refused in our indirect way the norms of Communism. The only alternative to Communism was the religious faith. The only order of values that had citizenship in a Communist country. In our way, we were dissidents. A true Christian had to be a dissident, had to refuse those forced – upon values. But nothing more. We fought for Hungarian schools, for fuller rights of the Hungarian minority and we fought against Romanian nationalism which was hidden behind the Communist ideology. We fought for human rights, the fundamental rights of speaking, of gathering, of the press and so on, but all the time within the frameworks of the regime. I don't want to boast with something which is not true and had no reality. If one is boasting with such things, he is not sincere and not true. We could reach only to the "human faced communism" with a little larger social possibility within the frameworks of Communism. No one could imagine that the Soviet Union would fall. I can say that in this regard one of my examples in a very important manner, a figure of this period was Karoly Kirai, a former Communist close to Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu who fell into disgrace at the end of the '70's. He became the pioneer of anti – Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu fight in Romania. He plainly criticised Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu. It was a miracle that he could survive. He was removed, persecuted, then obliged to forced locality. I was in close connection with Karoly Kiray.

My main example was my father, professor of Theology, who was the vicar of the Hungarian reformed church in Transylvania, so the second on the rank after the bishop. He was all the time of his life somehow a dissident, but within the frameworks of religious faith. My spiritual example was my mother. We are eight sisters and brothers. We were brought up in the spirit of faith and of true Protestantism. These are our roots in Transylvania. The Westernmost part of Western Christianity can be found in Transylvania. This is the borderline of gothic style as well. In Transylvania, the German Saxons and the Hungarians were the followers of Protestantism. Most of the Hungarians belong to the Calvinist branch of Protestantism and the Germans to the Lutheran Protestantism. Our tradition determined us to never accept fully Communism. Our spiritual resistance, our passive resistance was continuing all the time of the Communist decades, for five decades.

L: After the trial, you were invited to join the National Salvation Front.

T: Yes. That was a glass window of the putsch headed by Iliescu. They needed veritable and credible personalities, dissidents, to make a good image for the so – called Romanian revolution. As a matter of fact, the Romanian uprising was only the first face of the revolution, a spontaneous, I used to call it more properly an uprising. It was a spontaneous uprising but then it was kidnapped and transformed into a putsch by Iliescu. Until they could stabilise their power, they absolutely needed the bloodshed or the image of bloodshed. They needed the dissidents. They needed also the Hungarian minority. I was a representative. In that time, I received the greatest appreciation. Iliescu himself called me the hero of Romania when I first met him. I entered in large room where the leadership of those days was united. They were in discussion. That was the first time that I saw Iliescu. I entered the room and he received me quite theatrically, like I was the hero of Romania. They needed our moral, our moral capital, but no longer when they succeeded to the power and to stabilizing the power. Then, step by step, started the Communist restoration. This restoration kept going until 1996.

L: So, if you knew in advance that Iliescu would need you and the others...

T: I did not know in advance. Not at all. I was an idealist. We were so much delighted by the miraculous changes of the fall of Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu, the fact in itself that they executed Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu made them so credible for a short time. For

example I myself, I had no doubt about the execution of Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu. I was convinced that it was a legal act of a true revolution. I could not realise what stood behind. In a sense, I think it was a true dilemma for Iliescu himself and his group. I can imagine that as long as Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu was alive, the mere fact that he was alive, could mislead the people to support him. So I cannot judge, not even now, that the execution of Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu was right. Of course, on a principal, moral level, I am against any execution. But in the context of the situation, I don't dare to judge those who executed him. I dare to judge their later activity, the denial of the revolution, the cynical abuse towards the Romanian people. But not this act in itself.

L: Which acts of the 1990 spring made you decide to leave the Front? When did you decide to leave?

L: After Tirgu Mures. I can point it very concretely after the bloodshed of Tirgu Mures. Let's start with the beginning: I participated at half a dozen of meetings of the National Salvation Front, the provisory parliament of Romania. Gradually, I became alienated from what was going on there. It became evident for me that this National Salvation Front was only a pretext for the authority of Iliescu. It had no real authority. We were only used for legalisation of power and for the borrowing of credibility of power. And step by step I became more and more disillusioned about what was going on in the National Salvation Front. The last drop in this process of disillusionment was the bloodshed, the clashes, the so – called ethnic clashes of Tirgu Mures. Doina Cornea was more clever. She realised, as I remember, she was the first who realised that the National Salvation Front was only a scenery for the group of Iliescu, I was visiting the United States. I was received by George Bush. I was in the political top with the illusions of a revolution, with the enthusiasm of a sense of freedom and changes, with the hopes for a totally new life. On my tour in the United States I was in the Foreign Affairs Ministry when I received the news about Tirgu Mures. This point is marking a new period also in my life. Then I started a struggle against the restoration of communism, trying consequently to demask the true face of the Iliescu regime. From there to now that characterises my attitude, until 1996. It was a kind of new dissidence. I demasked the true face of the Iliescu regime. Afterwards, after 1996, the situation still remained very similar because the nomenclature remained in the decisive positions of economics, of the whole establishment of the Secret Service. Everywhere, they succeeded to preserve their positions. So the period of transition id too long in Romania. We can say that in 2000, in this year, we find ourselves on that point of transition in which Hungary was by the coming to power of Gyula Horn. We are in a later phase of post – communist transition. I am afraid that Romania is now following the equivalent of the Horn era in Hungary. Communism was the most deep – rooted in Romania. These roots are the roots of nationalism. Romania is a very interesting case of national Communism. A far analogy can be drawn to the national socialism of Germany. Nationalism was on the first level all the time, not Communism, a collective ideology, a collectivist ideology of nationalism.

L: When you decided to depart from the National Salvation Front, were you alone in leaving, or were other dissidents joining you?

T: Only me. I came home on the 20th of March, 1990. One of my first ways was to Bucharest. I was called by Iliescu because of the severe critics that I made in the United States. I had immediately made some critics regarding the role of Iliescu and the Securitate in the Tirgu Mures events. I was called to the Bureau of Iliescu. He was putting me on trial: "What did you do in the United States?" He confused me with a Communist Party member as in the former period. But of course I was a free man so I maintained my position regarding the post – communist background of Iliescu and the Tirgu Mures scenery because it was a total scenery of intimidation of Hungarians. Then Iliescu put me to choose between the National Salvation Front and the power or the truth. And of course, I could not accept their proposal of remaining with them. In their way, they tried first to intimidate and then to convince me in a positive way. But neither one or the other was successful. So from this point onwards, my way went on my own, and of course together with the Hungarian Democratic Alliance, the honorific president of which I am still. That is another question, that the Hungarian Democratic Alliance was very much corrupted in the last ten years. That's another question, a special question of this period. So I remained with my Hungarians, which was at the first election the second major political formation in total unity. It was a real political power. It could have become a real political power in that period, but it was so corrupted that until now, it became quite a conformist minority formation which is going to forget it's own aims. In all cases, a Hungarian minority community. In Timisoara, about ten ethnic and as much religious communities contributed very much to the changes in Romania, to the democratisation in Romania. That is my opinion. We were the most committed ones among the Romanian population to the democratic values. Of course, a minority only has a chance in a democracy. Under Communism, we were as a minority not accepted as communists in the last period. Minorities were disgraced in the Communist Party, put out of the Party, and this became our advantage, you know. We were prevented of becoming

Communists, thanks to God. Far from the power, far from the Communist Party, the minorities could preserve much more of their human and political integrity. Our people, for example, remained very faithful to our leage. That is an exceptional situation after nearly fifty of Communist atheist rule. The absolute majority of our people remained on it's base. All the children were baptised during the period of Ceau°escu. All of us were confirmed by religion. These circumstances gave us the advantage of being on the side of democracy.

L: How do you think Iliescu and the National Salvation Front were able to win the first elections? Was it only the Hungarian minority that opposed him and saw him as not being democratically minded? How could the relatively large part of the population believe in him despite the massacres?

T: It was not evident that he was behind the massacres, you know, so he was a misleading figure. On one hand his name was popular from some years ago because he was mentioned as the possible follower of Ceau°escu. He somehow personally represented an alternative to Ceau°escu. It gave him an advantage. On the other hand, this oppression made the values relative: a little more liberty, a little more freedom, some kind of a "human faced Communism", a little reform Communism makes it acceptable to the population even if it's the worst available situation. In those circumstances, he came out as an alternative and they were professional in crating an image of a true alternative, even to make the image of a revolution. He managed to sell himself as a true democrat who overcame Ceau°escu, the dictatorship. He posed himself as the first revolutionary of the Romanian people. On the other hand, the reason for him winning the election was the mere circumstance that this people was brought up according to Communist ideology and according to Communist propaganda style. The same propaganda, the same motives and the same reflexes and the spirit of the former regime was used in the campaign for the elections. Iliescu and the former communists knew the language of the people who had been brought up by the regime, by the Communists. So they touched where it was necessary. They convinced the people that they were the true electable ones. And still we've got such problems, as you see, also in other post – Communist countries. The Communist machinery of propaganda, of campaign making is still working.

L: Well, at least in some such countries, the economic conditions have turned worse after the transitions. The results might come from the fact that many thereby look back to the times where they had better material standards.

T: Yes, but that does not apply to the last period of Ceau°escu. In the last period of Ceau°escu they had nothing. That is why the revolution was so successful. Ceau°escu had deprived the people of everything, simply there was no electricity, no bread and no butter. This misery was so general and so overwhelming that it made people revolt against Ceau°escu. Not only for some strata of the people was the situation bad, but for everybody, except for the Communist nomenclature.

L: Did you and the other dissidents receive foreign support before the revolution and under the revolution? You see, I read an interview with the Hungarian foreign minister of the time, Mr. Gyula Horn in Der Spiegel where he states that the Hungarians were supporting the Romanian dissidents.

T: Oh yes, we had man – by – man support. So if anyone could cross the border from Romania, they brought us food and medicines, books, bibles and so on. So there was all the time close solidarity with people mostly from Hungary and also from Germany, especially towards those people who had relations in other countries, the minorities. We had relations with Western churches, for example. So our christian fellows, not only the Hungarians, supported us as they could. That was very important because we had our relations towards the Western world. The Romanian orthodox people had no such relations with the so – called democratic world. That was an advantage for the minorities. We were somehow a mediator also in ideas, ideals, the free movement of information and democratic values. Of course, Hungary became more and more sensitive to the suffreings of the minority in Romania. At the end of the Kadar regime, the national solidarity of Hungarian people helped their fellows on the other side of the border more and more .

L: Thank you very much for the interview, Mr. Tökes! I'm very satisfied and this will be of great help for me!

T: I also want to thank you. Thank you for coming and visiting us!

## **INTERVIEW WITH PETRE ROMAN**

by Der Spiegel

Issue: No. 37, November 10, 1990.

Title: "Wir haben Fehler gemacht". SPIEGEL-Interview mit dem rumänischen Premierminister Peter Roman über die Krise nach der Revolution".

Spiegel: Herr Ministerpräsident, trotz aller Verbote demonstrieren Antikommunisten täglich gegen Ihr Regime. Die Polizei prügelt und verhaftet. Hat die rumänische Revolution noch gar nicht gesiegt?

Roman: Sie reden von Antikommunisten, ich habe da Zweifel. Es sind Leute, die das Ergebnis der Wahlen vom Mai nicht anerkennen wollen. Ich behaupte: Am 22. Dezember vorigen Jahres wurden landesweit sämtlich kommunistischen Strukturen vernichtet. Es gibt keinen vernünftigen Grund für einen antikommunistischen Kampf gegen die Regierung.

S: Die Demonstranten sehen das anders, und das ist in einer Demokratie normal. Warum reagiert das Regime nicht gelassener auf die Proteste?

R: Wir sind gelassen, bis zu dem Punkt, wo die öffentliche Sicherheit und Ordnung in Gefahr gerät.

S: Durch ein Paar Krawalle auf Bukarester Strassen?

R: So harmlos bleibt es meist nicht. Nach 40 Jahren stalinistischer Diktatur weiss ein Grossteil der Bevölkerung nicht, wie er mit dem Phänomen Kritik an der Regierung umgehen soll. Auch die öffentliche Meinung reagiert überzogen. Wenn nur drei Prozent der Bevölkerung demonstrieren, ist das eigentlich keine Staatskrise.

S: Zu einer Krise für das Regime ist der Protest erst geworden, als Präsident Iliescu die Demonstranten mit Faschisten vergleicht und am 14. Juni Knüppelgarden von Bergarbeitern gegen die Demonstranten hetzte.

R: Mit dem Vergleich hat der Präsident gar nicht so unrecht. Viele ältere Bürger haben der Vandalismus und der Hass der Demonstranten an den Putsch der Faschistischen Legion vom Januar 1941 erinnert, der für Rumänien der Anfang vom Ende war.

S: Das ist doch eine Ausrede. Sie als ehemaliger Hochschullehrer müssten doch die kritische Haltung der Studenten kennen.

R: Ich war als Professor an der Uni früher sehr beliebt; deshalb bin ich erschüttert über die Feindseligkeiten der Studenten. Sicher, wir haben Fehler gemacht. Einer davon war, dass wir nicht rechtzeitig mit den Studenten geredet haben.

S: Ein noch grösserer Fehler war, Bergarbeiter gegen die Studenten einzusetzen.

R: Der Einsatz der Kumpel ist und war illegal. Aber die Bergarbeiter waren auch die einzigen, die schon früher durch ihre Streiks geschlossen gegen Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu aufgetreten waren.

S: Antikommunisten prügeln also Antikommunisten?

R: Es war ein grosser Fehler der Regierung, die Bergarbeiter nicht unter Kontrolle zu halten. Sie hätten sofort zurückgeschickt werden müssen.

S: Aber Präsident Iliescu hat sich bei den Schlägern ausdrücklich für deren patriotischen Einsatz bedankt.

R: Es war die einzige Möglichkeit, sie aus Bukarest wieder loszuwerden.

S: Sie haben auch Ceau<sup>o</sup>escus berüchtigte Geheimpolizei, die Securitate, beschuldigt, die Unruhen im Land zu schüren.

R: Ein Teil von Securitate – Offizieren arbeitet wieder im Staatsdienst, weil Beweise für ihre Verbrechen während der Diktatur fehlen. Aber im Rahmen der Säuberung nach der Revolution sind 4000 Securitate – Mitglieder

entlassen worden und finden keinen neuen Job. Einige dieser Leute haben möglicherweise bei den Unruhen im Juni mitgemacht in der Hoffnung, Chaos zu provozieren und die alten Verhältnisse wiederherzustellen.

S: Aber die Verhaftung des Studentenführers Marian Munteanu geht doch auf das Konto Ihrer Polizei?

R: Das war seine Rettung. Er wurde vorher halb totgeprügelt, nicht in der Haft. Munteanu hat doch wenige Tage vor der Revolution Ceau°escu in der Universität verteidigt.

S: Das beweist gar nichts. Ihr Präsident Iliescu war sogar ZK – Sekretär unter Ceau°escu.

R: Aber nur bis 1971. Damals hatte ausser Iliescu niemand im Land den Mut, Ceau°escu zu kritisieren – und der Westen hat diesen Grössenwahnsinnigen wegen seiner antisowjetischen Allüren auch noch hofiert.

S: Berichte, dass der Sturz Ceau°escus gar keine Volksrevolution, sondern einen wohl vorbereiteter Putsch von Parteifunktionären gewesen sei, sind durch den Ex – Verteidigungsminister Nicolae Militaru und den ehemaligen Parteiideologen Silviu Brucan indirekt bestätigt worden. Sie haben das stets bestritten. Wer lügt hier?

R: Es war eine Revolution und keine Konspiration. Es war eine Explosion in der ganzen Bevölkerung, entzündet durch die unkontrollierbare Wut über 40 Jahre Unterdrückung.

S: Brucan und Militaru sagen, jemand habe die Armee gehindert, auf die Bevölkerung zu schießen, und grosse Teile der Securitate auf die Seite des Volkes gebracht.

R: Niemand wollte mehr für Ceau°escu kämpfen. Alle, auch die Armee, haben nur auf einen Anlass gewartet. Ich will aber nicht ausschliessen, dass einige der späteren Sieger schon vorher Kontakte zur Armee geknüpft hatten.

S: Die Armee kann sich auch nicht mit der neuen Regierung anfreuen. Verteidigungsminister Stanculescu lässt sich von der Opposition als "starker Mann" feiern. Müssen Sie mit einem Militärputsch rechnen?

R: Nein, das sind nur Spekulationen.

S: Wie würden Sie Ihre Regierungspartei, die Front der nationalen Rettung, politisch definieren? Offenbar gibt es da sehr unterschiedliche Positionen.

R: Ursprünglich waren alle politischen Oppositionskräfte in der Front vertreten. Dann haben sich ausserhalb der Front politische Parteien gebildet, und auch wir verwandelten die Bewegung in eine Partei.

S: Das haben Ihnen viele Rumänen verübelt.

R: Es wäre besser gewesen, die Front als Dachorganisation aller demokratischen Kräfte zu lassen, aber das Schicksal hat es anders gewollt. Wenn wir unsere politische Ideologie definieren müssen, so besteht sie im absoluten Bruch mit dem Kommunismus. Wir verfolgen einen Mitte – Links – Kurs auf der Basis sozialdemokratischer Prinzipien.

S: Warum will die Sozialistische Internationale die Front dann nicht als Mitglied aufnehmen?

R: Es gab anfangs einige Verunsicherungen im Westen. Demnächst werden wir als Beobachter zugelassen.

S: Sind Sie ein Marxist?

R: Im Januar habe ich noch gesagt, ich weiss es nicht; nun glaube ich, dass ich es nicht bin. Heute fühle ich mich geistig verbunden mit Männern wie Francois Mitterand, Felipe Gonzales, Franz Vranitzky und auch Oskar Lafontaine.

S: Sie haben vorigen Monat ein umfangreiches Reformprogramm vorgelegt, aber in der Praxis, vor allem im Bereich der Wirtschaft, hat sich wenig geändert. Warum verläuft die Wende in Rumänien so langsam?

R: Ich bin für radikale Schritte und Iliescu wohl auch. Aber im Staatsapparat, vielleicht auch im Parlament, sitzen Leute, die für kleine Schritte sind.

S: Sie sprechen von Bremsern in der eigenen Partei?

R: Diese Leute haben keine politischen Erfahrungen; der Kommunismus hat ihnen das eigenständige abgewöhnt. Sie begreifen unsere Absichten und unsere Motive nicht. Trotzdem bleibe ich ein Optimist.

S: Auch die Gewerkschaften sind inzwischen Gegner Ihres Regierungsprogramms. Sie fordern kürzere Arbeitszeiten und höhere Löhne. Fürchten Sie neue Unruhen?

R: Es könnte zu einer harten Konfrontation mit der Regierung kommen. Ich jedenfalls denke nicht im Traum daran nachzugeben. Schuld an unserem niedrigen Lebensstandard ist die niedrige Produktivität. Wer nicht mehr arbeitet, kann auch nicht mehr Geld erwarten.

S: In Bukarest gibt es keinen Zucker, in der Provinz fehlt sogar das Brot. Warum sind die Regale der Läden schon im Sommer so erschreckend leer?

R: Das Angebot an Waren war vor den Wahlen besser. Ernste Sorgen gibt es aber nur in den Industriezentren, wo die Bevölkerung keine Kontakte zur Landwirtschaft hat. Sie dürfen nicht vergessen: Unter Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu war die mangelhafte Versorgung nur durch Zwangsarbeit in der Landwirtschaft notdürftig zu beheben.

S: Professor Brucan, früher ein führendes Mitglied Ihrer Partei, ist strikt gegen die Übernahme westlicher Wirtschaftsmodelle. Er behauptet, die Marktkräfte arbeiten ausschliesslich für die Reichen. Ist das auch Ihre Meinung?

R: Nein. Brucans Ideen sind nicht die der Front. Trotzdem habe ich nicht vor, die westliche Marktwirtschaft einfach zu kopieren.

S: Welches Land könnte Rumänien als Vorbild dienen?

R: Österreich. Das Land hat in den fünfziger Jahren eine ähnlich Entwicklung durchgemacht wie wir und eine Marktwirtschaft mit starker sozialer Komponente eingeführt. Nur, wir haben sehr wenig Zeit.

S: Die EG und die USA wollen die rumänischen Reformen vorerst nicht finanziell unterstützen. Nun kommen auch die Auswirkungen des Golfkonfliktes hinzu. Wie hart trifft das die Rumänen?

R: Das Embargo gegen den Irak hat und vor grösste Probleme gestellt. Das Land schuldet uns über 1,7 Milliarden Dollar und war gerade dabei, seine Verbindlichkeiten mit Erdöl abzubezahlen. Das fällt nun fort.

S: Die neue Reisefreiheit für die Rumänen hat dazu geführt, dass Zehntausende, vor allem Roma, versuchen, als Asylanten in den Westen zu gehen. Was kann Rumänien dagegen tun?

R: Die beste Antwort wäre eine bessere Wirtschaftslage. Nun fürchte ich, dass selbst eine florierende Wirtschaft das traditionelle Problem der Roma nicht lösen kann. Nur wenige sind bereit, ganz normale Bürger zu werden. Wenn wir mehr Zeit und Geld hätten, müssten wir ein Bildungsprogramm für diese Minderheit schaffen. Wenn mir die Geschichte noch Zeit lässt, werde ich so etwas zumindest versuchen, auch ohne allzu grosse Hoffnung auf Erfolg.

S: Herr Ministerpräsident, die parlamentarische Opposition spricht bereits von der Notwendigkeit einer zweiten Revolution. Können Sie Ihr Program überhaupt noch realisieren?

R: Wer so redet, ignoriert das Wahlergebnis. Offensichtlich können diese Herren mit der Demokratie noch nicht umgehen. Nach neuesten Umfragen geniesst die Regierung das Vertrauen von 75 Prozent der Bevölkerung. Das ist auch nach westlichen Kriterien sehr hoch.

S: Verdächtig hoch.



R: Was den Zeitraum meiner Reformen angeht: Ich rechne mit 18 bis 24 Monaten für die Einführung der Marktwirtschaft und mit etwa vier Jahren, um die völlig heruntergekommene Nationalwirtschaft zu modernisieren.

## THE “LETTER OF SIX”

by Silviu Brucan

Written in November 1989, broadcast by RFE and BBC on March 11, 1989

To President Nicolae Ceau°escu:

At a time when the very idea of socialism, for which we have fought, is discredited by your policy, and when our country is being isolated in Europe, we have decided to speak up. We are perfectly aware that by doing so we are risking our liberty and even our life, but we feel duty – bound to appeal to you to reverse the present course before it is too late.

1. The international community is reproaching you (for) the non - observance of the Helsinki Final Act, which you have signed yourself. Romanian citizens are reproaching you (for) the non - observance of the constitution on which you have sworn. Here are the facts:

a. The whole plan for (the) systematisation of the villages and the forced removal of peasants to three – story apartment blocks run(s) against Article 36 of the constitution, which protects the right to personal property of a household, with annexes (farm buildings) and the terrain on which they are situated.

b. The decree forbidding Romanian citizens to have contact with foreigners has never been voted by the legislative body and never published, thus lacking legal power. And yet our citizens are threatened to be fired, harassed, arrested, and sentenced on that basis.

c. The civic centre, the biggest multibillion – lei investment in Romania, has no public budget and is being built against all existing laws regulating constructions and their financing. The cost of that immense building has tripled because of changes you are ordering every month in the interior and exterior of the building.

d. The Securitate, which we created to defend the socialist order against exploiting classes, is now directed against workers demanding their rights, against old members of the party and honest intellectuals exercising their right to petition (Article 34) and freedom of speech (Article 28) guaranteed by the constitution.

e. Factories and institutions are ordered to force their employees to work on Sundays against (Article 19 of the constitution and the labour code.

f. Mail is systematically violated and our telephone conversations cut off against Article 34 guaranteeing their privacy. To sum up, the constitution is virtually suspended and there is no legal system in force. You must admit, Mr. President, that a society cannot function if the authorities, starting from the top, show disrespect for the law.

2. Planning no longer works in the Romanian economy, the meetings of the Executive Political Committee are all past – oriented, exhorting the workers to make up for the unfulfilled plan of (the) previous year, previous semester, or previous month. An increasing number of factories lack raw materials, energy, or markets.

3. Agricultural policy is also in disarray. Harsh administrative measures are directed against the peasants who, according to our own data, provide 40 percent of vegetables, 56 percent (of) fruits, 60 percent (of) milk, and 44 percent (of) meats, though they have only 12 percent of the arable land. But, of course, predominant in the villages is now the fear of being “systematised”, with seven or eight thousand villages threatened to be razed. Above all economic, cultural, and humanitarian objections of the civilised world to that program, a legitimate question arises:

why urbanise villages when you cannot ensure decent conditions of urban life in the cities, namely heating, lighting, (and) transportation, not to mention food. A government which (for) five winters in a row is unable to solve such vital problems for the populations proves (that it is) incompetent and inapt (inept) to govern. Therefore, we are not pressing on you any demand in this respect.

4. The very fact that Germans, Hungarians, and Jews are emigrating en masse shows that the policy of forced assimilation should be renounced.

5. Finally, we are deeply worried that Romania's international position and prestige is rapidly deteriorating. As you know, this is concretely shown by the decision of quite a few states to close their embassies in Bucharest. Most alarming, embassies of such European states as Denmark and Portugal have already left and others may follow. Our growing isolation affects not only diplomatic relations. We have lost the American clause for trade (most – favoured – nation status) and as a result some of our textile factories have no orders. The EEC is unwilling to extend its trade agreement with Romania, which will negatively affect other sectors of our economy. You have always maintained that summit meetings are decisive in improving interstate relations. But how are you going to improve Romania's external relations when all the leaders of the non - communist nations of Europe refuse to meet with you? Romania is and remains a European country and as such must advance with the Helsinki process and not turn against it. You started (by) changing the geography of the countryside, but you cannot remove Romania to Africa.

(In order) To stop the negative processes both domestic and international besetting our nation we appeal to you, as a first step, to take the following measures:

1. To state categorically in unequivocal terms that you have renounced the plan of systematisation of villages.
2. To restore the constitutional guarantees regarding the rights of the citizens. This will enable you to observe the decisions of the Vienna Conference on Human Rights.
3. To put an end to food exports, which are threatening the biological existence of our nation.

Once such measures are taken, we are prepared to participate in a constructive spirit in a dialogue with the government on the ways and means to overcome the present impasse.

(Signed)

Gheorghe Apostol, former member of Politburo and Chairman of Trade Unions.

Alexandru Birladeanu, former member of Politburo and Chairman of Planning Committee.

Cornel Manescu, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and President of UN General Assembly.

Constantin Pirvulescu, founding member of the Communist Party.

Grigore Ion Raceanu, veteran of the Communist Party

Silviu Brucan, forming acting editor of Scinteia

## **THE PROCLAMATION OF TIMISOARA**

Read by representatives of a demonstration in Timisoara on March 11, 1990

The population of Timisoara did initiate the Romanian Revolution. From December 16 to 20, 1989, it waged, by itself, a fierce war with one of the most powerful and hateful repressive systems of the world. It was a ferocious fight; it is only us, the people of Timisoara, who are aware of its real proportions. On one side there was the barehanded population, on the other there were the Securitate, the Militia, the Army and the zealous troops of party activists. However, all the means and methods of repression proved fruitless when confronted with the wish for

freedom of the people of Timisoara and their determination to be victorious. Neither the arrests, nor the harassment, not even the mass murders could stop them. Each bullet that was fired brought another hundred freedom- fighters onto the battlefield of the Revolution. And indeed we did win. On December 20, 1989 Timisoara was irrevocably in the population's hands and it turned into a free city within the huge prison that Romania had become. All of the city's revolutionary activity was led from the platform in the Opera Square by the Frontul Democratic Romanesc (Romanian Democratic Front), the mouthpiece of the Revolution of Timisoara at that time. On the same day the army fraternized with the demonstrators and vowed to defend the acquired victory together with them. On December 21, over 100.000 voices were chanting in the Opera Square: "We are ready to die"

A succession of occurrences in Romania, especially since January 28, 1990, have come to contradict the ideals of the Revolution of Timisoara. The central mass media has only partially and vaguely informed the Romanian public opinion about these ideals. In such circumstances, we, who participated directly in all the events from the 16<sup>th</sup> to the 22<sup>nd</sup> of December 1989, are bound to explain to the whole nation why the inhabitants of Timi<sup>o</sup>ara started the revolution, what they fought for, many of them sacrificing their lives, why we are determined to continue our fight at any price and against anybody to achieve complete victory.

1. From its earliest hours the Revolution of Timisoara was directed not only against Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu, but, definitely, also against communism. "Down with communism!" was chanted several hundred times during all the days of the Revolution. In full agreement with the wish of the hundreds of millions of East European people we, too, called for the immediate abolishment of this totalitarian and failing social system. The ideal of our Revolution has been and is the return to the genuine values of European democracy and civilization.
2. All the social classes did participate in the Revolution of Timisoara. Workers, intellectuals, office workers, students, school-children, even villagers, who came to support the Revolution, were cut down by bullets side by side in the streets of Timisoara. We positively oppose the typically communist method of domination by spreading feuds among social classes and strata. It was on behalf of the ideology of "class struggle" that the Bolsheviks rose to power in 1917 and, similarly, in the years following 1944, the Romanian communists pitted one social class against the other, dividing the society in order to subject it to terror more easily. We warn against the danger that this sorrowful history might repeat itself and we call on the workers, intellectuals, students, farmers, and all the social classes to join in a civilized and constructive dialogue in order to restore without delay the unity achieved during the Revolution. Our point of departure must be the sheer fact that all these social classes were oppressed during the communist regime and that none mean the others harm.
3. People of all age-groups participated in the Revolution of Timisoara. Even if young people were preponderant, it is right to admit that people of all ages fought for the cause of the Revolution with the same daring. The list of victims, though incomplete, is a standing proof in this respect.
4. Side by side with the Romanians, there were Hungarians, Germans, Serbians, members of other ethnic groups who sacrificed their lives for the cause of the Revolution. They have all been cohabiting our city in peace and goodwill for centuries. Timisoara is a European city where all the nationalities have rejected and reject nationalism. All the chauvinists of the country, no matter whether they are Romanians, Hungarians or Germans, are invited to come to Timisoara to a re-education course in the spirit of tolerance and mutual respect, the sole principles reigning in the future European House.
5. Already on the 16<sup>th</sup> of December, in the first hours of the Revolution, one of the most chanted slogans was "We want free elections!" The idea of political pluralism has been and is among the most cherished values of the people of Timisoara. It is our belief that without strong political parties genuine democracy, of a European kind, can not exist. In the city of Timisoara all political parties have the right to exist, except for the extremist ones, be they leftist or rightist. In Timisoara, the headquarters of the political parties were not attacked and laid waste, nor were any of their members threatened, insulted or slandered. The members of the political parties are our fellow townsmen, our work mates, our friends who have political opinions. European democracy means the free expression of political opinions, the civilized dialogue between their spokesmen and fair competition to capture public support and, implicitly, to gain power in the state. In the system of Romanian democracy we should have liked to accept the Romanian Communist Party too, had it not completely and irrevocably discredited itself by degenerating into red fascism. In all the East-European countries where the communist parties have maintained a minimum of propriety, society questions them in principal but tolerates them in fact. With us, however, the communist party went so far as genocide, thereby shutting itself out of society altogether. We will not tolerate it, neither in principle, nor in fact

regardless of the name under which it would try to be revived.

6. After four decades of exclusively communist education and propaganda, prejudices engendered by this ideology still haunt all Romanians' consciences. The existence of such prejudices is not the bearer's guilt. Nevertheless, their manipulation by groups interested in resuscitating communism and bringing it back to power is a counter revolutionary act. Among the slogans xeroxed and distributed to the demonstrators in Banu Mania Square in Bucharest on January 28, 1990, there were some that were 45 years old. One such slogan identified the "historical" parties with parties that sell out the country and represents a case of slander. On the contrary, 45 years ago the communists, some of whom still hold important positions in the country's leadership, were guilty of betraying Romania and enslaving her to the USSR. At that time they were the ones to chant "Stalin and the Russian people have brought us freedom", not the members of the "historical" parties. The latter resisted turning Romania into Moscow's satellite, and some of them paid with their lives for this daring. It is of utmost necessity to draw up immediately a short, but correct history of the 1944 - '50 period, and give it mass circulation.

7. By no means did Timisoara start the Revolution against the entire communist regime and its whole nomenclature as an opportunity for a group of anti Ceau'escu dissidents within the RCP to rise to political power. Their presence in the leadership of the country renders the deaths of Timi'oara's heroes useless. We may have accepted them 10 years ago, if at the XII party congress they would have joined Constantin Parvulescu and overthrown the dictatorial clan. But they had not done it, although they had had both the opportunity and the important positions that gave them prerogatives. On the contrary, some even obeyed the dictator's order to denigrate the dissident. Their cowardice cost us ten more years of dictatorship, the hardest of all the period, and a painful genocide.

8. As a consequence of the previous issue, we suggest that the electoral law should deny the former party workers and Security officers the right to be nominated as candidates on any list for the first three running legislatures. Their presence in the country's political life is the chief source of the tensions and suspicions that worry the Romanian society nowadays. Their absence from public life is absolutely necessary until the situation has been settled and national reconciliation has been effected. We also demand that in a special clause the electoral law should ban the former party activists from running for the position of President of the country. Romania's President ought to be one of the symbols of our divorce from communism. To have been a party member is not an offense. We all know how much the individual's life, from professional achievement to obtaining an apartment, depended on the red membership booklet and what the consequences were if it was turned in. The party activists had been those people who gave up their professions in order to serve the communist party and to benefit from the uncommon material privileges it offered. A man who had made such a choice is no longer morally worthy of being President. We suggest that the prerogatives entailed by this office be diminished, as it is the case in many civilized countries of the world. In this way remarkable personalities of cultural and scientific life, who lack any special political experience, could also run for the office of President of Romania. In this context, too, we suggest that the first legislature should last only for two years, a period needed to strengthen the democratic institutions and to clarify the ideological position of each of the many parties that have appeared. Only then will we be able to choose openly and knowledgeably.

9. The people of Timisoara did not make the revolution to get higher wages or other material advantages. A strike would have sufficiently achieved these goals. We are all dissatisfied with the system of wages; in Timisoara, too, many a worker toils under very hard circumstances for nothing more than a pittance (it is the car for instance, of those who work in foundries or in the detergent industry). Nevertheless, no working group went on strike for higher wages and sent delegates to negotiate strictly material claims with the government. Most of the inhabitants of Timisoara are acquainted with what all the economists strive to make known throughout the country nowadays: in this moment, a rise in wages would immediately cause inflation, just as it happens in other East European countries. Once inflation is let loose, several years of efforts to curb it will be necessary. Only an increase in production, i.e. the quantity of goods in market, will make a general wage increase possible. Besides, the priority of the impoverished budget would be to rest a minimum standard of civilization. Immediate investments are necessary, for instance, in the public services of health and sanitation.

1. Although we strive to re-Europeanize Romania, we do not want to copy the western capitalist systems with their drawbacks and inequities. Still we positively uphold the idea of private initiative. The economic foundation of totalitarianism is the all-powerful state property. We shall never have political pluralism without economic pluralism. But one can hear voices that, in true communist spirit, define private initiative as "exploitation" and warn against the danger of the appearance of rich people. This is a way to stir up the envy of a lazy and dread of work of

the former privileged people in the communist enterprises. That the people of Timisoara are not afraid of privatization is proved by the fact that several enterprises are considering becoming joint-stock companies. In order to sell these stocks for clean money in every city a special committee should be set up to draw an inventory of the fortunes belonging to the former proteges of power, corruption and scarcity. At the same time the stocks of an enterprise, ought to be offered for purchase. First of all to its employees. We also think as rewarding the more radical idea of privatization by distributing the stocks equally among the workers, the state keeping only those funds that may ensure the control of the activity. This would open equal chances for prosperity to all the workman. If the lazy missed their chance, they would not be able to complain about discrimination.

11. Timisoara is determined to take economic and administrative decentralization seriously. A model of market-economy has already been put forward for testing, utilizing the powerful capacities and the competence of experts to be found in Timis county. In order to attract foreign capital more quickly and more easily, chiefly as technology and special raw materials, and to create joint ventures, we urge that a branch of Foreign Trade Bank should be set up in Timisoara. A part of the hard currency incomes of the Romanian side in these joint ventures will be included in the workers' wages according to a percentage previously negotiated with the trade-union leaders. The payment in hard currency of a certain part of the wages will be a good material incentive for the workers. Moreover, passports will no longer be booklets worth keeping only in the drawer. Another positive consequence would be the fall of the free-market rate of hard currency, which will result in an immediate increase in the people's standard of living.

12. After the fall of the dictatorship all the Romanians living in exile were invited to return home to help reconstructing the country. Some have already returned, others announced their intention. Unfortunately, there are still people who, instigated by obscure forces, abused the returned exiles, calling them "traitors" and provocatively asking them what they have eaten in the last ten years. This attitude does not do us credit at all. In the despair that gripped us for forty years, there may not have been one single Romanian to whom the idea of escaping from squalor and taking the road of exile had not occurred at least once. Many of the Romanians who nowadays live abroad left the country following political persecution and even long terms of imprisonment. It would be shameful if we, too, abused them using the words of communist activists of yore. The Romanian exile means hundreds of outstanding professors teaching at the greatest universities of the world, thousands of experts esteemed by the most powerful western companies, tens of thousands of workers qualified in the most advanced technologies. We ought to take pride in them and change the evil into good by turning the sorrowful and painful Romanian Diaspora into a renovating force in Romania. Timisoara is affectionately waiting for all the Romanian exiles. They are our fellow countrymen and, more than ever, we need their competence, their European thought, and even their material support. Besides, the Romanian culture will be complete only after the culture of the exile has been re-integrated in it.

13. We do not agree with establishing December 22 as Romania's National Day. This is a way of immortalizing the dictator's person by celebrating a certain number of years since his fall. In most of the countries that associated their national day with a revolution, the chosen day marks the outburst of the revolutionary movement, thus the boldness of the people who rose to fight is being extolled. For example, the National Day of France is July 14, the day when the French Revolution started with the fall of the Bastille. Consequently, we demand that the 16th of December be established as the national day of Romania. Thus our children, grandchildren and great grandchildren will celebrate our people's courage in opposing oppression, and not the fall of an infamous tyrant. The press, the radio and the television of Bucharest, the Romania Liberi newspaper being an exception, have almost forgotten about the Revolution of Timisoara, the events referred to as revolutionary being only those of December 21 - 22. We bow with piety before the heroes of Bucharest, as well as the heroes of Sibiu, Brasov, Targu-Mures, Cluj, Arad, Resita, and of all the other towns that needed martyrs in order to attain freedom. But we are grieved and revolted by the central policy of minimizing our revolution, which is also obvious from the effort to diminish the number of the dead victims. In the days of the Revolution we were out in the streets and we know that their number is much than the one announced officially. However, we assure those who are concealing the truth today that we shall not give up fighting until they are brought to trial as accessories to genocide. This Proclamation engendered by the necessity of making the Romanian nation acquainted with the ideals of the Revolution of Timisoara. It was a revolution made by the people, and only by it, with the interference of party activists and security agents. It was a genuine revolution, not a Coup d'Etat. It was definitely anticommunist, not only anti-Ceau'escu. In Timisoara people did not die so that the second and third rank communists should go to the front line, or that one of the participants in the mass murders should be promoted by the latter as Minister of the Interior. People did die so that the social and national feuding, the personality cult, the censorship of the mass media, misinformation, written and telephone threats, and all the other communist methods

of coercion should be practiced openly, while we are requested to stay passive on behalf of social stability. This proclamation is First of all addressed to those who received the revolution as a present and who keep wondering why we are still discontented, as long as the dictatorship was overthrown, a number of bad laws were annulled and a few goods filled the shelves of the shops. Now they ought to know why we are dissatisfied: the ideal of the Revolution of Timisoara was altogether different. We, the authors of this Proclamation, participants in the events of 16th-22nd December 1989, do not consider the Revolution to be over. We shall continue it peacefully, but firmly. Having confronted and having gained victory over one of the world's most powerful repressive systems, nobody and nothing can frighten us anymore.

11 March 1990 Timisoara, Romania

## **TRANSCRIPT OF THE CLOSED TRIAL OF NICOLAE AND ELENA CEAU<sup>a</sup>ESCU**

December 25, 1989

Location of the trial: Tirgoviste Military Base

A voice: A glass of water !

Nicolae Ceau<sup>e</sup>escu: I only recognize the Grand National Assembly. I will only speak in front of it.

Prosecutor Gica Popa: In the same way he refused to hold a dialogue with the people, now he also refuses to speak with us. He always claimed to act and speak on behalf of the people, to be a beloved son of the people, but he only tyrannized the people all the time. You are faced with charges that you held really sumptuous celebrations on all holidays at your house. The details are known. These two defendants procured the most luxurious foodstuffs and clothes from abroad. They were even worse than the king, the former king of Romania. The people only received 200 grams per day, against an identity card. These two defendants have robbed the people, and not even today do they want to talk. They are cowards. We have data concerning both of them. I ask the chairman of the prosecutor's office to read the bill of indictment.

Chief Prosecutor: Esteemed chairman of the court, today we have to pass a verdict on the defendants Nicolae Ceau<sup>e</sup>escu and Elena Ceau<sup>e</sup>escu who have committed the following offenses: Crimes against the people. They carried out acts that are incompatible with human dignity and social thinking; they acted in a despotic and criminal way; they destroyed the people whose leaders they claimed to be. Because of the crimes they committed against the people, I plead, on behalf of the victims of these two tyrants, for the death sentence for the two defendants. The bill of indictment contains the following points:

Genocide, in accordance with Article 356 of the penal code. Two: Armed attack on the people and the state power, in accordance with Article 163 of the penal code. The destruction of buildings and state institutions, undermining of the national economy, in accordance with Articles 165 and 145 of the penal code. They obstructed the normal process of the economy.

P: Did you hear the charges? Have you understood them?

NC: I do not answer, I will only answer questions before the Grand National Assembly. I do not recognize this court. The charges are incorrect, and I will not answer a single question here.

P: Note: He does not recognize the points mentioned in the bill of indictment.

NC: I will not sign anything.

P: This situation is known. The catastrophic situation of the country is known all over the world. Every honest citizen who worked hard here until 22 December knows that we do not have medicines, that you two have killed children and other people in this way, that there is nothing to eat, no heating, no electricity.

Elena and Nicolae reject this. Another question to Ceau°escu: Who ordered the bloodbath in Timisoara. Ceau°escu refused to answer.

P: Who gave the order to shoot in Bucharest, for instance?

NC: I do not answer.

P: Who ordered shooting into the crowd? Tell us!

Elena Ceau°escu: Forget about them. You see, there is no use in talking to these people.

P: Do you not know anything about the order to shoot?

Nicolae reacts with astonishment.

P: There is still shooting going on. Fanatics, whom you are paying. They are shooting at children; they are shooting arbitrarily into the apartments. Who are these fanatics? Are they the people, or are you paying them?

NC: I will not answer. I will not answer any question. Not a single shot was fired in Palace Square. Not a single shot. No one was shot.

P: By now, there have been 34 casualties.

EC: Look, and that they are calling genocide.

P: In all district capitals, which you grandly called municipalities, there is shooting going on. The people were slaves. The entire intelligentsia of the country ran away. No one wanted to do anything for you anymore.

Unidentified speaker: Mr. President, I would like to know something: The accused should tell us who the mercenaries are. Who pays them? And who brought them into the country?

P: Yes. Accused, answer.

NC: I will not say anything more. I will only speak at the Grand National Assembly.

Elena keeps whispering to him. As a result, the prosecutor says: Elena has always been talkative, but otherwise she does not know much. I have observed that she is not even able to read correctly, but she calls herself an university graduate. Elena answers: The intellectuals of this country should hear you, you and your colleagues.

The prosecutor cites all academic titles she had always claimed to have.

EC: The intelligentsia of the country will hear what you are accusing us of.

P: Nicolae Ceau°escu should tell us why he does not answer our questions. What prevents him from doing so?

C: I will answer any question, but only at the Grand National Assembly, before the representatives of the working class. Tell the people that I will answer all their questions. All the world should know what is going on here. I only recognize the working class and the Grand National Assembly—no one else.

P: The world already knows what has happened here.

NC: I will not answer you putschists.

P: The Grand National Assembly has been dissolved.

NC: This is not possible at all. No one can dissolve the National Assembly.

P: We now have another leading organ. The National Salvation Front is now our supreme body.

NC: No one recognizes that. That is why the people are fighting all over the country. This gang will be destroyed.

They organized the putsch.

P: The people are fighting against you, not against the new forum.

NC: No, the people are fighting for freedom and against the new forum. I do not recognize the court.

P: Why do you think that people are fighting today? What do you think?

NC: As I said before, the people are fighting for their freedom and against this putsch, against this usurpation. Ceau°escu claims that the putsch was organized from abroad.

NC: I do not recognize this court. I will not answer any more. I am now talking to you as simple citizens, and I hope that you will tell the truth. I hope that you do not also work for the foreigners and for the destruction of Romania.

The prosecutor asks the counsel for the defense to ask Ceau°escu whether he knows that he is no longer president of the country, that Elena Ceau°escu has also lost all her official state functions and that the government has been dissolved.

The prosecutor wants to find out on which basis the trial can be continued. It must be cleared up whether Ceau°escu wants to, should, must or can answer at all. At the moment the situation is rather uncertain.

Now the counsel for the defense, who was appointed by the court, asks whether Nicolae and Elena Ceau°escu know the aforementioned facts— that he is no longer president, that she has lost all official functions. He answers: I am the president of Romania, and I am the commander in chief of the Romanian army. No one can deprive me of these functions.

P: But not of our army, you are not the commander in chief of our army.

NC: I do not recognize you. I am talking to you as simple citizens at the least, as simple citizens, and I tell you: I am the president of Romania.

P: What are you really?

NC: I repeat: I am the president of Romania and the commander in chief of the Romanian army. I am the president of the people. I will not speak with you provocateurs anymore, and I will not speak with the organizers of the putsch and with the mercenaries. I have nothing to do with them.

P: Yes, but you are paying the mercenaries.

No, no, he says. And Elena says: It is incredible what they are inventing, incredible.

P: Please, make a note: Ceau°escu does not recognize the new legal structures of power of the country. He still considers himself to be the country's president and the commander in chief of the army.

Why did you ruin the country so much: Why did you export everything? Why did you make the peasants starve? The produce which the peasants grew was exported, and the peasants came from the most remote provinces to Bucharest and to the other cities in order to buy bread. They cultivated the soil in line with your orders and had nothing to eat. Why did you starve the people?

NC: I will not answer this question. As a simple citizen, I tell you the following: For the first time I guaranteed that every peasant received 200 kilograms of wheat per person, not per family, and that he is entitled to more. It is a lie that I made the people starve. A lie, a lie in my face. This shows how little patriotism there is, how many treasonable offenses were committed.

P: You claim to have taken measures so that every peasant is entitled to 200 kilograms of wheat. Why do the peasants then buy their bread in Bucharest?

The prosecutor quotes Ceau°escu, Ceau°escu's program.

P: We have wonderful programs. Paper is patient. However, why are your programs not implemented? You have



destroyed the Romanian villages and the Romanian soil. What do you say as a citizen?

NC: As a citizen, as a simple citizen, I tell you the following: At no point was there such an upswing, so much construction, so much consolidation in the Romanian provinces. I guaranteed that every village has its schools, hospitals and doctors. I have done everything to create a decent and rich life for the people in the country, like in no other country in the world.

P: We have always spoken of equality. We are all equal.

Everybody should be paid according to his performance. Now we finally saw your villa on television, the golden plates from which you ate, the foodstuffs that you had imported, the luxurious celebrations, pictures from your luxurious celebrations.

EC: Incredible. We live in a normal apartment, just like every other citizen. We have ensured an apartment for every citizen through corresponding laws.

P: You had palaces.

NC: No, we had no palaces. The palaces belong to the people. The prosecutor agrees, but stresses that they lived in them while the people suffered.

P: Children cannot even buy plain candy, and you are living in the palaces of the people.

NC: Is it possible that we are facing such charges?

P: Let us now talk about the accounts in Switzerland, Mr. Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu. What about the accounts?

EC: Accounts in Switzerland? Furnish proof!

NC: We had no account in Switzerland. Nobody has opened an account. This shows again how false the charges are. What defamation, what provocations! This was a coup d'etat.

P: Well, Mr. Defendant, if you had no accounts in Switzerland, will you sign a statement confirming that the money that may be in Switzerland should be transferred to the Romanian state, the State Bank.

NC: We will discuss this before the Grand National Assembly. I will not say anything here. This is a vulgar provocation.

P: Will you sign the statement now or not?

NC: No, no. I have no statement to make, and I will not sign one.

P: Note the following: The defendant refuses to sign this statement. The defendant has not recognized us. He also refuses to recognize the new forum.

NC: I do not recognize this new forum.

P: So you know the new forum. You have information about it. Elena and Nicolae Ceasescu state: Well, you told us about it. You told us about it here.

NC: Nobody can change the state structures. This is not possible. Usurpers have been punished severely during the past centuries in Romania's history. Nobody has the right to abolish the Grand National Assembly.

The prosecutor turns to Elena: You have always been wiser and more ready to talk, a scientist. You were the most important aide, the number two in the cabinet, in the government.

P: Did you know about the genocide in Timisoara?

EC: What genocide? By the way, I will not answer any more questions.

P: Did you know about the genocide or did you, as a chemist, only deal with polymers? You, as a scientist, did you know about it?

Here Nicolae Ceau°escu steps in and defends her.

NC: Her scientific papers were published abroad!

P: And who wrote the papers for you, Elena?

EC: Such impudence! I am a member and the chairwoman of the Academy of Sciences. You cannot talk to me in such a way!

P: That is to say, as a deputy prime minister you did not know about the genocide?

P: This is how you worked with the people and exercised your functions! But who gave the order to shoot? Answer this question!

EC: I will not answer. I told you right at the beginning that I will not answer a single question.

NC: You as officers should know that the government cannot give the order to shoot. But those who shot at the young people were the security men, the terrorists.

EC: The terrorists are from Securitate.

P: The terrorists are from Securitate?

EC: Yes.

P: And who heads Securitate? Another question . . . .

EC: No, I have not given an answer. This was only information for you as citizens.

NC: I want to tell you as citizens that in Bucharest . . . .

P: We are finished with you. You need not say anything else. The next question is: How did Gen. Milea {Vasile Milea, Ceau°escu's defense minister} die? Was he shot? And by whom?

EC: Ask the doctors and the people, but not me!

NC: I will ask you a counterquestion. Why do you not put the question like this: Why did Gen. Milea commit suicide?

P: What induced him to commit suicide? You called him a traitor. This was the reason for his suicide.

NC: The traitor Milea committed suicide.

P: Why did you not bring him to trial and have him sentenced?

NC: His criminal acts were only discovered after he had committed suicide.

P: What were his criminal acts?

NC: He did not urge his unit to do their patriotic duty. Ceau°escu explains in detail that he only learned from his officers that Gen. Milea had committed suicide. The prosecutor interrupts him.

P: You have always been more talkative than your colleague. However, she has always been at your side and apparently provided you with the necessary information. However, we should talk here openly and sincerely, as

befits intellectuals. For, after all, both of you are members of the Academy of Sciences.  
Now tell us, please, what money was used to pay for your publications abroad—the selected works of Nicolae Ceau°escu and the scientific works of the so-called Academician Elena Ceau°escu.

EC: So-called, so-called. Now they have even taken away all our titles.

P: Once again, back to Gen. Milea. You said that he had not obeyed your orders. What orders?

NC: I will only answer to the Grand National Assembly. There I will say in which way he betrayed his fatherland.

P: Please, ask Nicolae and Elena Ceau°escu whether they have ever had a mental illness.

NC: What? What should he ask us?

P: Whether you have ever had a mental illness.

NC: What an obscene provocation.

P: This would serve your defense. If you had had a mental illness and admitted this, you would not be responsible for your acts.

EC: How can one tell us something like this? How can one say something like this?

NC: I do not recognize this court.

P: You have never been able to hold a dialogue with the people. You were not used to talking to the people. You held monologues and the people had to applaud, like in the rituals of tribal people. And today you are acting in the same megalomaniac way. Now we are making a last attempt. Do you want to sign this statement?

NC: No, we will not sign. And I also do not recognize the counsel for the defense.

P: Please, make a note: Nicolae Ceau°escu refuses to co-operate with the court-appointed counsel for the defense.

EC: We will not sign any statement. We will speak only at the National Assembly, because we have worked hard for the people all our lives. We have sacrificed all our lives to the people. And we will not betray our people here. The court notes that the investigations have been concluded. Then follows the reading of the indictment.

P: Mr. Chairman, we find the two accused guilty of having committed criminal actions according to the following articles of the penal code: Articles 162, 163, 165 and 357. Because of this indictment, I call for the death sentence and the impounding of the entire property of the two accused.

The counsel for the defense now takes the floor and instructs the

Ceau°escus once again that they have the right to defense and that they should accept this right.

Counsel for the defence: Even though he—like her—committed insane acts, we want to defend them. We want a legal trial. Only a president who is still confirmed in his position can demand to speak at the Grand National Assembly. If he no longer has a certain function, he cannot demand anything at all. Then he is treated like a normal citizen. Since the old government has been dissolved and Ceau°escu has lost his functions, he no longer has the right to be treated as the president. Please make a note that here it has been stated that all legal regulations have been observed, that this is a legal trial. Therefore, it is a mistake for the two accused to refuse to cooperate with us. This is a legal trial, and I honor them by defending them. At the beginning, Ceau°escu claimed that it is a provocation to be asked whether he was sick. He refused to undergo a psychiatric examination. However, there is a difference between real sickness that must be treated and mental insanity which leads to corresponding actions, but which is denied by the person in question. You have acted in a very irresponsible manner; you led the country to the verge of ruin and you will be convicted on the basis of the points contained in the bill of indictment. You are guilty of these offenses even if you do not want to admit it. Despite this, I ask the court to make a decision which we will be able to justify later as well. We must not allow the slightest impression of illegality to emerge. Elena and Nicolae Ceau°escu should be punished in a really legal trial. The two defendants should also know that they are entitled to a counsel for defense, even if they reject this. It should be stated once and for all that this military court is absolutely

legal and that the former positions of the two Ceau<sup>o</sup>escus are no longer valid. However, they will be indicted, and a sentence will be passed on the basis of the new legal system. They are not only accused of offenses committed during the past few days, but of offenses committed during the past 25 years. We have sufficient data on this period. I ask the court, as the plaintiff, to take note that proof has been furnished for all these points, that the two have committed the offenses mentioned. Finally, I would like to refer once more to the genocide, the numerous killings carried out during the past few days. Elena and Nicolae Ceau<sup>o</sup>escu must be held fully responsible for this. I now ask the court to pass a verdict on the basis of the law, because everybody must receive due punishment for the offenses he has committed.

The final speech of the prosecutor follows:

P: It is very difficult for us to act, to pass a verdict on people who even now do not want to admit to the criminal offenses that they have committed during 25 years and admit to the genocide, not only in Timisoara and Bucharest, but primarily also to the criminal offenses committed during the past 25 years. This demonstrates their lack of understanding. They not only deprived the people of heating, electricity, and foodstuffs, they also tyrannized the soul of the Romanian people. They not only killed children, young people and adults in Timisoara and Bucharest; they allowed Securitate members to wear military uniforms to create the impression among the people that the army is against them. They wanted to separate the people from the army. They used to fetch people from orphans' homes or from abroad whom they trained in special institutions to become murderers of their own people. You were so impertinent as to cut off oxygen lines in hospitals and to shoot people in their hospital beds. The Securitate had hidden food reserves on which Bucharest could have survived for months, the whole of Bucharest.

EC: Whom are they talking about?.

P: So far, they have always claimed that we have built this country, we have paid our debts, but with this they bled the country to death and have hoarded enough money to ensure their escape. You need not admit your mistakes, mister. In 1947, we assumed power, but under completely different circumstances. In 1947, King Michael showed more dignity than you. And you might perhaps have achieved the understanding of the Romanian people if you had now admitted your guilt. You should have stayed in Iran where you had flown to.

In response, the two laugh, and she says: We do not stay abroad. This is our home.

P: Esteemed Mr. Chairman, I have been one of those who, as a lawyer, would have liked to oppose the death sentence, because it is inhuman. But we are not talking about people. I would not call for the death sentence, but it would be incomprehensible for the Romanian people to have to go on suffering this great misery and not to have it ended by sentencing the two Ceau<sup>o</sup>escus to death. The crimes against the people grew year by year. They were only busy enslaving the people and building up an apparatus of power. They were not really interested in the people.

## **E-MAIL FROM PROFESSOR EIVIND SMITH**

February 1, 2000.

Envelope-to: Oyvind.Lervik@student.uib.no

Delivery-date: Tue, 01 Feb 2000 10:02:11 +0100

Received: from mons.uio.no [129.240.130.14]

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Mime-Version: 1.0  
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X-Sender: esmith@uio-pop.uio.no  
Message-Id: <v04011702b4bc511ed7b9@[129.240.34.94]>  
In-Reply-To: <E12FYmX-0006ji-00@rasmus.uib.no>  
Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2000 10:03:36 +0100  
To: Øyvind Lervik <Oyvind.Lervik@student.uib.no>  
From: Eivind Smith <eivind.smith@jus.uio.no>  
Subject: Re: Juridiske problemer  
X-UIDL: h\*4e9I&<!!\_\Wd9DKYd9

Svaret er vel først og fremst at et nytt regime etter en "revolusjon" selv må forsøke å etablere sin legitimitet, som ikke kan utledes av det tidligere regimets lovgivning m.v. På sett og vis blir det som i Norge i 1814: Påstanden om at grunnloven var landets grunnlov var ikke nødvendigvis "sann" bare fordi påstanden ble satt frem. Det var den omkringliggende

argumentasjon samt den senere utvikling som i det lange løp ble avgjørende.

På denne bakgrunn tror jeg ikke du skal vente å finne noe "juridisk riktig" svar på dine spørsmål. Men de ulike aktørenes argumentasjon er jo av interesse likevel. Det samme gjelder den etterfølgende utvikling.

Hilsen

Eivind Smith

Kjære Eivind Smith!

Jeg er en hovedfagsstudent i Sammenlignende Politikk, UiB, som har et par problemer av mer juridisk art jeg ikke finner ut av. Juridisk fakultets hjemmeside viser at ditt spesialfelt er offentlig rett, så jeg håper at du kanskje kan hjelpe meg. Min oppgave tar for seg den demokratiske transisjon og konsolidering i Ungarn og Romania.

Romania hadde et kort demokratisk intermezzo før andre verdenskrig. Deretter fulgte et høyrediktatur før det kommunistiske, som ble avsluttet ved revolusjonen i 1989. Da grep den Nasjonale Redningsfront makten. Denne bestod for en stor del av såkalte "gammelkommunister". De kunngjorde valg i Mai 1990. Inntil den tid ville de ta seg av maktvakuumet som var oppstått. Det oppstod stridigheter over deres rett til å vedta lover. Mest sentralt stod fastsettelse av valglover samt bestemmelse av valgdato. Opposisjonen

hevdet for eksempel at valget burde arrangeres senere, slik at de skulle få anledning til å opparbeide de nødvendige ressurser for en valgkamp.

Jeg lurar på følgende: Hvor ligger den juridiske rettferdiggjøring for Redningsfrontens avgjørelser etter diktaturets fall? Finnes det internasjonale regler som gir retningslinjer for en stats anliggender i en situasjon preget av anarki? Ville det være naturlig å bruke grunnloven fra 1930 - tallet? Kanskje er det slik at ved oppløsningen av et diktatur med sine regler kan den som tar makten gjøre som han vil, da (forhenværende) regimes regler er satt ut av funksjon? Dette spørsmålet er viktig for meg for å kunne ta stilling til Frontens fremgangsmåte og opposisjonens argumenter. Håper du kan hjelpe meg med et svar og en referanse jeg kan bruke.

På forhånd takk!

Vennlig hilsen Øyvind E. Lervik

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